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Abstract 
This thesis explores the relationship between literature and the public sphere in the 
internet age. The introduction identifies gaps on these three topics in current academic 
work, and outlines the need for clarification of the links between them. The chapters 
go on to explicate these links with reference to the work of four contemporary authors, 
namely Jonathan Franzen, Dave Eggers, Zadie Smith, and David Foster Wallace. In 
their writing, these authors all identify different challenges to the public sphere in the 
internet age and, in response, ‘model’ alternative modes of being in the public sphere. 
These modes of being emerge from the particular formal affordances of literature, and 
are described here as forms of ‘literary publicness.’ The thesis situates these authors 
on a spectrum of discursive agency, ranging from a view of the public sphere in which 
writers are seen as authoritative, to a view in which reading processes are prioritised. 
Each chapter also addresses how these authors have themselves been considered as 
figures in the public sphere. As such, the story that this thesis tells both helps to clarify 
the role that culture plays in the public sphere, and reveals the concept of the public 
sphere itself as a key locus of the relationship between contemporary literature and the 
internet.  
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Introduction: Literature and the Public Sphere in the Internet Age 
Search Terms 
In its December 11th, 2017 issue, The New Yorker magazine published a list of 
its most-read articles of the year. Calculated by collating the amount of time readers 
spent on each article on the magazine’s website, the top of the list comprised a mixture 
of pieces about the two hottest topics covered by the publication that year – the serial 
sexual abuse committed by Hollywood producer Harvey Weinstein, and U.S. president 
Donald Trump’s tempestuous first year in office. Given the contexts of 2016’s 
fractious presidential election, and the rapid rise to prominence of the #MeToo 
movement, the fact that the magazine’s most-read articles of 2017 were pieces of 
journalism concerning topics of national conversation was unsurprising. But these 
contexts also ensured that the very idea of national conversation was itself a topic of 
public debate: the controversies surrounding the spread of fake news associated with 
the 2016 election, and the explosion of activism on social media that comprised 
#MeToo, drew attention to the ways in which public discussions of political issues 
occur in the internet age. Amidst this widespread consideration of the roles of 
journalism and digital technologies in public life, however, The New Yorker found 
itself at the centre of a cultural event that raised questions about where literature sat in 
this emerging narrative of public discourse in the internet age.  
A week after the initial publication of its most-read list, the magazine posted 
an amended version of the rankings on its website, with Kristen Roupenian’s “Cat 
Person,” a short story printed in the same issue as the original article rankings before 
being published online, now listed as The New Yorker’s second most-read article of 
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the year.1 Roupenian’s story, about a series of increasingly unpleasant encounters 
between a young woman and a man she is dating, was perfectly pitched for the 
discursive atmosphere of 2017’s close, and rapidly went viral. Although it never 
mentions the movement itself, Roupenian’s story immediately contributed to the 
broader cultural debates about gender and power that were being foregrounded by 
#MeToo – as Tony Williams neatly summarises, “the story sparked passionate debate 
among readers, elevating it beyond the ghetto of short fiction to global conversations 
about gender, sex, violence and power.”2 The story recounts the nascent relationship 
between Margot, a student, and Robert, an older man who she gets to know mainly via 
text messaging. When Robert drives Margot to a cinema on their first date, she 
suddenly realises how much trust she has placed in him – “as they got on the highway, 
it occurred to her that he could take her someplace and rape and murder her; she hardly 
knew anything about him, after all.”3 Margot is more ready to distrust her own instincts 
than to distrust Robert, however, and quickly considers whether the “discomfort” 
between them in the car “was her fault,” precisely “because she was acting jumpy and 
nervous, like the kind of girl who thought she was going to get murdered every time 
she went on a date.”4 Many female readers have highlighted their experiences of 
identification with Margot, and cited the story’s portrayal of her fears (and her 
consistent second guessing of them) as an important representation of the gendered 
experiences of everyday life that #MeToo aimed to highlight.5 
                                                          
1 Michael Luo, “The Twenty-Five Most-Read New Yorker Stories of 2017,” The New Yorker, December 
19, 2017, https://www.newyorker.com/.  
2 Tony Williams, “Cat Person: A Creative Writing Expert on Why You Should Read the Short Story 
for the #MeToo Age,” The Conversation, December 19, 2017, https://theconversation.com/. 
3 Kristen Roupenian, “Cat Person,” The New Yorker, December 11, 2017, 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/12/11/cat-person.   
4 Ibid. 
5 Rozina Sini, “Cat Person: The Short Story People are Talking About,” BBC News, December 11, 2017, 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/blogs-trending-42307714.  
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But if “Cat Person” was hailed by many as a nuanced depiction of the 
intimacies and intricacies of contemporary courtship, the story’s abrupt ending (when 
Robert drunkenly texts Margot, calling her a “whore,” the word with which the story 
finishes) proved controversial.6 Some saw the move as a “cheapening,” as Williams 
puts it, “a waste of the story’s resonant, teasing balance of effects in favour of mere 
polemic.”7 Yet Williams also points out that the story’s structure can be read as 
strengthening its contribution to public debate – “the way that abusive behaviour 
obliterates complexity in real life is mirrored by the way it obliterates nuance in the 
story.”8 In this reading, it was not only the story of Margot’s experience that 
contributed to public debate, but the way the story was told. By allowing readers to 
experience its protagonist’s plight on a formal level, “Cat Person” represented a 
particularly literary way of discussing experiences of modern dating. Roupenian 
herself conceives of the story specifically as an intervention into this wider cultural 
discussion – although it focusses on two characters, the patterns of behaviour portrayed 
are, she claims in one interview, “bigger than Margot and Robert’s specific interaction; 
[they speak] to the way that many women, especially young women, move through the 
world.”9  
“Cat Person’s” interest in the social rules and assumptions at play in 
communication, however, also extends beyond the argumentative contributions that 
the story makes to debates about gender. Roupenian encodes in “Cat Person’s” form 
its own set of discursive rules, modelling the ways in which she believes the issues at 
play should be discussed. Throughout the story, Roupenian highlights Margot’s 
                                                          
6 Roupenian, “Cat Person.” 
7 Williams, “Cat Person.” 
8 Ibid. 
9 Kristen Roupenian, “Kristen Roupenian on the Self-Deceptions of Dating,” interview by Deborah 
Treisman, The New Yorker, December 4, 2017, https://www.newyorker.com/. 
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uncertainties about Robert – as the writer glosses it in one interview, “Margot keeps 
trying to construct an image of Robert based on incomplete and unreliable information, 
which is why her interpretation of him can’t stay still.”10 Recognising that both Margot 
as a character, and we as readers, have access to limited information involves 
acknowledging the limitations of individual perspective – an important element of 
Roupenian’s modelling. Margot finds her first date with Robert awkward, noting that 
he is “disconcertingly quiet,” and she quickly imagines a future in which the two 
“wouldn’t talk again.”11 But while trying to imagine how her own behaviour might 
have made Robert feel (she had been initially dismissive of the film he suggested they 
see together), “a totally different interpretation of the night’s events occurred to her.”12 
Roupenian highlights these different interpretations throughout her story, structuring 
the narrative around Margot’s affective oscillations in order to make an argument 
about the ways in which patriarchal society pressures women to doubt the legitimacy 
of their responses. But parallel to this feminist reading, we can also identify 
Roupenian’s attention to different interpretations as modelling a mode of discussing 
issues that respectfully considers alternative views before making decisions, and 
acknowledges the contingent perspectives of all discussants. Indeed, it is these facets 
that form the foundations of “Cat Person’s” model for debate, and structure both how 
the story progresses, and the reason it finishes in the way that it does. As Roupenian 
outlines, “the point at which [Margot] receives unequivocal evidence about the kind 
of person [Robert] is is the point at which the story ends.”13 “Cat Person” ends so 
abruptly, then, because there are red lines in Roupenian’s discursive world, and the 
story can no longer make room for Robert’s perspective in good faith – he has engaged 
                                                          
10 Ibid. 
11 Roupenian, “Cat Person.” 
12 Ibid. 
13 Roupenian, “Self-Deceptions of Dating.” 
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in abusive behaviour, and the debate that the story stages is no longer tenable in line 
with the rules it has established.  
Despite its modelling of these discursive ideals, public debates about “Cat 
Person” rarely framed the story's attention to other perspectives as anything more than 
narrative ambiguity – Margot’s recurrent equivocations, and her many 
miscommunications with Robert, seemingly resulted in many readers’ own 
uncertainties about how to interpret the story. A number of outlets published 
explanations of the piece online, as well as summaries of the controversies associated 
with it, and Roupenian gave several interviews concerning the story’s origins and 
meanings.14 The story’s consideration on such a large scale soon became a topic of 
conversation itself. The literature pages of myriad print and online publications 
covered the story’s popularity (and the subsequent backlash against it) as a significant 
cultural event, and offered analyses that connected its widespread online 
contemplation to broader debates about literature’s relationship with digital 
technologies. Indeed, if “Cat Person” is a story “for the #MeToo moment,” as one 
commentator suggested, this is not only because the story’s subject slotted easily into 
ongoing debates of the time.15 Just as centrally, its rapid spread was seemingly enabled 
by the same social media sharing that fuelled that movement’s initial rise. The story 
was quick to read and easy to share, and the cultural phenomenon of its publication 
was framed time and again as particular to the internet age.16  
                                                          
14 Constance Grady, “The Uproar Over the New Yorker Short Story ‘Cat Person,’ explained,” Vox, 
December 12, 2017, https://www.vox.com/; Jonah Engel Bromwich, “‘Cat Person’ in The New Yorker: 
A Discussion with the Author,” The New York Times, December 11, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/. 
A later piece by Roupenian also reflects on her experience of reading these reviews and giving these 
interviews: Kristen Roupenian, “What It Felt Like When ‘Cat Person’ Went Viral,” The New Yorker, 
January 10, 2019, https://www.newyorker.com/.  
15 Olga Khazan, “A Viral Short Story for the #MeToo Moment,” The Atlantic, December 11, 2017, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/. 
16 Laura Miller, “The New Yorker’s ‘Cat Person’ Story Is Great. Too Bad the Internet Turned It Into a 
Piping-Hot Thinkpiece,” Slate, December 11, 2017,  https://slate.com/.  
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Many of the conversations sparked by “Cat Person” either explicitly or 
implicitly addressed a topic that this thesis takes as its central subject – how literature 
operates in the public sphere in the internet age. The functioning of the public sphere, 
broadly defined as the space in which private citizens come together to discuss matters 
of public concern, depends upon both “quality of discourse and quantity of 
participation,” as Craig Calhoun puts it.17 “Cat Person” seemingly represented a 
remarkable example of literature’s circulation within the public sphere primarily 
because of the quantity of participation it inspired, but it also sparked important 
conversations about how literature discusses publicly relevant issues, and how it is 
itself discussed in public. Yet for all that “Cat Person” can tell us about the ways in 
which literature functions in the public sphere, its usefulness to understanding how the 
internet affects this functioning is less clear. For even if the story’s distribution online 
was a key part of its success, centring solely on this aspect occludes the fact that “Cat 
Person” was published by The New Yorker, a prestigious magazine with a wealth of 
cultural capital that surely also fuelled the story’s virality. And for all Roupenian’s 
interest in modelling discursive ideals, her story does not itself incorporate or reflect 
upon the context of the internet age in any detail. Beyond demonstrating that the 
architecture of the social internet makes the rapid sharing of content easy, “Cat Person” 
appears to tell us little about contemporary literature’s relationship with the internet. 
Rather, what it suggests more than anything is that the advent of the internet has, for 
the most part, affected how literature is discussed more than it has affected literature 
itself. Indeed, despite the steady publication over the past twenty years of anxious 
ruminations on the future of literature under a digital dispensation, ‘literature’ remains 
                                                          
17 Craig Calhoun, “Introduction: Habermas and the Public Sphere,” in Habermas and the Public Sphere, 
ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1992), 2. 
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a category analytically separable from ‘the digital.’18 This is not to deny the impact of 
the latter upon the former – as Adam Hammond reminds us, contemporary writing and 
publishing practices nearly always comprise “a hybrid of digital and analog 
processes.”19 But one perspective within literary studies would take this to be the end 
of the matter, seeing digital technologies as no more than an inevitable, if not entirely 
banal, part of contemporary literary production. In one notable instance of this view, 
Mark McGurl has claimed that “to speak of, say, ‘fiction in the age of the Internet,’ 
however illuminating the discussion, would risk missing the extent to which literary 
experience remains even now unassimilated to the phenomenology of web browsing 
(let alone reading or writing HTML code), from which it is quite distinct.”20  
Yet it is precisely this seemingly enduring distinction between literary 
experience and web browsing that animates the enquiries of the four novelists on 
whom I focus in this thesis – Jonathan Franzen, Dave Eggers, Zadie Smith, and David 
Foster Wallace. Recent novels by these writers that address the internet’s impacts upon 
contemporary life in fact draw attention to their own generic and formal qualities, and 
emphasise their separation from (and opposition to) digital interfaces. But these 
authors do not do this in order to represent what Jessica Pressman has called an 
“aesthetic of bookishness” – that is, they do not employ “an emergent literary strategy 
that […] exploit[s] the power of the print page in ways that draw attention to the book 
as a multimedia format, one informed by and connected to digital technologies.”21 
Rather, these authors explore the particular qualities and roles that literature (as well 
                                                          
18 I use the phrase “digital dispensation” here and throughout to refer to the prevalence and importance 
of digital technologies in how contemporary societies and systems are organised. 
19 Adam Hammond, Literature in the Digital Age (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 200. 
20 Mark McGurl, “Everything and Less: Fiction in the Age of Amazon,” Modern Language Quarterly 
77, no. 3 (2016): 452. 
21 Jessica Pressman, “The Aesthetic of Bookishness in Twenty-First Century Literature,” Michigan 
Quarterly Review 48, no. 4 (2009): 465. 
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as norms and values associated more broadly with ideas of the literary) might be able 
to perform in the public sphere in an era when that sphere is being reformulated by a 
digital dispensation.  
Working from the premise that the internet specifically, and society’s digital 
dependence more generally, are having negative effects on public discourse, these 
authors write novels that make contributions to debates about how the public sphere 
should operate in the internet age. These contributions comprise, on the one hand, 
arguments about the internet’s apparent denigration of public life, and, on the other, a 
potentially curative modelling of alternative norms, ideals, and values that the public 
sphere might instead adopt. By making their contributions in such a way, these authors 
make the case for a particularly literary form of publicness, one which they argue could 
refigure and revitalise the public sphere along literary rather than digital lines. Yet if 
each of these authors implicitly agree that part of literature’s role in the public sphere 
of the internet age is to model discursive norms that contrast with the digital, the facets 
of literary publicness that they highlight differ from case to case. The four chapters of 
this thesis as such stage a debate about how we should conceive of literary publicness 
and its uses – broadly, however, I mean the term to refer to a mode of engagement in 
the public sphere which is specifically modelled on literature, and incorporates a 
variety of values, norms, ideals, and processes associated with it. Alongside narrating 
the interplay between these authors’ varying conceptions of literary publicness, 
however, I also tell a concurrent story about the particular ways in which contemporary 
literature operates in the political public sphere. This second strand of my thesis also 
means that my chapters function as case studies in a broader attempt to clarify the role 
15 
 
of culture in the public sphere, a role which has been referred to by political scientists 
as a “lacuna in the theory of the public sphere.”22  
This is not the only theoretical lacuna I hope to address here – if work on the 
role of contemporary literature is absent in extant theories of the public sphere, the 
public sphere as a topic is itself a gap in academic thinking on literature and the 
internet. Instead, most of the popular and academic criticism concerning literature’s 
relationship with the internet has focussed on the twin tropes of anxiety and adaptation. 
As Hammond explains, “periods of medium transition have tended to be productive 
moments for literary thinking, presenting opportunities to understand better what 
literature is and how it can be adapted to thrive in a new media environment,” but 
“transitions in literary technology tend to produce very similar anxieties.”23 A good 
deal of popular criticism concerning the internet and literature betrays, to use Kathleen 
Fitzpatrick’s phrase, an anxiety of obsolescence, a concern for the future of literature 
in a culture increasingly dominated by digital technologies.24 Work in this vein draws 
sharp lines between analogue and digital culture, and often argues that the internet 
specifically is adversely affecting our critical faculties and the ability to attend to one 
task (such as reading) for a sustained period of time.25 While there is some academic 
work that makes similar arguments, most sustained scholarly studies of literature and 
the internet focus on the other highlighted trope of adaptation.26 A number of such 
                                                          
22 Jostein Gripsrud et al., “Editors’ Introduction,” in The Idea of the Public Sphere: A Reader, eds. 
Jostein Gripsrud et. al (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2010), xxi. 
23 Hammond, Literature in the Digital Age, 22. 
24 Kathleen Fitzpatrick, The Anxiety of Obsolescence: The American Novel in the Age of Television 
(Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2006). 
25 Sven Birkerts, Changing the Subject: Art and Attention in the Internet Age (Minneapolis: Graywolf 
Press, 2015); Nicholas Carr, The Shallows: How the Internet is Changing the Way We Think, Read, and 
Remember (London: Atlantic Books, 2011); Tim Parks, “Reading: The Struggle,” New York Review 
Daily, June 10, 2014, http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2014/06/10/reading-struggle/.  
26 Paul Socken, ed., The Edge of the Precipice: Why Read Literature in the Digital Age? (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2013); Naomi S. Baron, Words Onscreen: The Fate of Reading in a 
Digital World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
16 
 
studies place technological developments of general reading practices at the heart of 
their enquiries, while others examine how the digitization of existing texts can inflect 
and renew critical approaches.27 Work in the rapidly expanding discipline of the 
Digital Humanities, which applies concepts and methodologies from computing to any 
number of humanities subjects, is most geared towards this latter focus.28 The study of 
‘born-digital’ texts also comprises a great deal of academic work concerning the 
internet and literature. Born-digital texts are composed and read on or via digital 
devices, and the term encompasses genres such as hypertext, network fiction, 
electronic literature, and post-internet poetry.29 There is relatively little work, 
however, specifically addressing the internet’s relationship with literature published in 
print: Marta Figlerowicz has argued that novels by Ben Lerner and Karl Ove 
Knausgaard are structurally informed by digital storage and surveillance technologies; 
N. Katherine Hayles and Jessica Pressman have closed studies with chapters focusing 
on how digitality manifests in print literature, with both critics examining Mark Z. 
Danielewski’s Only Revolutions (2006).30 This relative paucity of academic enquiry is 
                                                          
27 Anouk Lang, ed., From Codex to Hypertext: Reading at the Turn of the Twenty-first Century 
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2012); Andrew Piper, Book Was There: Reading in 
Electronic Times (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012);  Lori Emerson, Reading Writing 
Interfaces: From the Digital to the Bookbound (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014); 
Peter L. Shillingsburg, From Gutenberg to Google: Electronic Representations of Literary Texts 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
28 For an expansive primer on such work, see Ray Siemens and Susan Screibman, eds., A Companion 
to Digital Literary Studies (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007). See also Franco Moretti, Distant 
Reading (London: Verso, 2013). 
29 For a critical introduction to hypertext, see George P. Landow, Hypertext 3.0: Critical Theory and 
New Media in an Era of Globalization, 3rd ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006). 
‘Network fiction’ is a term coined in David Ciccoricco, Reading Network Fiction (Tuscaloosa: 
University of Alabama Press, 2007). ‘Electronic literature’ is more commonly used, and is given 
perhaps its most thorough treatment in N. Katherine Hayles, Electronic Literature: New Horizons for 
the Literary (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2008). This category is compared with other 
digital forms in Roberto Simanowski, Digital Art and Meaning: Reading Kinetic Poetry, Text Machines, 
Mapping Art, and Interactive Installations (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011), and 
connected more specifically with literary history in Jessica Pressman, Digital Modernism: Making It 
New in New Media (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). For work on poetry and Internet culture, 
see Kenneth Goldsmith, Uncreative Writing (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011). 
30 Marta Figlerowicz, “The Novel of Infinite Storage,” Poetics Today 39, no. 1 (2018): 201-19; Hayles, 
Electronic Literature; Pressman, Digital Modernism.  
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understandable – as I have suggested, the two technologies of the internet and the book 
remain distinct, even oppositional. Yet this does not mean that the two do not intersect 
in ways that are vital to developing our understanding of contemporary literature. 
For Simone Murray, the fact that “the vast majority of online literary discussion 
concerns traditionally linear, single-author narratives published either in print form or 
in e-book versions that mimic the codex experience,” begs questions of print 
literature’s circulation in the twenty-first century.31 Her book, The Digital Literary 
Sphere: Reading, Writing, and Selling Books in the Internet Era (2018), provides a 
thorough and much needed intervention in the study of contemporary literary 
production and reception, and comes closest to interrogating the idea of how literature 
and the public sphere interact in the internet age. But Murray’s focus remains on 
developing the emergent field of the “sociology of literature,” as she examines online 
communities and literary festivals, book review culture, and changing modes of 
authorship to empirically examine three aspects of the “digital literary sphere”: 
creation, circulation, and consumption.32 For this reason, “textual analysis is far from 
the main focus of [her] project” – but while her empirical research is enlightening, 
there is another story to tell about the internet and print literature that requires paying 
attention to specific texts.33 Indeed, textual analysis must be central to our study if we 
are to fully understand how “literary discourse and its characteristic dispositions 
continue to shape the nature and norms of online book talk” in the context of the public 
sphere.34 
                                                          
31 Simone Murray, The Digital Literary Sphere: Reading, Writing, and Selling Books in the Internet Era 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2018), 3. 
32 Ibid, 17; 170. 
33 Ibid, 19. 
34 Ibid, 3. 
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My thesis will focus on the twin processes of how literature contributes to and 
is considered within the public sphere. Examining these processes with reference to 
writers who tackle head on the topic of life under a digital dispensation will reveal the 
public sphere as a key concept that has been hitherto lacking in academic thinking on 
literature’s relationship with the internet. The difficulty of outlining my argument in 
detail before defining my key terms is evident here – ‘public sphere’ is a complex term, 
one with different resonances in different contexts. This introduction will proceed, 
then, by defining the public sphere as a key term of enquiry, and describing key debates 
about its manifestation in the internet age. From there, I will outline some of the ways 
in which the public sphere’s links with literature have been conceived, situate my 
intervention in relation to other treatments of the topic, and offer some justifications 
for my methodology. I will then introduce the authors and works on which my chapters 
focus by outlining the concurrent stories that each chapter will tell, before briefly 
restating the central claims that this thesis will make. 
Public Inquiry 
In 1962, the German critical theorist Jürgen Habermas published The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, a text which has animated a half 
century of debate amongst political scientists, philosophers, historians, and literary 
scholars.35 Habermas’s book has three main strands: a historical account of the 
emergence of what he calls the bourgeois public sphere, an interrogation of the 
normative ideals  of that sphere (although these first two strands are intricately linked), 
and an argument concerning the structural transformation of that sphere which 
                                                          
35 Several primers dedicated to Habermas’s work on the public sphere go into much more detail on the 
topic than I can here. The most useful and thorough of these are: Calhoun, “Introduction”; Gripsrud et 
al., “Editors’ Introduction,” xxi-xxviii; Luke Goode, Jürgen Habermas: Democracy and the Public 
Sphere (London: Pluto Press, 2005). 
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incorporates an account of its twentieth-century manifestation. In an encyclopaedia 
article summarising his argument, Habermas defines the public sphere as “the realm 
of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed,” and 
Structural Transformation enters into dialogue with previous work about public 
opinion, including that of Hegel, Kant, Mill, and Hannah Arendt, whose influential 
The Human Condition was published just four years before Habermas’s intervention.36 
Habermas distinguishes his project, however, by grounding his argument in the 
interrogation of public debate in a particular historical moment, one which he contends 
“was unique and without historical precedent.”37 His study explores the bourgeois 
public sphere, which functions as “the sphere of private people come together as a 
public […] to engage [public authorities] in a debate over the general rules governing 
relations in the basically privatized but publically relevant sphere of commodity 
exchange and social labor.”38 Habermas outlines how the development of a 
mercantilist phase of capitalism throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
created a “traffic in news” parallel to “the traffic in commodities,” as “merchants’ 
market-oriented calculations required more frequent and more exact information about 
distant events.”39 From here he tracks the emergence of political journals, which made 
previously private news more widely available, and describes how state authorities 
“made use of this instrument to promulgate instructions and ordinances.”40 In doing 
so, “the addressees of the authorities’ announcements genuinely became ‘the public’ 
in the proper sense,” and the expanding stratum of a bourgeois reading public gained 
                                                          
36 Jürgen Habermas, “The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article (1964),” trans. Sara Lennox and 
Frank Lennox, New German Critique 1, no. 3 (Autumn 1974): 49. 
37 Ibid, 52. 
38 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category 
of Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger with Frederick Lawrence (1962; repr., Cambridge: Polity, 
1989), 27. 
39 Ibid, 16. 
40 Ibid, 21. 
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an awareness of themselves as “the abstract counterpart of public authority […], as the 
public of the now emerging public sphere of civil society.”41 As the critical press 
developed throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the proliferation of 
salons and coffee houses across major Western European cities provided a site for 
bourgeois men (and, rarely, select women) to debate the ideas expounded in print. By 
“functionally converting the public sphere in the world of letters,” the historically 
specific bourgeois public sphere developed, shifting “from properly political tasks of 
a citizenry acting in common to more properly civic tasks of a society engaged in 
critical debate.”42 
Having explained and interrogated the beginnings and workings of the 
bourgeois public sphere, Habermas turns to the titular story of its structural 
transformation. The ideals of increasing both quantity of participation and quality of 
discourse became, Habermas argues, incompatible in the particular form of the 
bourgeois public sphere. To understand why, it is important to comprehend 
Habermas’s apparently paradoxical claim that  
the model of the bourgeois public sphere presupposed strict separation of the 
public from the private realm in such a way that the public sphere, made up of 
private people gathered together as a public and articulating the needs of 
society with the state, was itself considered a part of the private realm.43  
This passage highlights one of the difficulties of Habermas’s work, namely the 
slipperiness and recurrence of terms in different contexts. Here, ‘private’ essentially 
means outside of state control. The bourgeois public sphere, encompassing the 
deliberative practices of private citizens, could only function if it remained a private 
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endeavour; the public sphere could only influence the state if the state held no sway 
over the public sphere. As Calhoun usefully explains, “structural transformation came 
about […] as private organizations began increasingly to assume public power on the 
one hand, while the state penetrated the private realm on the other.”44 Concurrently, 
“the inclusion of more people in the public sphere made it impossible to escape 
addressing the class divisions of civil society,” and put an end to the supposed 
‘bracketing’ of participants’ identities, which proponents claimed underwrote the 
rationality of debates.45 In summary, the structural transformation of the public sphere 
comprised two shifts: one from a public of private individuals to a public of private 
organizations; and, as a corollary, another shift towards state involvement in the 
private realm (and hence the public sphere). All of this was aggravated by the 
fragmentation consequent to the expansion of the public sphere.46 
It is important to remember, however, that this historical story is only one 
strand of Habermas’s work. Structural Transformation is just as interested in the 
normative ideals that underwrote the idea of the bourgeois public sphere as in its actual 
historical manifestation. Perhaps this multiplicity of meaning would be more 
immediately obvious if I were writing in German. The original title of Habermas’s 
study was Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit – this latter word (perhaps better 
translated as ‘publicness’ or ‘publicity’) being strongly linked to Enlightenment ideals 
of intellectual and expressive freedom in public debate, while also indicating the 
spaces where such exchanges can take place and the nature of their practice.47 We must 
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bear in mind these multiple associations when we discuss the public sphere – it is not 
to be taken as merely denoting a set of institutions. Rather, it also connotes the 
normative ideals and practices that comprise the very idea of publicness. Habermas 
identifies the definitive locus of this publicness in the exercise of reason. He intends 
his historical story to demonstrate how the bourgeois public sphere was founded on 
the ideal of rational-critical argument, an ideal which broadly bracketed the identities 
of discussants in favour of a supposed meritocracy of argumentation. Efficacy was 
important, too – the ideal public sphere would strive for consensus based on the 
strength of argument alone, and could expect to have a recognisable impact on political 
decisions. Given that the bourgeois public sphere was almost entirely “composed of 
narrow segments of the European population, mainly educated, propertied men,” 
however, we might be more than a little sceptical about this sphere’s claims to 
democratic legitimacy.48 Indeed, many critics have responded to Habermas by calling 
into question the efficacy, desirability, and logic of several of the normative ideals he 
presents. Although much important work has also been done on particular historical 
manifestations of the public sphere, it is those critiques that initiate conceptual debate 
about norms and ideals that I am most interested in here.49 For when the idea of the 
public sphere has been at least partly abstracted from its concrete historical contexts, 
a more politically philosophical kind of work can take place – exactly the kind of work, 
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I will argue later, that Franzen, Eggers, Smith, and Wallace so often undertake in their 
writing. 
Goode notes that, as a piece of “overtly political history writing, [Structural 
Transformation] lays itself open to the charge that the end justified distorted means,” 
and many historians have made a point of highlighting the book’s “imbalanced 
methodology.”50 Most notably, the “narrative of exclusion” which Habermas uses to 
explain the absence of women and working-class participants from the bourgeois 
public sphere has been shown to be flawed, with much historiographic work 
demonstrating both the “convergences with and divergences from the dominant male 
bourgeois model privileged by Habermas.”51 Further to this, the narrative of 
ideological exclusion fails to sufficiently interrogate its own problematic assumptions. 
As Nancy Fraser puts it, 
the view that women were excluded from the public sphere turns out to be 
ideological; it rests on a class- and gender-biased notion of publicity, one which 
accepts at face value the bourgeois public’s claim to be the public. […] On the 
contrary, virtually contemporaneous with the bourgeois public there arose a 
host of competing counterpublics.52 
Fraser’s concept of counterpublics is an important feminist revisionist approach to the 
concept that names those “parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated 
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social groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses to formulate oppositional 
interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs.”53 Fraser’s concept also serves 
a related purpose, gestured to in her problematising of the notion of the public; 
acknowledging the idea of counterpublics means accepting that the public sphere is no 
longer (or, as Fraser shows, has never been) unitary – multiple publics, and as such 
multiple public spheres, exist. 
The notion of counterpublics has become a foundational part of public sphere 
theory, and is worth stressing here for three reasons. Firstly, even if “the idea of a 
public, as distinct from both the public and any bounded totality of audience, has 
become part of the common repertoire of modern culture,” as Michael Warner has 
claimed, “our intuitive understanding” of publics often occludes the particular ways in 
which these publics operate.54 Public spheres not only differ in what they discuss (the 
term ‘issue publics’ is often used to denote public spheres dedicated to specific 
political topics), but also in how they discuss. As Warner puts it, “public discourse 
says not only ‘Let a public exist’ but ‘Let it have this character, speak this way, see the 
world in this way.’”55 A key question for academics tracking the development of the 
public sphere in the internet age has been what character digital public spheres have. 
Whatever their findings, the internet’s proclivity for, as Habermas describes it, “the 
fragmentation of large but politically focused mass audiences into a huge number of 
isolated issue publics,” identifies the idea of counterpublics as central to understanding 
the public sphere in the internet age.56 Secondly, recognising that different public 
spheres operate in different ways draws attention to the need to clarify the particular 
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facets of literary publicness, which I will attempt to do in the next section of this 
introduction. The fact that the authors I focus on each conceive of literary publicness 
in different ways, however, highlights the third reason that the idea of counterpublics 
is important here: the recognition that multiple publics exist simultaneously serves as 
a prompt to clarify my use of terms and articles in reference to various public spheres. 
When I refer to the public sphere, I am referring to the broad concept of Offentlichkeit, 
rather than a particular manifestation of it. I believe that ‘the public sphere’ is a useful 
term because it provides some conceptual stability – we can understand the public 
sphere as an umbrella term under which those multiple public spheres that comprise 
actual public discourse operate. It is for this reason that I sometimes use the definite 
article in relation to public spheres – I do not mean to perpetuate discriminatory 
practices that foreground certain forms of publics in order to discount others, but rather 
as an umbrella term that also gestures to the idealised version of the concept, whatever 
that ideal comprises for a particular speaker.57 
Fraser’s conception of counterpublics is just one example of how she 
systematically challenges a number of assumptions at the heart of the bourgeois, 
patriarchal public sphere. Her intervention also troubles the idea that a requirement of 
a functioning public sphere is a strictly upheld separation between the state and civil 
society, the feasibility of bracketing the social status of participants, and the view that 
private issues and interests are always anathema to public discourse.58 This latter view 
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is given further attention by Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge in Public Sphere and 
Experience (1972), in which they attempt to theorise a ‘proletarian public sphere’ in 
contrast to Habermas’s bourgeois one. In their view, for an emancipatory proletarian 
public sphere to come into being, “the interests of the productive class must be the 
driving force.”59 For Negt and Kluge, theorising a corrective that establishes a space 
for working class interests means not taking any elements of the public sphere to be 
intractable – rather, “the proletarian public sphere is none other than the form in which 
the interests of the working class develop themselves.”60 Public Sphere and 
Experience thus challenges the idea that the public sphere should be focussed entirely 
upon verbal or written discourse. Rather, as Goode glosses it, their model “privileges 
praxis over discourse,” and includes “material and cultural production, as well as 
political action.”61 Combined with the earlier suggestion that different publics operate 
in different ways, this notion of contributions to a public sphere manifesting in 
whatever form best expresses the interests of a public points to the concept’s 
malleability. Indeed, the public sphere as topic seems to be perpetually present in the 
public sphere, as we debate how best to debate, across cultural contexts, myriad media, 
and disparate disciplines.62 But enacting or encouraging the formation of any idealised 
forms of the public sphere has become, over the last twenty-five years, even more 
complicated than Habermas initially envisaged.  
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Since Structural Transformation was published in its English translation in 
1989, Gisprud et al. note,  
three interlinked phenomena have emerged as crucial to the future of the public 
sphere, as both an idea and an ideal: the transnationalization of the political, 
economic, and cultural domains; the growth of digital communication 
technologies; and the amplification of pluralism in multicultural societies.63 
There has been much work on transnationalization, particularly in the European 
context, and some scholars have also explored the role of pluralism in the public 
sphere.64 The most attended to of these phenomena, however, and the most important 
for my purposes here, has been the ascendancy of digital communication technologies, 
particularly the internet. Media has always played a key part in conceptions of the 
public sphere – Habermas brings his account in Structural Transformation up to date 
by writing about mass media, claiming that with the development of “radio, film, and 
television […] the form of communication as such has changed”, and that “in 
comparison with printed communications the programs sent by the new media curtail 
the reactions of their recipients.”65 In this way, as Calhoun notes, Habermas’s account 
“is typical of the critique of mass culture in which members of the Frankfurt School 
had already played a prominent role.”66 The social, political, and media landscape is 
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so changed, Habermas argues, that we cannot simply return to a bourgeois model of 
the public sphere. In more recent work, Habermas has acknowledged that digital 
technologies have complicated matters even further. For one thing, even if the internet 
cannot be said to curtail users’ reactions, Habermas is clearly suspicious of its 
capacities for fragmentation (its “splintering effect,” as he puts it).67 
Despite Habermas’s own doubts, the spread of the World Wide Web was 
initially met by many commentators with an optimism that was often undergirded by 
“an appeal to values which should surely tug at the Habermasian heart strings: the 
promise of radicalized citizenship […] and a more participatory democracy.”68 Yet it 
might seem to many today that claims about the Web’s radical potential for 
deliberative democracy were, if not entirely misguided, then at least overblown. Its 
spread undoubtedly enhanced quantity of participation, but its effects on quality of 
discourse have been less immediately clear. Indeed, one’s perspective on this depends 
upon how one defines quality discourse. Many critiques seem to follow Habermas in 
this regard, lamenting the internet’s rapid colonisation by private corporations, 
increasing surveillance by the state, and the lack of civility that many attribute to the 
anonymity of Web users.69 But there is by no means complete agreement on this. 
Christian Fuchs has surveyed a number of thinkers to delineate between optimistic and 
sceptical views – the former emphasizing new media’s potential to extend freedom of 
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speech, collapse artificial boundaries of public and private, and bracket social 
differences; the latter highlighting how capitalist ideology inflects the development of 
many digital platforms, the weak and often apolitical ties fostered by social media, and 
the potential myopia of post hoc thinking about technology and politics.70  
There is disagreement too on the issue of the internet’s fragmentation of the 
public sphere. On the one hand, Bohman argues that the internet’s intrinsic features 
and effects, both positive and negative, suggest that “the space opened up by computer-
mediated communication supports a new sort of ‘distributive’ rather than unified 
public sphere with new forms of interaction.”71 On the other hand, Keane warns 
against such an approach – although “the vision of a unified public sphere in which 
‘public opinion’ and ‘the public interest’ are defined is a chimera […], for the sake of 
democracy it ought not to be jettisoned.”72 The authors whose work I focus on in this 
thesis enter this very same debate about the possibility of fostering public spheres 
online – they all share an anxiety about the internet’s effects on public discourse as 
much as (if not more than) the threat technology poses to the novel of formal 
obsolescence. They consistently contrast the norms and values associated with the 
digital and the literary in order to suggest that a public sphere that is literary in 
character is better for democracy than those public spheres fostered online. But before 
sketching how this debate unfolds over the course of my chapters, it will be necessary 
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to flesh out the role literature plays in the public sphere, and clarify where my 
intervention stands in relation to current understanding. 
Literary Iterations 
As I have noted, the role of literature, and indeed of culture more generally, is 
a “lacuna in the theory of the public sphere.”73 I believe that one way to correct this is 
to clarify, with examples, how literature operates in the political public sphere through 
the distinct but reciprocally affecting processes of contribution and consideration. 
Although this description may seem obvious to some, it cannot simply be taken for 
granted as an adequate explanation in the theory of the public sphere. But to understand 
why this represents a necessary clarification of the links between literature and the 
public sphere, and to appreciate properly how these processes operate in a 
contemporary context, we must first take a historical view. The public sphere’s 
connections with literature are clearly important in Habermas’s work – indeed, in his 
account the bourgeois public sphere emerges from what he calls variously the ‘public 
sphere in the world of letters,’ or the ‘literary public sphere.’ Habermas’s conception 
of the literary public sphere has manifold associations. Firstly, his use of the term 
points to how journalism played a vital role in constructing the bourgeois public 
sphere. Habermas argues that, during the inception of the early capitalist commercial 
system, “the press […] developed a unique explosive power,” and helped to formalise 
the notion of an addressable public (not least due to the upsurge of governmental 
proclamations made in print journals).74 A vital role was also later played by “the 
institution of art criticism, including literary [criticism],” wherein the “lay judgement 
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of a public that had come of age […] became organized.”75 Secondly, Habermas 
identifies a key part of the literary public sphere in his analysis of the social institution 
of the family; in his view, “the conjugal family’s audience-oriented intimate sphere 
provides a key both to the development of a literary public sphere and to certain 
conditions of its collapse.”76 Habermas links the emergence of rational-critical debate 
with the specific subjectivity of bourgeois family life, paying particular attention to 
those discussions within this intimate sphere that focussed on literature. As Terry 
Eagleton puts it, literature provided “a vital nexus or mediation between the now 
privatized nuclear family and the political public sphere; it provided the symbolic 
forms for the negotiation of new modes of subjectivity, which could then be 
transmitted into the public domain.”77 Thirdly, then, Habermas means the literary 
public sphere to refer to the role that the rise of the novel played in constructing notions 
of public and private, as well as how it modelled modes of subjectivity and norms of 
behaviour for interactions in the bourgeois public sphere. The basic premise of this 
strand of Habermas’s argument is that the rise of the novel coincided with, and helped 
to foster, the rise of the bourgeois public sphere: reading practices ensured that 
“bourgeois subjectivity was essentially intersubjective,” as epistolary fictions like 
Samuel Richardson’s Pamela (1740) provided a “great mirror of the eighteenth 
century soul.”78 As Grisprud et al. gloss it, the literary public sphere was instrumental 
in inculcating citizens with the “key resources of empathy, self knowledge, as well as 
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workable procedures, [without which] political deliberation is[,] at best, severely 
impoverished and[,] at worst, impossible.”79 
It is important to note that the literary public sphere was conceived of as 
separate to the political public sphere. As Gripsrud et al. usefully summarise, 
Habermas identified two public spheres: a political public sphere organized 
around discussion of issues of common concern, and a literary public sphere, 
or more accurately, a cultural public sphere, devoted to discussion of the 
problems and dilemmas encountered in everyday life as presented in cultural 
productions, particularly the newly emerging form of the novel.80 
It was the end of this separation that signalled the end of the bourgeois public sphere 
itself. By the mid-eighteenth century, the rapid expansion of a reading public and the 
relative diminution of the sway of salons had shifted the public sphere’s centre. “Book 
clubs, reading circles, and subscription libraries” took on a key role, so much so that 
they in fact “constituted the public that had long since grown out of early institutions 
like the coffee houses”; the public sphere “was now held together through the medium 
of the press and professional criticism.”81 But if in its final manifestation the bourgeois 
public sphere was held together by print media, this did not signal the compatibility of 
the two. Rather, it spelled the end of the bourgeois public sphere’s integrity, as the 
structural transformation of that sphere was triggered in part by its infiltration by 
private organisations (not least those comprising ‘the media’).  
Several other critics have taken steps to develop Habermas’s conception of the 
literary public sphere, abstracting it from the context of the bourgeois public sphere, 
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and focussing on its operation in different contexts.82 As Elizabeth Maddock Dillon 
has noted, “Habermas’s typology is confusing given that the ‘public sphere in the 
world of letters’ is defined as a third space” between the private lives of citizens and 
the state, “yet it also seems, at various moments in the text, to be assimilated to both 
the public and the private sphere.”83 Dillon’s work points out the need for clarification 
of the literary public sphere, and she follows Eagleton in her proposed solution: we 
should think of the literary public sphere as “a social space that links the public and 
private and mediates between the two.”84 Yet Dillon’s solution is just as productive 
for understanding literature’s role in the political public sphere as it is for 
understanding the literary public sphere itself. By understanding how literature 
circulates in a social context, we will be able to see as reciprocal the ways in which it 
both contributes to and is considered within the public sphere. Yet to examine these 
twin processes properly, we must acknowledge that literature operates in the public 
sphere in ways particular to its form – an idea which theorists have debated for some 
time. Most strikingly, Rosa A. Eberly has claimed that “literary public spheres have 
nothing de facto to do with aesthetics; historically and contemporarily, literary public 
spheres reflect various publics’ common concerns about the consequences of the news 
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life,” see David Carter and Kay Ferres, “The Public Life of Literature,” in Culture in Australia: Policies, 
Publics and Programs, eds. David Carter and Tony Bennett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001), 140-60. 
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Sphere, (Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2004), 5-6. 
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of literary and cultural texts for their collective lives.”85 This definition is useful on the 
one hand, pointing us to the use of literary and cultural texts in public arguments, but 
on the other hand, its outright dismissal of the role of the aesthetic ignores the ways in 
which both writers and readers conceive of the particular use of literature as an 
aesthetic form in such arguments. I will demonstrate this capability of literature by 
close reading a number of novels over the following chapters. But first I must justify 
my methodology, and explain why literature’s aesthetic contributions to the public 
sphere are better understood through the lens of literary publicness than through 
attention to the concept of the literary public sphere.  
In Habermas’s story, the bourgeois public sphere adopted the practices, norms, 
and ideals of a mass media controlled by corporate interests, and was structurally 
transformed as a result. Franzen, Eggers, Smith, and Wallace narrate a similar story in 
their recent fiction – the public sphere is still held together by mass media, but the fact 
that the internet takes up an increasing percentage of that media has particular 
consequences, ones which these writers also believe results in a structural 
transformation. In opposition to this transformation, these authors draw attention to 
what they see as a preferable form of engagement in the public sphere – literary 
publicness. For my purposes, the separation between the political public sphere and 
the literary public sphere is unhelpful – although the fact that I am able to call on a 
distinct notion of literary publicness would seem to align with the literary public 
sphere’s conceptual separation from the political public sphere, the authors whose 
work I address are making contributions to the political public sphere specifically with 
the hope of reforming that sphere along literary lines. Further work clarifying the idea 
                                                          
85 Rosa A. Eberly, Citizen Critics: Literary Public Spheres (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2000), 
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of the literary public sphere is needed in critical theory, literary studies, and political 
philosophy, and I will gesture to some potential avenues for enquiry at the end of this 
thesis. But the following chapters develop the connections between literature, the 
internet, and the public sphere, by demonstrating how literature responds to the internet 
through two forms of contribution to the political public sphere (which I will refer to 
from here simply as ‘the public sphere’).  
The most recognisable kind of contribution that literature makes to the public 
sphere is an argumentative one – a contribution which can manifest in both content 
and form, and can be either a straightforwardly presented contention about an issue, or 
a point more complexly embedded in narrative.86 But another kind of contribution is 
just as central to the story this thesis tells – those contributions that inherently address 
the idea of the public sphere itself by modelling discursive norms, ideals, and practices. 
To understand this second form of contribution, it is important to recognise the innate 
circularity of discursive publics – “a public is a space of discourse organized by 
nothing other than discourse itself,” Michael Warner reminds us, one which depends, 
“from one point of view, on the rhetorical address and, from another point of view, on 
the real context of reception.”87 Warner argues that “it is only meaningful to speak of 
public discourse where it is understood as the discourse of a public rather than as an 
expansive dialogue among separate persons.”88 From here, it becomes clear that we 
must interrogate how each public sphere is constructed through reference to the texts 
and utterances that circulate within them, as “all discourse […] addressed to a public 
                                                          
86 Argument may, of course, be embedded in forms other than diegetic or mimetic narrative – poetry, 
for example, has its own particular relation to the public sphere. For more, see Shira Wolosky, Poetry 
and Public Discourse in Nineteenth-Century America (New York: Springer, 2010); Paula Bernat 
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1900 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003). 
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must characterize the world in which it attempts to circulate and it must attempt to 
realize that world through address.”89 The authors on whom I focus here attempt to 
characterize their work’s publics by instantiating certain forms of literary publicness – 
a mode of being in the public sphere modelled on facets associated with literature and 
ideas of the literary. The idea of literary publicness, it is worth reaffirming, changes 
from model to model and writer to writer, and these authors define their notions of 
literary publicness in two different ways. Firstly, they draw attention to different 
discursive qualities of the processes of writing and reading; and secondly, they model 
certain ideals, norms, and values that apply to the public sphere.  
Yet, as Habermas reminds us, “there can be no public sphere without a public,” 
and acknowledging the circularity of publics means that, alongside its contributions, 
we must also acknowledge how literature is considered within the public sphere.90 
Warner has summarised how, for “literary criticism, journalism, theory, advertising, 
fiction, drama, [and] most poetry[,] the available addressees are essentially imaginary, 
which is not to say unreal. […] They are in principle open-ended. They exist by virtue 
of their address.”91 The open-ended, essentially unknowable nature of the publics 
instantiated by literary texts means that there are very few preconditions for discussion 
– understanding literature as a valid form of contribution to the public sphere 
contravenes the bourgeois public sphere’s requirement of face-to-face discussion that 
aims for consensus and efficacy. Discussions may take place between anyone included 
in the text’s public, be that through direct conversation, or written responses published 
over time. Literature can either initiate debates in the political public sphere, or it can 
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90 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 364. 
91 Warner, Publics and Counterpublics, 73. 
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contribute to and foment extant debates. Either way, when literary texts are themselves 
considered in the public sphere, this consideration is intertextual in nature.  
In Between Facts and Norms (1992), Habermas describes the political public 
sphere using the metaphor of a text, but his metaphor can also serve here as a literal 
description of how literature operates in that sphere: “the one text of ‘the’ public 
sphere, a text continually extrapolated and extending radially in all directions, is 
divided by internal boundaries into arbitrarily small texts for which everything else is 
context; yet one can always build hermeneutical bridges from one text to the next.”92 
When we think of how literature is considered in the public sphere, we must bear in 
mind how the process of consideration can connect any texts that are being discussed 
with other material. This includes peri-, epi- or hypo-texts – in responding to a text, 
readers might reflect on how it relates to its author’s previous work, biographical 
information, their comments in interviews, or the work of another author.93 In this way, 
even if an author thinks of themselves as making separate contributions to the public 
sphere in their remarks in interviews (as opposed to in their writing), these comments 
can be connected to their written work in how that work is considered and discussed. 
This is especially prevalent in the internet age, due to the widespread accessibility of 
such material – as Murray notes, “in such a context, the author does not (as post-
structuralists might have it) disappear from the text so much as continuously offer 
pronouncements on how readers should interpret it.”94 It is for this reason that I will 
read novels by Franzen, Eggers, Smith, and Wallace in this thesis in relation to relevant 
                                                          
92 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 374. 
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trans. Jane E. Lewin (1987; repr., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
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intertexts, including essays and interviews. It also accounts for why this project’s title 
refers to ‘literature’ rather than ‘the novel’ – even if I focus my enquiries primarily on 
contemporary novels, considering their circulation within the public sphere necessarily 
involves connecting them with other texts and comments by their authors. 
Prose and Comms 
Having now clarified two of the key terms in my project title, I will briefly 
address the third, and explain why I refer to the ‘internet age,’ as opposed to using 
another term for the period. Referring to the ‘digital age’ puts us in mind of a time 
when digital technology has become an inextricable part of contemporary life; when 
we talk about the ‘information age,’ we connote a more complex set of cultural 
associations and values that were made possible by the proliferation of digital 
technology. For my purposes, I will refer to the contemporary period as the ‘internet 
age,’ as it alludes to both of these other terms, but focusses attention on one particular 
part of our technological landscape. My use of the term ‘internet’ is meant to 
encompass a range of associations – while most of the time I will use it, as many do, 
as a colloquial way of referring to the World Wide Web, I also hope that readers will 
associate with the term the pervasive cultural impact of online life, and the 
infrastructure upon which the Web is dependent. Pinning down exactly when the 
internet age is, however, is more difficult to clarify. As John Naughton points out,  
the Internet that we use today […] is now relatively old technology. Research 
on its design commenced in 1973 and the network became operational in 
January 1983. For the first two decades of its existence, it was the preserve of 
a technological, academic, and research elite. From the early 1990s, it began to 
percolate into mainstream society and is now (2016) widely regarded as a 
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General Purpose Technology (GPT) without which modern society could not 
function.95  
I am mostly concerned here with the period during which the internet has been 
accepted as a General Purpose Technology. Indeed, the novels I examine in this thesis 
were written and published over a period that saw the rapid expansion of the social 
internet, the biggest resurgence of popular cyberutopianism since the early 1990s (a 
resurgence often associated with protest movements), and the increasingly obvious 
power of the digital landscape in our politics.  
More specifically, nearly all of these novels were published during Barack 
Obama’s two terms as President of the United States.96 Christian Lorentzen has 
attempted to map trends in “the novel in the Age of Obama,” and while it is by no 
means my primary focus, the story that this thesis tells may well contribute to such 
attempts at periodisation, and help to clarify some of the chief concerns of 
contemporary Anglophone literature.97 Examining these particular novels, however, is 
at least certain to fill gaps in the existing scholarship on the authors who have written 
them. The two extant monographs on Franzen examine his work in relation to the 
legacy of postmodernism, and the links between form and ideology.98 Studies 
                                                          
95 John Naughton, “The Evolution of the Internet: From Military Experiment to General Purpose 
Technology,” Journal of Cyber Policy 1, no. 1 (2016), 5. 
96 David Foster Wallace’s The Pale King, although posthumously compiled by an editor and released 
in 2011, comprises material Wallace completed before his death in 2008. Zadie Smith’s Britishness 
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presidency (Michiko Kakutani, “Obama’s Secret to Surviving the White House Years: Books,” The 
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97 Christian Lorentzen, “Considering the Novel in the Age of Obama,” Vulture, January 11, 2017, 
http://www.vulture.com/2017/01/considering-the-novel-in-the-age-of-obama.html.  
98 Stephen J. Burn, Jonathan Franzen at the End of Postmodernism (London: Continuum, 2009); Jesús 
Blanco Hidalga, Jonathan Franzen and the Romance of Community: Narratives of Salvation (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2017). Another resource, a biography-cum-analysis of Franzen, could arguably be 
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interrogating Eggers’s writing look at genre, authorship, and his role as a publisher.99 
Smith is often written about in terms of postcolonialism and identity politics.100 
Swathes of Wallace criticism connect his work to literary theory, philosophy, and 
politics.101 It is not unprecedented for these authors to be grouped together, but 
although the internet and the public sphere are present as contexts and terms in some 
of these studies, they have never been interrogated at length.102 I contend that these 
authors have written novels that expressly and complexly engage with the internet’s 
effects on the public sphere. They enter contemporary debates while evoking 
antecedent literary moments or figures, suggesting ways in which to read our cultural 
present through the past that led to it. Just as importantly, these authors’ popular 
profiles allow me to marry an exploration of their fiction with an analysis of their own 
statuses as public figures.  
My first chapter focusses on Jonathan Franzen’s 2015 novel Purity, which 
makes the case that the internet is adversely affecting journalism. Franzen locates the 
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heart of this crisis in the concept of journalistic authority, which is replaced in the 
public sphere of the internet age with an abundance of unfiltered information and 
uninformed opinion. Franzen connects his focus on journalism with what he sees as an 
equivalent crisis in literary authority more broadly, and suggests that in the face of the 
internet’s denigration of public discourse, stable figures of authority are needed. To 
this end, Franzen highlights the role that writers can play in the public sphere, 
presenting a form of literary publicness that is underwritten by the expertise of the 
author figure. For this reason, he chooses Charles Dickens as an antecedent literary 
model. But Dickens is also suited to Franzen because of their shared ambivalence 
about success, and their knowledge that the public sphere is the ultimate arbiter of 
literary authority, that readers inevitably play as much of a role in that sphere as writers 
do. For Franzen, the internet represents a useful scapegoat here – ways of reading are 
being impacted by the internet, he argues, and the public sphere is shifting its focus 
from cerebration to celebrity. Yet having bemoaned the internet age’s attention to 
authors, Franzen conversely invites author-inflected readings of his work by casting 
himself as an expert figure. 
In the second chapter, I examine Dave Eggers’s The Circle (2013). Eggers 
suggests that Franzen’s anxiety about changes in journalistic practice is misplaced – 
rather, he believes that the real problem lies with the institution most effectively 
infiltrating journalism: Silicon Valley. Eggers’s novel argues that Silicon Valley is 
rewriting the public sphere’s values in a dangerous way, with corporations increasingly 
translating their financial power into public influence. Eggers draws comparisons 
between the outsize power of Silicon Valley and the totalitarian state as represented in 
George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949). Orwell presents an ideal antecedent 
model for Eggers, who intends his novel to be taken as political critique, and whose 
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notion of literary publicness rests on reifying ideas of public and private through 
literary forms. Eggers seemingly agrees with Franzen on the notion of the author’s 
centrality to the public sphere, but also draws attention to the institutional contexts of 
their work. Eggers is himself often considered through the lens of institutional 
affiliation – his association with the publishing house McSweeney’s, and magazines 
like The Believer, inform the ways in which his fiction is contextually understood.  For 
this reason, we can also read Eggers’s model of authorship as present in The Circle’s 
exploration of institutions, and see how he looks to redeem the corporate practices his 
novel pillories. 
For Zadie Smith, focussing too much on institutions distracts from a much-
needed interrogation of the role individual behaviour has played in the rise of the 
internet. Corporations such as Facebook attract plenty of ire from her, but she also 
encourages readers to ask questions of their own agency. In my third chapter, I read 
Smith’s novels NW (2012) and Swing Time (2016) as evidence of her attempts to 
understand how digital technologies change the ways in which the stories of individual 
lives are told. She creates an opposition between the categories of the literary and the 
digital, suggesting that the former is interested in portraying individual experience, 
while the latter prioritises instrumental data. Her attention to literary depictions of 
individual experience highlights her interest in difference, and points to the 
perspectivism of her fiction. She looks to Virginia Woolf as an example, building on 
certain core insights of modernism to develop a model of literary publicness that 
respects difference. This attempt reflects her formal belief that writers cannot conceive 
of themselves as more important than readers – the equal opportunities of 
consideration afforded to both parties underwrite the discursive freedom of her model 
of literary publicness. Smith’s attention to perspective, however, often means that she 
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is read through the lens of her own perspective, linked sometimes reductively to her 
identity. While often important to acknowledge, this approach can occlude the ways 
in which Smith explores other perspectives, and the arguments she makes about 
literature’s discursive potential. 
In my closing chapter, I explore David Foster Wallace’s final novel, The Pale 
King (2011). For Wallace, attending to agency is problematised by neoliberalism’s co-
option of the idea of the individual, and his novel explores how the internet plays a 
key part in the story of this ideology’s rise. Like Smith, he creates an opposition, but 
here between the categories of the digital and the human. He portrays a public sphere 
that has become impossible to navigate, in part due to its oversaturation with 
information. Because of this dilemma, Wallace cannot in good faith look to writing for 
a solution or model – although he is working out of the encyclopaedic tradition, he 
finds no one antecedent suited to the problems of the internet age. Rather, he suggests 
that we must focus on strategies of reading to revitalise a public sphere inundated with 
excessive information. He does not simply align himself with a rational-critical 
approach, however – rather, he attempts to model a Bakhtinian public sphere, where 
dialogue is an end in itself, rather than one which strives for consensus. Debates about 
whether Wallace’s work should even be studied at all come to the fore here – in light 
of a number of protests against evidence of abusive behaviour in his personal life, some 
have suggested that the author’s writing should not be engaged. Examining these 
debates will help to delineate some of the different ways in which literature is 
considered in the public sphere – while such discussions ask important questions about 
how gendered power circulates in cultural discourse, they cannot hope to tell us 
anything about Wallace’s work without actual attention to those texts. 
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In these chapters, then, I will stage a debate about the public sphere in the 
internet age as it is found to play out in a number of contemporary Anglophone novels. 
I will outline four approaches to problems that arise from this debate, and sketch the 
different models that these authors conceive of as correctives to the internet’s apparent 
denigration of public discourse. Through these case studies, I will lay out a spectrum 
of discursive agency, beginning with a view in which writers must reclaim authority 
in the public sphere, through to one in which reading processes are highlighted as 
central to substantive public discourse. I will ask how each author’s writing relates to 
actual public discussion of their work, and whether these discussions align with or 
depart from the authors’ analyses. These narratives coalesce to tell a hitherto 
unexamined story about literature’s relationship with the internet, demonstrate the 
importance of four authors to contemporary literary studies’ understanding of this 
relationship, and develop extended examples of how literature operates in the public 
sphere in the internet age.
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Jonathan Franzen: Authority and Authorship 
No Filter 
Early in Jonathan Franzen’s Purity (2015), readers are informed of a ritual that the 
novel’s protagonist, Purity ‘Pip’ Tyler, enacts every week. “From somewhere, in 
college, Pip had gotten the idea,” we are told, “that the height of civilization was to 
spend Sunday morning reading an actual paper copy of the Sunday New York Times 
at a café.”1 Pip’s ritual, mentioned only in passing, at first seems to be a small element 
of her life, a detail included by Franzen to efficiently establish her as a character at 
odds with the digital dispensation that much of Purity addresses. But the way that 
Pip’s ritual develops over Purity’s first section in fact serves as vital fuel for the 
novel’s plot (which it will be worth briefly outlining here). In its early stages, Pip’s 
routine meant that she “happily forgot herself for a few hours”; when she notices “a 
nice-looking, skinny boy who had the same Sunday ritual,” however, she suddenly 
becomes more aware of how she looks or acts within the public space of the café.2 
Pip’s emergent self-consciousness leads conversely to her ability to connect with the 
boy, Jason, and they soon find themselves sharing a newspaper every Sunday. The two 
begin dating, and their conversations cover all manner of cultural and political topics, 
from Breaking Bad to nuclear disarmament. When Pip takes Jason back to her house 
to have sex, however, she is interrupted by a visitor, Annagret, who convinces Pip to 
abandon her plans. Instead, Annagret shepherds Pip through an application for an 
internship at the Sunlight Project, a website that publishes leaked information about 
current events. Pip breaks up with Jason, and the following “four months of 
                                                          
1 Jonathan Franzen, Purity (London: 4th Estate, 2015), 10. 
2 Ibid, 10. 
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abstinence” are “dreary” for her – so when she begins emailing Andreas Wolf, the 
Sunlight Project’s charismatic founder, she is pleased “to have begun a flirtatious 
correspondence with somebody world-famous,” and soon accepts an internship.3 
The development of Pip’s Sunday ritual is not only important to Purity’s plot, 
however – it also encapsulates many of the novel’s key concerns. Franzen’s references 
to a printed newspaper, a coffee shop, self-consciousness, political and cultural 
dialogue, and ideal, civilized behaviour all gesture towards an historical notion of the 
bourgeois public sphere. Indeed, whereas in Franzen’s novel The Corrections (2001), 
Chip Lambert is forced to sell his copy of “Jürgen Habermas’s Reason and the 
Rationalization of Society, which he’d found too difficult to read, let alone annotate,” 
we might infer that Pip would take to the critical theorist’s Structural Transformation 
of the Public Sphere more enthusiastically.4 And, just as Purity explores how the 
public sphere is being once more transformed by the disruptive potential of the 
internet, Pip’s burgeoning relationship with Jason is disrupted by the Sunlight Project, 
the institution most closely aligned with the internet in Purity. The interruption of 
Pip’s relationship also highlights a further central theme of Purity’s – authority. While 
applying for the internship, Pip asks if Annagret is a recruiter for the Sunlight Project. 
Annagret replies by saying: “Yes, I have authority,” but quickly corrects herself: “Or 
not authority, we reject authority.”5 Annagret’s slip of the tongue raises questions 
about how much readers should believe in the Sunlight Project’s purported neutrality, 
but also highlights the slippery nature of authority as a concept, especially as it relates 
to how information circulates in the internet age.  
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Purity goes on to address ideas relating to the internet’s relationship with 
information in much further detail over its course, but the novel’s contribution to this 
debate is already present in how Pip’s ritual has been developed. The argumentative 
core of Franzen’s novel in fact follows the same pattern as his treatment of Pip’s ritual: 
he draws attention to the public sphere as it relates to journalism, argues that its 
priorities are being disrupted by the internet, and questions what this means for 
contemporary conceptions of authority. Franzen’s reservations about internet culture 
are well-known, and he has gained a reputation for being, as Curtis Sittenfeld’s tongue-
in-cheek description has it, “a pompous white male Luddite who gazes disdainfully 
down at us tweeting, Facebooking fools.”6 But despite this reputation, Franzen’s major 
complaints are not born of a generally distrustful Luddism – rather, his contributions 
to debates about the internet consistently focus on the public sphere’s discursive 
priorities, and how the concept of authority relates to them. His critique in Purity is 
twofold: the public sphere of the internet age is saturated with unfiltered information 
because it lacks stable figures of authority to discern what is important; and yet, when 
it comes to online debate, too much focus is given to individual figures, rather than 
the content of their contributions. Because of his awareness that his novel will itself 
be discussed in this imperfect public sphere, Franzen attempts to build a model of 
literary publicness that rejects current notions of authority while simultaneously 
appealing to them. To do this, Franzen must cohere his two (potentially conflicting) 
arguments by casting himself as an authoritative figure through his critique of 
authority – a complex task that, I will argue, mainly draws attention to Franzen’s own 
ambivalent position in the public sphere. 
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For all that Franzen seeks to highlight the importance of authors’ contributions 
to the public sphere, he cannot escape the fact that the contemporary public sphere is 
held together by the media that publicly considers his work.7 Indeed, Purity’s central 
argument concerns the public sphere’s domination by media, as Franzen draws 
attention to how the internet is changing journalism’s operation, which in turn is 
changing the operation of the public sphere. Throughout Purity, journalism is 
described in terms of its role in the public sphere. When one character, Tom Aberant, 
outlines his reasons for becoming a journalist, he emphasizes its dialogic potential: 
“the truth is somewhere in the tension between the two sides” of a debate, and “that’s 
where the journalist is supposed to live, in that tension.”8 Another journalist character, 
Leila Helou, likewise locates journalism’s importance within its discursive qualities, 
describing her mission as being at its core about “adults trying to communicate with 
other adults.”9 And when Leila defends her profession by claiming that journalists 
“may not always have the best of motives, but at least we have some investment in 
civilization,” Franzen tellingly establishes a link with his earlier description of Pip’s 
ritual – how her “Sunday mornings were when she felt most civilized.”10 Identifying 
journalism as key to civilization is not just a positive, normative statement about 
journalism itself; it is the foundational premise of Purity’s depiction of the internet as 
a negative, disruptive force. For Franzen, when the internet threatens journalism, it 
threatens civilized society – and in Purity, the internet is always getting in the way of 
good journalism.  
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Much of Purity’s attention to journalism concerns how the internet is 
transforming the fourth estate’s priorities and processes. Tom abandons his ambition 
to set up a “journal of opinion called The Complicater [that] could change the world” 
and reinvigorate the public sphere, due to the pressing concern that, in the internet age, 
“covering daily news responsibly was a worthier and more embattled cause.”11 Leila 
laments the loss of analogue investigative practices, suggesting that “Google and 
Accurint can make you feel very smart, but the best stories come when you’re out in 
the field.”12 Most centrally, an online culture of leaking is characterised as redefining 
journalistic priorities. Rather than individual figures such as “Snowden or Manning,” 
who Leila describes as “glorified sources,” Franzen directs our attention at “outlets 
like WikiLeaks,” or his fictional equivalent, the Sunlight Project.13 One danger of 
leakers’ cultural dominance, Purity suggests, is that the reliance of these outlets on the 
infrastructure of the World Wide Web means that some of the very companies that 
should be held to account in the public sphere are instead left alone. So, despite the 
fact that “there were a lot of could-be Snowdens inside” Silicon Valley companies, 
“most of the could-be Snowdens kept their mouths shut”; even when Wolf is offered 
“dumps of internal email and algorithmic software” from Google, he refuses to publish 
the information, “fearing what Google could do to him.”14  
The fact that some of the most high-profile leaks in the years since Purity’s 
publication have in reality concerned the malpractice of large technology companies 
dampens this element of Franzen’s critique.15 Indeed, it is redolent of the rapidity with 
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which digital culture tends to change that Purity’s primary concern with leaking seems 
overblown just a few years after the novel’s release – especially when compared with 
the increasingly obvious threats posed to journalism by fake news and falling 
revenues. But Franzen’s focus on leaking is still valuable for how it relates to his 
discussion of the changing nature of journalistic authority. Purity makes the case that, 
by valorising information over investigation, the internet has robbed journalists of 
their authoritative role in the public sphere. Instead, many have been drawn into 
working on the terms of data-mongers like Andreas Wolf: “The leakers just spew. It 
takes a journalist to collate and condense and contextualize what they spew.”16 As 
Leila puts it, once again aligning these journalistic practices with Pip’s earlier vision 
of the public sphere, “filtering isn’t phoniness – its civilization.”17 And if the Sunlight 
Project is proud to call itself a “neutral and unfiltered platform,” this is just another 
example of what Leila calls “the false promise of the internet and social media as 
substitutes for journalism.”18 Franzen maintains that there are concrete consequences 
of this substitution: the internet’s perceived reduction of filtering has led to, as the title 
of Purity’s third section has it, “Too Much Information.”19 When Leila receives some 
awkward personal information from a source, she suggests that it “would have been 
TMI if there were such a thing in this business.”20 The idea of excessive information 
is here initially cast as anathema to journalism’s operation – yet it becomes clear that 
Leila holds the view that in an age of prolific leaking, there is an excess of information. 
The mass availability of information online has, she admits, “made the journalist’s job 
so much easier, […] but the internet is also killing journalism” by ignoring the 
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importance of curation and investigation, eliding “the difference between a story and 
a non-story,” and overwhelming the public sphere with irrelevant information.21 
It is worth noting that the importance placed on filtering by Leila and other 
characters does not negate their earlier characterisations of journalism’s role in the 
public sphere as dialogic. Rather, this filtering process is to be understood as 
guaranteeing the vitality of a liberal democratic public sphere. As Habermas argues in 
Between Facts and Norms, we should think of journalists as actors within the public 
sphere, whose processes of selection are one source of the mass media’s power.22 
Habermas suggests that “these official producers of information are all the more 
successful the more they can rely on trained personnel, on financial and technical 
resources, and in general on a professional infrastructure.”23 He links these traits of 
success to the institution of journalism, and highlights “tasks that the media ought to 
fulfil in democratic political systems,” principles that “orient the professional code of 
journalism and the profession’s ethical self-understanding,” including “meaningful 
agenda-setting” and “dialogue across a diverse range of views.”24 Even if this 
promotes an outsize role for the concerns of individual journalists, the process of 
filtering functions as a pronouncement of faith in the institution of journalism in such 
a way that journalists’ power is not a problem.25  
Franzen’s contribution to debates about the public sphere in the internet age 
comprises a focussed series of arguments about waning journalistic authority. Yet if 
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Franzen’s defence of this journalistic authority’s importance to the public sphere is 
sound enough, his analysis of why it must be reasserted in the internet age is less 
convincing. For although the question of authority emerges from Franzen’s novel as a 
contemporary problem, it requires historical, cultural, and political theorising to be 
properly understood. As Matt Carlson points out, “technological change has become 
an organizing principle for understanding journalism; it acts as a metanarrative.”26 
This is an important part of the story of contemporary journalism, but runs the risk of 
turning “into a problem when technology becomes a linguistic wedge referring only 
to recent technological developments while ignoring – and even naturalizing – existing 
technologies.”27 This is a mistake not least because it conceives of journalism 
primarily as a form of information transfer, whereas Carlson argues that we should 
understand journalism within a social context that moves beyond an exclusive focus 
on news texts and their delivery. A more useful way to understand how journalism 
operates in the internet age, he argues, is to ensure a “greater historical grounding to 
expose the deep-seated connections between the technologies of journalism and 
journalistic authority.”28 Lennard J. Davis has in fact argued that the problem of 
journalistic authority is as old as journalism itself. The invention of the printing press 
and moveable type, Davis suggests, can also be thought of as the invention of the 
(relatively) instantaneous publication of textual materials. This technology “permitted, 
but did not guarantee, a text of recentness” to readers; “likewise, with the beginning 
of the report of recent events came the problem of proving the truth of that report.”29  
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Franzen’s neglect of the broader questions of journalistic authority (such as 
those attending to its social, political, and historical contexts) inflexibly premises the 
problem as primarily related to a digital dispensation. His oversight here is a telling 
one, as it represents a departure from how his novels have previously foregrounded 
complexities rather than looked to resolve them, a strategy that Stephen J. Burn has 
highlighted as “one of the crucial distinctions between Franzen’s novels and his non-
fiction.”30 In his essays, Franzen “frequently expresses his divided feelings about a 
subject, or presents an opposition, but he nearly always reaches some kind of 
resolution by the end of the essay.”31 Burn claims that Franzen’s fiction, on the other 
hand, “works on much more complex ground than the rhetorical flourishes of his 
nonfiction suggests.”32 Burn’s main focus is the relationship between The Corrections 
and Franzen’s 1996 essay “Why Bother?,” but in the case of Purity this distinction 
between rhetorical strategies is not as clear cut. Certainly, there are moments in Purity 
when Franzen appears to complicate the position that the internet is the cause of a 
crisis in journalistic authority. When Andreas Wolf highlights how Google “actively 
filtered the information it claimed passively to reflect,” for example, he cites this as 
one of the company’s most insidious practices, despite this process echoing the 
journalistic filtering that Leila claims is vital.33 And, as Tom points out, the online 
newspaper he and Leila work for is arguably “just as wedded to the internet as the 
Sunlight Project.”34 But both of these counterpoints are dismissed with ease – in 
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Wolf’s case by aligning Google’s brand of filtering with totalitarian ambitions of 
obfuscation rather than the journalistic dedication to democracy and truth; in Leila’s 
by reframing the question of reliance on the internet, suggesting that if journalists and 
leakers depend on the same technology, this means that the two are ineluctably 
“competing,” and the likes of Wolf are “winning.”35 In both cases, just as in Franzen’s 
essays, the central question (of whether the internet is uniquely and inherently 
disruptive for journalistic authority or not) is easily resolved. Indeed, as I have shown, 
even by suggesting that journalistic authority’s instability is a problem of the internet 
age, Franzen has already resolved the issue. Franzen’s engagement with the issue of 
journalistic authority in this way reveals an important element of his approach to 
authorship. In Purity, Franzen reveals his anxieties about maintaining his literary 
authority by employing the definitive resolution of an issue in a manner characteristic 
of his essays; his appeals to the rhetorical strategies of his non-fiction function as 
attempts to bolster that authority. 
In his monograph on Franzen, Jesús Blanco Hidalga reads Purity as an 
assertion of literary authority, stated through a proxy discussion of journalistic 
authority in the internet age. In Hidalga’s reading, the “antagonistic dichotomy drawn 
by the novel between leakers and true journalists” clearly points to “a self-legitimating 
intention on Franzen’s part.”36 The importance that Franzen places on “social 
investigation, selection of relevant, representative features, and careful edition” in 
Purity’s vision of good journalism is evidence that “Franzen is also vindicating his 
own position as a novelist.”37 Hidalga is right to draw a connection between these two 
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forms of authority – filtering is central, for example, to Henry James’s notion of 
literary authority.  But we cannot simply map these two forms of authority onto each 
other. As I have shown, the vision of journalistic authority that Franzen foregrounds 
depends upon maintaining faith in the institution of journalism. His vision of literary 
authority, however, like James’s, emerges from the individual figure of the author. 
James was a proponent of the idea of consequent authority, whereby authority 
necessarily follows the author’s “careful ascertainment” of how their “subject most 
completely expresses itself.”38 In other words, by writing an authoritative text (or 
writing a text authoritatively), authors produce their own authority. James is aware of 
his argument’s circularity, and indeed its lack of precision – he describes authority’s 
production as akin to alchemy. But his notion of consequent authority is apposite here, 
particularly the suggestion that it is through an author’s curation of a story, and all its 
attendant themes and issues (“drawing the positive right truth out of the so easy 
muddle of wrong truths”), that they produce their own authority.39  
Franzen likewise looks to model a consequent authority in Purity. At first 
glance, his rhetorical appeals might appear to be evidence that his vision of literary 
authority lies more squarely in the essay form than the novel, but this is not the case. 
Rather, it lies in the figure of the author. In a recent essay, Franzen reflects on the 
process of writing. His opening gambit is to undermine his own authority by 
suggesting that an essay is “something essayed – something hazarded, not definitive, 
not authoritative; something ventured on the basis of the author’s personal experience 
and subjectivity.”40 He opens the essay’s next section by embracing this venture, 
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explicitly introducing “a personal and subjective micronarrative” in order to make an 
argument about the purpose of essay-writing.41 By the end of the piece, after Franzen 
has lamented various groups’ responses to a previous essay of his on the subject of 
climate change, he reasserts his faith in his own authority, claiming that the problems 
of his work could have been solved had he just “kept revising.”42 In other words, after 
initially appearing to deny his authority, Franzen works towards an assertion of it – 
even if the essay is not an authoritative form, he seems to suggest, its author has the 
capacity to be authoritative.43 If, in Purity, the content of Franzen’s contributions seem 
confused, the way in which he makes them is still revealing, and points us to the core 
facet of his form of literary publicness – the situating of authority in the figure of the 
author. In his novel, Franzen makes the case that the public sphere faces a crisis of 
authority, and laments the apparent loss of a public sphere underwritten by expertise. 
In response to this, he models an idealised literary publicness that casts the 
contributing author as an authoritative figure. Yet Franzen is aware that his ideal is far 
from reality – indeed, as I will now show, his construction of a form of literary 
publicness based on the expertise of the author emerges precisely from his knowledge 
that literary authority exists as an unstable quality. 
Author IT 
In his work on the authority of literature, Edward W. Said argues that it is 
“nomadic: it is never in the same place, it is never always at the center, nor is it a sort 
of ontological capacity for originating every instance of sense.”44 In Purity, Franzen 
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foregrounds his awareness of literary authority’s instability when he writes about 
Leila’s husband, Charles Blenheim. Charles is an American novelist whose trajectory 
in the novel mirrors the same anxiety of declining literary authority that Franzen’s 
rhetorical appeals point to. When readers are introduced to Charles, he is “at the apex 
of his career,” the attendant authority of which depends upon several factors.45 Richard 
Sennett has claimed that “the work of authority has a goal: to convert power into 
images of strength.”46 Charles’s initial portrayal comprises several images of strength 
that are all of a piece. The fact that “he rode a Harley-Davidson to class, he wore his 
corn-silk hair down to the shoulders of his leather jacket, [and] he referred to literary 
giants by their first names” ensures that Charles is hubristically confident of his literary 
authority.47 More than this, Charles’s images of strength are intensely patriarchal – a 
fact which receives a knowing wink from Franzen in the title of Charles’s successful 
novel: “Mad Sad Dad.”48  
We meet Charles in the section of Purity that focusses on Leila – he is her 
creative writing teacher, immediately placing him in a position of power over her. 
When the two later get married, Leila realises what “her function” is in his eyes: “to 
be younger and fresh and somewhat exotic, to excite the envy of male writers.”49 
Charles’s images of strength, often linked to his sexual relationship with Leila, are just 
one example of what Urmila Seshagiri has highlighted as Purity’s preponderance of 
“phallocentric” imagery.50 Charles’s literary ambitions are described in these terms 
too: “He settled down to write the big book, the novel that would secure him his place 
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in the modern American canon. Once upon a time, it had sufficed to write The Sound 
and the Fury or The Sun Also Rises. But now bigness was essential. Thickness, 
length.”51 But further to her convincing critique of Purity’s problem with “female 
autonomy,” Seshagiri also credits Franzen by suggesting that Charles mainly functions 
as “Franzen’s laudable parody of himself.”52 Indeed, I would add that far from 
endorsing Charles’s images of authority, Franzen goes on to demonstrate their 
inadequacy, and yet in doing so also doubles down on his model of authorially centred 
literary publicness. 
One influential way of conceiving of authority, put forward by Max Weber in 
his work on the authority of states, is that it functions as “a belief in legitimacy, 
measured by voluntary compliance.”53 Franzen suggests that in the case of literary 
authority, this belief in legitimacy is culturally produced – Charles’s legitimacy rests 
on fellowships, prizes, and social connections.54 This dependence upon a veritable 
industry of authority extends to literary production pre-publication as well – when 
Charles delivers his second book to his publisher, “his editor wanted revisions and he 
couldn’t make up his mind about the smallest change.”55 Even the process of writing 
a novel is portrayed here as a tug of war of authority over the text. The most significant 
arbiter of authority in Purity, however, is literary journalism. For Charles, reviews are 
life-or-death. His early success is marked, if not guaranteed, by a “front-page Times 
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review,” and his masculine image of authority is propped up by critics’ assessments 
of his novel’s “twinned muscularity and febrility.”56 When the reviews’ tones turn, on 
the other hand, this image starts to look suspect (Charles’s second book is 
“slaughtered” by the press – rather than muscular, his prose is now “‘stale,’ ‘obese,’ 
‘exhausting’”).57 Further cementing the idea that literary journalism is central to 
success, Leila assigns herself a share of blame: “the fault was his, but also undeniably 
hers,” as she had “allowed her husband’s life to spin out of control.”58 Charles’s 
dependence on the intangible notion of status, and the reactions of others to his work, 
reveals the scaffolding around his images of strength (the only part of his authority 
that he had control over). Indeed, in one scene, they are cast as wholly inadequate, and 
far inferior to the authority that emerges from the public considerations of an author’s 
work – with nothing to fuel them, the images fail, and “on a warm Colorado night in 
late June, […] Charles went over the front of the XLCR 1000 he’d bought with the 
last third of his U.K. advance.”59 Charles’s legs are paralysed in the accident, but if 
his “paraplegia had objectified his grievance with the literary world,” his subsequent 
dependence on Leila (who helps to organise, and sometimes provide, his care needs) 
objectifies the world of journalism’s power over him.60  
Yet even if Franzen clearly sees literary authority as the debilitated poor 
relation of journalistic authority, the latter’s power is not inviolable – as Tom remarks 
to Leila upon hearing of Charles’s bad reviews: “Fuck the reviewers. I’m still going 
to buy it.”61 The distinctions between different forms of authority are important here 
– Tom promises to invest in Charles’s new novel because of the authority that Charles 
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has built up through his previous publications. But even if Charles’s authority is shown 
to persist under the threat of negative reviews, a danger still remains – “when the only 
usable, effective capital is […] ‘prestige’ or ‘authority,’” Pierre Bourdieu claims, “the 
economic capital that cultural undertakings generally require cannot secure the 
specific profits produced by the field […] unless it is reconverted into symbolic 
capital.”62 In other words, as many people can buy Charles’s book as they like – if 
those economic profits are not re-translated into the symbolic capital of authority (as 
the book’s bad reviews suggest they will not be), they count for very little in what 
Bourdieu terms the field of cultural production.63 Interestingly, Charles’s situation 
here in fact mirrors that of Leila and Tom – despite their concerns about the internet’s 
disruptive power, a good number of people still read their online newspaper. These 
characters inhabit a complex of precarious authority, and represent a sort of kinship in 
the threats Franzen believes both journalists and novelists face in the internet age. The 
novel form’s dependence on journalism for critical and commercial success means 
that it too is liable to the changes that Leila has railed against – as Charles puts it in 
one conversation with her, “when you suffer, I suffer.”64  
Here we can see how, through his portrayal of Charles’s fragile literary 
authority, Franzen looks to justify his model of authorially centred literary publicness. 
If, as Franzen argues throughout the novel, the internet is adversely affecting the public 
sphere, this means that the processes by which literary authority emerges are adversely 
affected too, and must be replaced with a superior model. Yet for Franzen’s own model 
to convince, he must first gain authority by the very methods he critiques. In Susan 
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Sniader Lanser’s study of women writers and narrative voice, she describes an 
unintended consequence of attempts to challenge extant notions or constructions of 
authority: novelists who challenge authority are often “constrained to adopt the 
authorizing conventions of narrative voice in order, paradoxically, to mount an 
authoritative critique of the authority that the text therefore also perpetuates.”65 We 
can identify a version of this perpetuation in Franzen’s attempts to challenge the 
authority of how his novels are considered in the public sphere in the internet age. This 
risk of perpetuation, however, might also seem to advantage Franzen’s critique: to 
bolster the image of himself as an authoritative literary figure, he embeds within his 
novel a demonstration of his awareness of the processes of consideration on which he 
is dependent. To emphasise this awareness, Franzen invites readers to reflect upon 
how his own work is considered in the public sphere. When Charles’s second book is 
published, he receives an unfavourable review from one named critic: “‘bloated and 
immensely disagreeable,’ Michiko Kakutani, New York Times.”66 Here, Kakutani is 
cast as an arbiter of failure; tellingly, the positive reviews of Charles’s previous book 
are given no attribution. This can be read all too easily through the lens of Franzen’s 
personal history with Kakutani – after her unfavourable review of Franzen’s memoir 
The Discomfort Zone (2006), the author called her “the stupidest person in New York 
City” during an interview.67  
Franzen’s personal connection here serves as a useful reminder of the role that 
an author’s public persona plays in the public sphere. Indeed, contrary to Kakutani’s 
own claim that Franzen’s most recent novel is his “least self-conscious,” Purity 
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represents an exploration of the overlap between literature and the public sphere that 
is highly self-referential.68 In one scene, Charles talks to Pip about literary culture, 
complaining that there are “so many Jonathans. A plague of literary Jonathans. If you 
read only the New York Times Book Review, you’d think it was the most common male 
name in America. Synonymous with talent, greatness. Ambition, vitality.”69 In this 
scene, Franzen makes it clear that he recognises literary authority is bound up not only 
with how an author’s novel circulates in the public sphere, but also with how their 
persona does – his portrayal of Charles concedes that this reality reduces the ability 
of authors to control their reception. Indeed, we can understand Franzen’s use of his 
essayistic strategies as rhetorical appeals to his authority as a persona in the public 
sphere – as Paul Dawson points out, appeals like this are evidence of an author’s 
endeavour to draw “authority not from the novelist as observer of human nature and 
guide to ethical conduct, but from the writer as public intellectual both competing with 
and deploying other nonliterary discourses of ‘knowledge’: journalistic, historical, 
scientific, critical, and so on.”70 Franzen attempts his rhetorical performance to 
establish himself as an authority both specifically on the issues that his novel 
addresses, and more generally as a public intellectual. But rather than reading this kind 
of performance through the lens of narrative voice, as Dawson does, it is more fruitful 
to conceive of Franzen’s attempt at authority as defining his authorial ethos.  
Liesbeth Korthals Altes has usefully explicated the notion of authorial ethos as 
it relates to processes of narrative interpretation. She begins her study by evoking 
Aristotle’s rhetorical theory, defining ethos as “a person’s or community’s character 
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or characterizing spirit, tone, or attitude.”71 In particular, Altes draws out those parts 
of the Rhetoric relating to the authority of a speaker. She sums up how, for Aristotle, 
the three ethical means of speech (ethos, pathos, and logos),  
whether directly or indirectly expressed, buttress each other and cooperate to 
warrant the reliability and authority of the speaker, and hence of his discourse. 
In what looks like a feedback loop, it is indeed the discursively produced effect 
of trustworthiness or reliability that, for Aristotle, grounds that same 
discourse’s effectiveness.72  
This use of particular rhetorical strategies to both produce and prove a speaker’s 
authority results in a situation whereby “speakers need only to hint at recognized 
signals of authority and ethos topoi to make their audience jump to attention and adopt 
the expected receptive attitude.”73  
Whereas Aristotle believed “that a speaker had to convey his ethos through 
discursive means alone,” other rhetoricians such as Cicero “insisted on the importance 
of the prior ethos, the image an audience already has of the speaker on the basis of his 
reputation, previous deeds, or generally known character traits.”74 The insight that 
follows from this, “that discourse through its whole form is likely to be understood as 
expressing its enunciator’s character,” is central to understanding Purity’s treatment 
of literary authority.75 Altes suggests that prior ethos is a key facet of authorial image, 
which is one way readers can attribute “symbolic value, authority, and relevance to 
the literary work.”76 She defines this facet as follows: 
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The image of the author constructed on the basis of a writer’s previous oeuvre, 
which may be considered to function as a prior ethos, in light of which a (new) 
work is classified, interpreted, and invested with value – or divested of it. 
Besides the author him or herself, literary historians and critics, among others, 
contribute to the construction of this oeuvre-based ethos. Such an ethos need 
not be monolithic or consistent […].77 
In the public sphere, Franzen’s prior ethos does a lot of work. Stephen J. Burn 
has argued, for example, that “virtually every critical interpretation of The 
Corrections” took “Why Bother?” to be “a kind of preface” to the novel, which could 
be read as a representation of “a successful resolution to the creative problems Franzen 
suffered in the early 1990s.”78 James Wood suggests that “Franzen partly has himself 
to blame for the idiocy of [The Corrections’ media] coverage,” as “Why Bother?” was 
“so autobiographically infected” that it “predictably […] appealed to the media” as a 
way to ‘explain’ the text.79 Even if, as he claimed in one interview, Franzen is “not 
here to tell [readers] how to interpret the book,”80 it seems that his infamous essay is 
inadvertently doing that job for him: to take just a few examples, reviews of Purity for 
The Nation, The Millions, and BBC Culture all begin with discussions of “Why 
Bother?”81 This would all be well and good were it not for the fact that, as Burn points 
out, “Franzen’s own comments about his work are often misleading” – in the case of 
“Why Bother?,” for example, “the aesthetic foundations of The Corrections are more 
complex than the essay intimates.”82  
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Yet in Franzen’s view, the real problem with prior ethos lies in his being 
misunderstood, as he explains in the introduction to his first essay collection, How to 
Be Alone (2002). Franzen claims that, when he was promoting the publication of The 
Corrections, he was constantly questioned about the novel’s relation to “Why 
Bother?,” even though “most interviewers hadn’t read the essay, and […] the few who 
had read it seemed to have misunderstood it.”83 Two novels, tens of essays, and 
hundreds of interviews later, Franzen’s prior ethos has taken on a recognisable shape, 
one I referenced earlier in Curtis Sittenfeld’s terms: “a pompous white male 
Luddite.”84 To Franzen, the fact that this joke is even a recognisable description is 
evidence of his being misread time and time again, something that he appears to have 
resigned himself to (“I know that if you are hostile, you will find ammunition […] 
There’s a sense that there is really nothing I can do except die – or, I suppose, retire 
and never write again”).85 Elsewhere, he takes particular issue with how online 
indictments of his work have taken the form of ad hominem attacks.86 All of which is 
to say that, for Franzen, the internet age has overinflated the role of prior ethos in 
narrative interpretation, and corrupted it with a debased cultural logic that has less to 
do with the actual content of literature than with its author’s public persona. Yet, as I 
have shown, Franzen finds himself appealing to notions of prior ethos all the same. 
He is by no means averse to making extreme statements that garner much commentary, 
and is aware that his being a “public novelist” is linked to his “having strong opinions 
and enjoying speaking them.”87 His choice of verb here is important – in claiming that 
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his speaking of strong opinions is responsible for his reception, rather than his writing 
of them, Franzen suggests that being a public novelist might be more about being in 
public than about being a novelist. Examining Purity’s references to one archetypal 
public novelist can help to further clarify Franzen’s ambivalence towards his position 
within the public sphere, and bring into sharper focus his novel’s treatment of the 
topic. 
What the Dickens? 
If, through the character of Charles, Franzen is to some extent lampooning the 
fragile literary authority dependent on the sometimes inadequate considerations of 
readers in the public sphere, he is less cynical about one other potential source of 
literary authority: history. In the face of the internet’s obsession with the present and 
the future, antecedent forms and figures present a useful link to the past – at least, this 
is how Franzen’s work is often framed by the author and others. Upon the release of 
Franzen’s fourth novel, Freedom (2010), much was made by reviewers of the contrast 
between the book’s supposedly nineteenth-century style and its twenty-first-century 
setting. Adam Hammond has outlined how, in interviews given at the time of the 
novel’s release, Franzen “went out of his way both to reaffirm his commitment to 
novels of Victorian scope and proportions and to argue that such novels could only be 
composed through a studied and disciplined avoidance of the digital.”88 Hammond 
goes on to summarise Franzen’s belief that it is not just literary forms that are being 
corrupted by the internet (hence the need to invoke a more ‘pure’ antecedent), but the 
practice of writing itself. The supposedly lost goals of nineteenth-century social 
realism are for Franzen incompatible with the influence of online life – a perspective 
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which accounts for his composition of Freedom on a laptop “from which he had not 
only removed the wireless card but also physically blocked the Ethernet cable.”89 The 
question facing Franzen in Purity, however, is whether it is possible to successfully 
engage with the internet as subject matter while maintaining a disciplined avoidance 
of the digital. Yet for him, there is no contradiction between these endeavours – 
indeed, he has openly admitted to how little research he undertook in preparation for 
writing his fifth novel.90 As with Freedom, Purity resists the call for innovation 
inherent to digital culture, instead reaching into the past to find ways of understanding 
our present. As Franzen puts it, the novel has “a nineteenth-century premise” involving 
a “very nineteenth-century quest” which leads Pip “through a twenty-first-century 
world.”91  
As Purity’s protagonist’s nickname suggests, Franzen has one particular 
antecedent literary figure in mind – Charles Dickens. The way that Franzen’s fiction 
itself aligns with Dickens’s, however, is not immediately clear. While it may be 
tempting to hold up Dickens’s work as a general example of the kind of social realism 
that Franzen aims to write, this does not give us much detail about the way that 
Franzen’s association with Dickens functions. A comparative reading can help unpack 
the authors’ alignment – in particular, reading Joshua Cohen’s PCKWCK (2015) and 
Book of Numbers (2015) can elucidate how it would be wrong to mistake Franzen’s 
formal conservatism for an active engagement with nineteenth-century style. Reading 
                                                          
89 Ibid, 198. Contrary to Franzen’s suggestions, Richard Salmon has shown that a similar attitude of 
avoidance itself stretches back to the nineteenth century, playing out in Henry James’s 1888 novella 
The Lesson of the Master – “where one [character] construes the world beyond the private space of 
authorial creation as potentially liberating fiction from its status as a market commodity, the other sees 
the external world as a distraction from the necessary solipsism of the artist” (Richard Salmon, 
“Authorship,” in Henry James in Context, edited by David McWhirter (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 111). 
90 Isaac Chotiner, “Jonathan Franzen on Fame, Fascism, and Why He Won’t Write a Book About Race,” 
Slate, July 31, 2016, http://www.slate.com. 
91 Franzen, “Start the Week.” 
68 
 
Cohen, on the one hand, we can clearly identify an author who is interested in 
Dickens’s ways of telling, and who looks to echo Dickens’s contingent, experimental 
style. Franzen, on the other hand, is better understood as a writer interested in what 
Dickens tells us as a canonical figure whose command of form and structure proved 
his authority. As I will show, by casting Dickens as an expert whose knowledge 
contemporary readers can draw on, Franzen incorporates his references to antecedent 
texts into his model of authorially centred literary publicness. But I will also 
problematise Franzen’s association, and argue for another way of reading Dickens in 
relation to Purity that has less to do with authority than with ambivalence.  
Franzen and Cohen represent two opposing approaches to how literature might 
address the topic of the internet. Six weeks after Purity’s publication, Cohen wrote, in 
instalments, “a reinterpretation of Charles Dickens's first serialized novel The 
Pickwick Papers […] in front of the entire internet.”92 A press release for the project, 
titled PCKWCK, outlined its process: “Every day from 1pm-6pm EST visitors to 
pckwck.com will be able to watch Cohen write in real time, offer feedback that may 
affect the outcome of the novel, and talk with Josh and other readers in the chat 
room.”93 PCKWCK represents an alternative method of engagement with novels of 
Victorian scope and proportions, one that manages to both formalise Dickens’s own 
creative labour, and to satirise the internet’s commercialisation. Rather than picking 
Dickens as a model just because of The Pickwick Papers’ “seriality,” Cohen admitted 
in an interview that the “enormous pressure [the author] was under” interested him, as 
Dickens was “writing at a time when it was cheaper than ever to mass-produce content, 
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and to disseminate it, [and] it seemed to me to be a time close to our own.”94 
PCKWCK’s website clearly alludes to this pressure, with its strict “rules for both the 
writer and readers” outlined in the website’s terms of service.95 Cohen’s suggestion 
that the experience of Victorian novelists is similar to his own highlights his opposition 
to Franzen’s belief that the internet always threatens the writer’s ability and craft, and 
not for the first time. In his review of Franzen’s polemical commentary on the writings 
of Austrian satirist Karl Kraus, The Kraus Project (2013), Cohen bemoans how 
“Franzen’s unstructured exegeses attempt to summon a similar abhorrence of the 
digitisation of the novel” as Kraus had done with journalism’s fin-de-siècle 
transformation.96 Cohen points out, however, that Franzen “never considers that if 
German poetry was able to survive the German-language press (and two wars, and 
communism), the odds are that American fiction will survive Google.”97 If Cohen and 
Franzen disagree on how Kraus’s work resonates with our contemporary moment, they 
are more aligned in their belief that Dickens’s writing provides a useful perspective 
for addressing contemporary issues. The ways in which they evoke Dickens in their 
treatments of the internet, however, are starkly divergent.  
Book of Numbers, despite setting itself up in direct opposition to projects like 
PCKWCK from its very first line (“If you’re reading this on a screen, fuck off”) is 
certainly a more formally experimental work of fiction than Purity, steeped as it is in 
engagement with the digital rather than avoidance of it.98 But it arguably also engages 
more fully with Dickens’s work than Franzen’s novel does, at the very least at the 
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level of style. In an interview for the radio show Bookworm, Cohen suggests that “the 
convoluted ways in which information passes in the Victorian novel, specifically in a 
Dickens novel,” were very influential upon Book of Numbers.99 Bookworm’s host links 
Cohen’s wordplay explicitly to Dickens’s, using The Pickwick Papers as the model of 
a novel in which “events are […] linked by verbal events,” suggesting that he is a 
writer “who, when he’s not making things happen, [is] making words happen.”100 This 
is a notable component of Dickens’s writing – as Daniel Tyler puts it in his 
introduction to an essay collection on style in Dickens’s work, “his prose is rich with 
acoustic effects, such as the linkages of alliteration, assonance and internal rhymes, 
chimes that build connections of their own amid the representation of fragmented 
reality.”101  
A significant part of Cohen’s debt to Dickens is paid at the level of the 
sentence, demonstrating Cohen’s interest in evoking the way in which Dickens writes 
about the world. Examples abound in Book of Numbers, from its descriptions of 
passersby, one wearing a “cap, Red Sox and red crocs,” and the protagonist’s 
meditation on the artefacts in a museum: “Roll me in scrolls, volumina of vellum and 
parchment, papyri.”102 At one point, Cohen humorously foregrounds the complicated 
neologisms and ubiquitous acronyms of contemporary life: “AMOR, AROM, MARO, 
MORA, OMAR, ORAM. Administration. Management. Organization. Responsibility. 
The Reign of Multiple Acronyms, ROMA. The Regency of Authoritarian Maturity, 
ROAM.”103 Book of Numbers is packed with such punning, and Cohen proves to be, 
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like Dickens, “alert to the latent meanings in words, to buried etymologies that prompt, 
in an instant, a lively wordplay.”104 Most interesting is when Cohen refigures such 
Dickensian strategies in computational terms, linguistically riffing on the novel’s 
digital theme, as in his use of coding terms to outline the protagonist’s thinking:  
find (Indian) 
find ($$$$) 
if (amount of $$$$ Indian has left < amount of $$$$ that was ours) 
then# beat him down 
else (he can bring us our $$$$ within start=datetime end=datetime with interest 
compounded daily for range at rate_float) 
else (we would derive > satisfaction from having beaten him to death).105 
At one point in Purity, Pip ruminates on the similarities between keyboard shortcuts 
and spoken commands (“Control pee, she told herself. Control-P”), but elsewhere 
Franzen’s novel shares little of Cohen’s restive, digitally-inflected prose style;106 
indeed, in The Kraus Project, Franzen admits to finding “linguistic accidents […] a 
little cheap.”107  
Clearly, Franzen is not interested in evoking Dickens for his use of language. 
Rather, he cites Great Expectations (1881) as a text to help us understand the internet 
age, because of its expert handling of one particular theme: secrecy. Working from the 
premise that an online culture of leaking raises important ethical questions about 
information, transparency, and secrecy, Purity enters into dialogue with provocations 
made about these topics in Great Expectations. Both novels heavily thematise secrecy, 
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and stage debates about the value of keeping or disclosing secrets. When Andreas 
Wolf sets forth a theory that having secrets lets “you know that you’re a person, 
distinct from other people,” but that “closeness with other people” is built “by sharing 
secrets,”108 the implicit question being asked of his interlocutor is one that Mr. Jaggers 
asks Pip in Great Expectations: “For whose sake would you reveal the secret?”109 
Dickens’s Pip concludes that the fact that “it is not my secret, but another’s,” should 
prevent him from revealing the identity of his benefactor.110 But Wolf’s public rallying 
cry for the Sunlight Project dismisses such sentiments out of hand, with the self-
promoting claim “that secrecy was oppression and transparency freedom.”111 
Importantly, however, Franzen ensures that Wolf later has a change of heart. His 
realisation that the Sunlight Project “functioned mainly as an extension of his ego” 
aligns with Dickens’s suggestion that revealing another’s secret can be a selfish act – 
Wolf has, in fact, built a career doing this, fuelling his charismatic reputation by 
disclosing information about others.112 Through Wolf’s realisation, Franzen highlights 
a difference between the internet age and Dickens’s own period – if Franzen sees 
overlaps between these times, he also suggests that our contemporary moment is far 
more concerned with self-promotion at the expense of others’ reputations than 
Dickens’s was. 
Purity’s attention to secrecy also inflects its form, chiefly through its intricate 
plotting: in a Dickensian manner, the novel’s plot relies on the disclosure or guarding 
of various secrets. Franzen’s plotting represents an example of the curation and 
ordering that Leila suggests is lacking in the leaks and data dumps of the Sunlight 
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Project, and serves as a formal link to the novel’s exploration of journalism and the 
public sphere. Great Expectations is thus an apposite novel for Franzen to refer to, as 
it features one of the few scenes in Dickens’s work that addresses the public sphere. 
Dallas Liddle suggests that Dickens does not show “great interest in using his art to 
analyse how discourse circulates and ramifies within his culture”; the scene in Great 
Expectations in which Mr. Jaggers and Mr. Wopsle argue over the contents of a 
newspaper in a public house, however, does show such an interest. 113 Whereas in 
Great Expectations journalism and secrecy are linked in the public spaces of village 
and city life, in Purity the themes coalesce in the virtual public space of the Web. The 
Sunlight Project exemplifies Manuel Castells’s observation that “there are no more 
political secrets in the internet age, once they have gone beyond a very small circle of 
insiders.”114 Purity stages the personal ramifications of this emerging political logic: 
for Castells, the circulation of secrets and rumours means that “the borderline between 
gossip, fantasy, and valuable political information becomes increasingly blurred, thus 
further complicating the use of information as the privileged political weapon in the 
internet age”; for Franzen, information is the ultimate personal weapon, as characters’ 
relationships turn on their discovery of secrets, such as when a document recounting 
Tom’s affairs with Anabel is sent to Pip, who then discovers that her mother has been 
hiding a vast personal fortune from her.115  
For several critics, however, these links are insufficient to earn Franzen the 
authority of the label ‘Dickensian’. James Meek has claimed that Franzen’s elaborate 
plotting operates as little more than a cursory nod to Dickens: “the most Great 
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Expectations aspect of Purity is the treatment of Pip’s difficulty in paying back her 
college debt”, which is posed “as a Dickensian plot problem: how will she land the fat 
inheritance her goodness deserves?”116 Michiko Kakutani also suggests that “Purity 
uses Dickens and Great Expectations as a touchstone only in so much as it invokes an 
array of classics.”117 And Benjamin Hale argues that, although Dickens is “the 
ancestor Franzen claims in Purity, […] the real father to his style is also still his real 
bête noir, William Gaddis.”118 Hale presents a reading of Purity in dialogue with 
Franzen’s 2002 essay “Mr. Difficult,” to suggest that Purity’s pessimistic “tone and 
worldview” is evidence that “Gaddis is still an influence on Franzen in spite of 
himself.”119 But even if, as these critics show, Purity’s debts to Dickens can appear 
superficial, I believe that it is Dickens who is still an influence on Franzen in spite of 
himself.  
In particular, the Victorian novelist can be read as emblematic of Franzen’s 
own ambivalence about his position within the public sphere. To demonstrate this, it 
will first be necessary to outline Dickens’s views on the public sphere. Dickens was a 
vocal proponent of political modernisation, and Borislav Knezevic has highlighted 
how many of Dickens’s political views are encapsulated in a speech he gave to the 
Administrative Reform Association in 1855.120 Dickens’s speech comprised a 
“dramatic polarization of middle-class society and patrician political society”121 – in 
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his address, the author laments the astronomic power differential between “the 
‘governors’ and the ‘governed,’” and calls for “the awaking of the people, […] to 
effect a great peaceful constitutional change in the administration of their own 
affairs.”122 Knezevic is careful to avoid propagating the argument, however, that “by 
insisting on the tension between civil society and political society in Britain Dickens 
tried to recreate the originary moment of the bourgeois public sphere,” and encourage 
rational-critical debate amongst citizens.123 Rather, Dickens’s message, of the need for 
administrative reform that incorporates civic engagement, is inseparable from “the 
symbolic capital he accumulated as a professional writer and a public figure.”124 His 
claim early in the speech that it is “by literature I have lived, and through literature I 
have been content to serve my country,” is affirmed in the rest of his address.125 His 
rhetoric rests on storytelling, as he recounts an “old indisputable, very well-known 
story, which has so pointed a moral at the end of it,” and evokes images of the 
“miserable people,” and “seething, hard-worked millions” whose needs are not met by 
their government.126 
As such, Knezevic argues, we see that in Dickens’s “idea of the public sphere 
what counts is not so much the enlightenment emphasis on reason but an emphasis on 
sentiment capable of mobilizing the reading public in the cause of reform – a 
sentimental re-education of civil society.”127 In Purity, Franzen gives voice to a 
number of similar assertions through Andreas Wolf, contrasting the internet age’s 
supposed penchant for democratisation with the fact that its “ruling elites consisted of 
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the grasping, brutal old species of humanity” operating an impoverished public life.128 
Franzen is, similarly to Dickens, loath to hold up reason as the answer to these public 
problems, as the societal fears (“of unpopularity and uncoolness, […] of missing out, 
[…] of being flamed or forgotten”) that produce the internet’s “state of nature” are all 
“entirely reasonable.”129 Indeed, these fears are “the product of reason,” or, rather, the 
product of a technocratic society defined by its “impatience with irrationality.”130 
Franzen’s alignment of the internet with a state of nature here is strange, as he also 
suggests that one of the main problems with “technocracy” is its overt interference in 
social life, particularly how it seeks “to liberate humanity from its humanness through 
the efficiency of markets and the rationality of machines.”131 By focussing on this 
apparently insidious ‘liberation,’ however, Franzen puts forward an analogous 
argument for the need for a sentimental re-education of civil society: if one wishes to 
resist technocracy, maintaining a sense of humanness will be key.  
If it is opposed to efficiency and rationality, we might think of humanness here 
as instead connected with affective states – states that the author of the realist novel is 
far more equipped to intelligently foreground, we might presume, than the brutally 
rational technocratic imagination. Yet even if Franzen’s critique of technocracy here 
serves mainly to prop up his arguments for a stabilised literary authority located in the 
author figure, the contradictions of his contribution remain. In Wolf’s tirade, 
technocracy’s apparent promotion of mechanic rationality over irrational humanness 
is held up as a threat; in Franzen’s treatment of journalism, the appeal by digital culture 
to intimate emotions and personal opinions appears to frustrate the author. This kind 
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of split is common in Franzen’s work – as Colin Hutchinson has noted, Franzen wavers 
“between a radical and a pragmatic political outlook[,] and between a rejection of, and 
a persistent adherence to, traditional distinctions between ‘high’ and ‘low’ culture.”132 
Hutchinson includes both Franzen’s own work and his critical reception in this 
analysis, suggesting that “themes of entrapment within circularities, and of resistance 
being undermined by ambivalent impulses, are at the heart of The Corrections,” and 
also of his work’s reception.133 In particular, Hutchinson highlights the contradictory 
claims of James Wood, for whom “Franzen’s approach is insufficiently conservative,” 
and James Annesley, for whom “Franzen’s fiction is too conservative.”134 Bearing in 
mind that this double stance has so far defined Franzen’s career can provide another 
way of reading the author’s relationship to Dickens. In light of Franzen’s unstable 
relationship with reputation and authority, Dickens becomes a figure who stands for a 
certain kind of authorship, and a certain mode of being in the public sphere – a writer 
who can be better understood as an analogue not for Franzen’s style, but for his 
attitude.  
For Dickens, success came with its own struggles: “the public sphere of 
unregulated print and vocal culture seemed increasingly dangerous and 
unsympathetic” to him as his work became more and more popular.135 Ivan Kreilkamp 
has noted how, in the passage from Great Expectations that I earlier highlighted, in 
which Mr. Jaggers and Mr. Wopsle argue over a newspaper, readers can identify “two 
competing models of literary reception: one in which reading is a creative public 
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performance of a script-text, and another in which it is an exact decoding.”136 Dickens 
himself oscillated between critique and endorsement of these two models of reading, 
as his potential discomfort with the tenor of popular discussions of his work was 
tempered by the dependence of his popularity on such discussions. Kreilkamp suggests 
that, “in Dickens’s writings and his performances of authorship, we witness a new 
kind of uneasy reconciliation with a mass audience,” and as such his experience of 
fame resonates strongly with discussions of Franzen’s own literary celebrity.137 This 
is most notable in relation to Franzen’s controversial comments about the selection of 
The Corrections for the Oprah Winfrey Book Club. It may well be the case, as Jeremy 
Green suggests, that the “fractured terrain of cultural authority” foregrounded by the 
Book Club controversy “reflects the objective status of the literary novel in the media 
age,” but the mass of contradictions generated by Franzen’s response also functions 
as a link between the contemporary moment and Dickens’s own era.138 If, for Franzen, 
being a public novelist is more about being in public than about being a novelist, as I 
earlier suggested, his conflicted view of literary authority can be partly explained by 
the apparent ceding of authority from the novel to the novelist, not as author but as 
celebrity. We can identify a particularly ambivalent stance in Franzen’s tendency to 
play up to this situation, one that mirrors Dickens’s uneasy reconciliation. As 
Hutchinson summarises, Franzen enters into “an incoherent circularity that castigates 
extraliterary culture even as it seeks justification from that culture.”139 This attitude 
represents a significant but hitherto overlooked connection between Franzen’s work 
and Dickens’s, and is just as important to understanding Purity’s antecedents as the 
                                                          
136 Ibid, 96. 
137 Ibid, 99.  
138 Jeremy Green, Late Postmodernism: American Fiction at the Millennium (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005), 96. 
139 Hutchinson, “Politics of Disengagement,” 198. 
79 
 
authors’ complimentary treatments of secrecy. By attending to one further critique of 
the internet that Franzen foregrounds in Purity, I will be able to highlight the problems 
that Franzen’s reliance on his own celebrity create for his model of authorially centred 
literary publicness. 
Strongman Motion 
Franzen’s references to Dickens are in my reading related to his ambivalence 
about the workings of literary authority – in this regard, Great Expectations is once 
again an apposite text to reference. Edward W. Said argues that Great Expectations 
represents an exemplary staging of the problem of literary authority, particularly 
novelistic authority. He points out that Pip’s drive for authority in Dickens’s novel 
(the attempt to meet his ‘great expectations’) is problematized by his awareness of the 
origins of his benefactor. For Said, this encapsulates the problem of novelistic 
authority, a form of authority which he argues is tempered by ‘molestation.’ 
Molestation here refers to the implicit “sham” of a novelist’s claims to authority – it 
“occurs when novelists and critics traditionally remind themselves of how the novel 
is always subject to a comparison with reality and thereby found to be an illusion.”140 
For Franzen, the biggest threat to literary authority lies not in awareness of the novel 
form’s ‘molestation,’ however, but in how novels are considered in the internet age. 
As I have suggested, Franzen particularly laments what he sees as the ceding of 
authority from the novel-as-contribution to the novelist-as-celebrity, even as he plays 
up to this transfer by appealing to his credentials as a public intellectual. Indeed, 
Franzen confuses things further by aligning himself with his characters’ views (his 
suggestion in one interview that “there’s no way to make myself not male,”141 for 
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example, echoes Andreas Wolf’s claim that he “never asked to be born male”), and 
thus inviting readers to find connections between him and his characters.142 Altes 
argues that this phenomenon arises from the “tensions between […] the author as 
private and public person, which intensify readers’ search for the author’s ‘true’ 
communicative attitude.”143 It is precisely these tensions, and this search for 
communicative attitude, that Franzen draws attention to in Purity, in order to justify 
his simultaneous critique and endorsement of a literary publicness focussed on the 
authority of the author figure. He attempts this justification primarily through what 
Seshagiri calls the novel’s “governing analogy,” which casts the internet as a 
totalitarian technology.144  
In the novel’s penultimate chapter, Wolf compares the East German 
government of his youth with what he refers to as the “New Regime” of the internet 
age, calling both “totalitarian.”145 This metaphor lends itself to multiple 
interpretations, including one related to literary authority. But it is first worth 
unpacking the metaphor on Franzen’s own terms, and noting that he seems aware of 
its ambiguity – as Wolf observes, several people misunderstand him when he uses the 
word, inferring claims about “total surveillance, total mind control, [and] gray armies 
in parade with medium-range missiles.”146 Instead, Wolf means to draw comparisons 
between the “apparatchiks” of both regimes, their corresponding “buzzwords”, and 
their braggadocio – that is, the role of agents within the system.147 Most centrally, 
however, Wolf means to refer to “a system that was impossible to opt out of,” a claim 
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which then deflects attention from individual agency.148 If totalitarianism is Purity’s 
governing analogy, then it is a paradoxical one. Yet this is part and parcel of the 
ideology itself. Hannah Arendt’s work on totalitarianism highlights the “paradoxical 
situation” of “a movement, international in organization, all-comprehensive in its 
ideological scope, and global in its political aspiration, seiz[ing] power in one 
country.”149  But the internet’s borderless ‘Regime’ appears to solve this problem of 
domination, and Wolf’s claim could be taken to follow from Arendt’s provocation that 
the “potentialities [of totalitarianism] can be fully realized […] only when no human 
being can any longer live outside its murderous domination.”150  
Even with Wolf’s caveat that he means to highlight the internet’s cultural 
dominance with his references to totalitarianism, however, Franzen’s decision to 
compare the German Democratic Republic with the ‘New Regime’ of the internet age 
may still seem strange, particularly how he seems to conflate a technology with a 
political ideology. Indeed, as Hidalga suggests, “it is hard […] not to feel that positing 
the Web and its ubiquity as what is most wrong with the world today is an ideological 
act” itself, one that might be taken to “dismiss and drive out of focus a variety of social 
and political problems.”151 Franzen’s analogy, however, does lend itself to a social and 
political reading. As Castells has usefully highlighted, “in the last quarter of the 
twentieth century […] a new social structure predominantly based on networks” 
emerged, and the internet “became the lever for the transition to a new form of society 
– the network society.”152 Despite the “horizontal communication” enabled by the 
network form, “the most important role of the internet in structuring social 
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relationships is its contribution to the new pattern of sociability based on 
individualism.”153 As Arendt has claimed, totalitarianism “could not exist without 
destroying the public realm of life,” which it does by “isolating” people, and as such 
“destroying […] their political capacities.”154 One reading of Franzen’s analogy, then, 
might maintain that it highlights how the technologizing of network relations in the 
internet age powerfully renders them as instruments of individualism, decimating the 
public realm. Yet, once again, the contradictions of Franzen’s metaphor are still 
conspicuous – if the metaphor is to work, it requires more attention to the structures 
and systems of the internet than Franzen’s novel allows for. In Purity, the metaphor’s 
real value lies in what it tells us about Franzen’s problems with literary authority.  
It is notable that the character who describes the internet as totalitarian is 
Andreas Wolf (who Franzen aligns himself with to an extent), and that he does so in 
a section of the novel where he also considers his public reputation. At one point, Wolf 
observes that, “in his own case, when he’d started to be properly famous, he’d 
recognized that fame, as a phenomenon, had migrated to the internet, and that the 
internet’s architecture made it easy for his enemies to shape the Wolf narrative.”155 
Franzen’s characterisation of the internet here chimes with his focus elsewhere in 
Purity on how literature is considered in the public sphere – his portrayal of the internet 
suggests that the technology is partly responsible for what he sees as the public 
sphere’s excessive focus on the prior ethos of authors, rather than on what they have 
written. In light of this, it is worth reconsidering a question that Franzen initially posed 
in “Why Bother?,” of whether the cultural frames that the internet produces have made 
it more difficult for a writer “who’s really serious about resisting a culture of 
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inauthentic mass-marketed image [to] resist becoming an image himself.”156 This 
question is inevitably accompanied by another, however, about the extent to which we 
can think of Franzen as a resistant author. Again, Wolf’s tirade is relevant here, as he 
goes on to propose that there exists “in utopianly titled books […] a smarmy syrup of 
convenient conviction and personal surrender” to the New Regime of internet 
boosterism.157 Might this suggest that there is a degree of convenient conviction and 
personal surrender in such utopianly titled books as Freedom and Purity? The context 
of Franzen’s career since the publication of Freedom certainly provides an interesting 
perspective from which to re-examine the relationship between his fiction, non-fiction, 
and popular discussions of his work. Franzen’s complaint in “Why Bother?” that Time 
magazine “not long ago aspired to shape the national taste, [but] now serves mainly to 
reflect it,” takes on a different significance in the context of Franzen’s own appearance 
on that magazine’s cover in 2010.158 Likewise, his comments on Mark Leyner’s 
strategy of marketing “by making fun of marketing […] on Letterman,” are interesting 
to note in light of Franzen’s own appearances on The Late Show with Stephen Colbert, 
and Late Night with Seth Meyers.159 Indeed, Franzen seems to have adopted Leyner’s 
approach to marketing: his appearance in a video clip for the latter show’s YouTube 
channel, in which he performs a reading from Purity with deliberately heavy-handed, 
tongue-in-cheek references to Adidas products inserted throughout, is a parody of 
product placement that seems to balk at the very idea that a novel could be co-opted 
in the same way that journalism and television have been, even if promotion is an 
inevitable part of the contemporary writer’s working life.160  
                                                          
156 Jonathan Franzen, “Why Bother?,” in How To Be Alone (London: 4th Estate, 2010), 86. 
157 Franzen, Purity, 448. 
158 Franzen, “Why Bother?,” 62. 
159 Ibid, 85. 
160 “Jonathan Franzen Reads From Purity, Paperback Sponsored By Adidas,” YouTube, video, 3:25, 
posted by “Late Night with Seth Meyers,” August 6, 2016, 
84 
 
Yet even if these appearances seem to represent a departure from Franzen’s 
assertion that “the writer for whom the printed word is paramount is, ipso facto, an 
untelevisable personality,” Franzen is more than capable of maintaining a double 
stance towards his audience.161 Through Andreas Wolf, Franzen seems to imply that, 
since the structures of fame have migrated to the internet, and since the internet is an 
unavoidable context that champions individualism, fame and its appurtenances are 
phenomena that high-profile writers simply must contend with:  
He could either ignore the haters and suffer the consequences, or he could 
accept the premises of the system, however sophomoric he found them, and 
increase its power and pervasiveness by participating in it. He’d chosen the 
latter, but the particular choice didn’t matter.162 
Just as he has characterised the internet’s totalitarianism as robbing subjects of their 
agency, Franzen here looks to play down his agency as a writer of contemporary 
literature. The note of resignation this strikes marks an important moment in Franzen’s 
work. Across his essays, Franzen has criticised the ideology of technological 
consumerism, suggesting that “media technology” is to blame for a “national 
foregrounding of the personal,”163 and that “subjectivity […] is the essence of the 
blog.”164 He claims that such radical individualism not only commodifies social 
relationships, but causes the private and public worlds to bleed into one another.165  In 
its ideological insistence that the personal be publicised, the internet represents “the 
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ugly spectacle of a privacy triumphant.”166 But whereas in “Why Bother?” Franzen 
was worried about the risk of “writing fiction that makes the same point over and over: 
technological consumerism is an infernal machine,” in Purity he suggests that he has 
no choice but to do this.167 
Purity serves as a contribution to the public sphere that does indeed make this 
same point over and over, even if doing so in a novel marks Franzen’s attempt at a 
formally different approach to making it. His reliance on the authority that he derives 
from being a ‘public novelist,’ however, embeds within Purity a reading that 
encourages the lens of the personal. Indeed, whereas Henry James’s writing of 
prefaces “historicisizes his relation to the artwork by embedding it in the history of his 
consciousness in order to claim the authority of origins,” Franzen historicisizes his 
relation to Purity by embedding in it that same history of compositional struggle.168 
As with James, “the text becomes a history of his struggles to compose; the reader 
reads for authorial performance; the imperfect text signifies an imperfect world and 
an idealized author who therefore does not fit in that world except as totem.”169 In 
Purity, Franzen must work against his reputation, preface the novel within itself, and 
employ an essayistic tone to reify, paradoxically, his self-sufficiency as authoritative 
novelist. 
Yet the response to Franzen’s latest essay collection, The End of the End of the 
Earth (2018), suggests that his attempts at authority have not been successful. When 
one piece from the collection was published online, a list of Franzen’s “ten rules for 
novelists,” it attracted such ire from online commentators that several news outlets 
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published pieces chronicling its “trolling.”170 Ironically, the scale of this public 
mockery proves the premise of Purity’s argument more than the novel itself could. For 
Franzen’s work is by no means as misanthropic as his reputation has it. At the end of 
Purity, when Pip has completely extricated herself from the Sunlight Project, she 
returns to her hometown and gets a job at the café where she had previously read the 
New York Times every Sunday. She rekindles her relationship with Jason, and begins 
to rebuild her life. The novel’s final sentences strike a hopeful note:  
It had to be possible to do better than her parents, but she wasn’t sure that she 
would. Only when the skies opened again, the rain from the immense dark 
western ocean pounding on the car roof, the sound of love drowning out the 
other sound, did she believe that she might.171 
After forgoing the affirmation that she has previously received from Andreas Wolf, 
the Sunlight Project, and her parents, Pip can envisage a new life for herself. 
Bombarded by the onslaught of rain, listening to her parents argue inside a nearby 
cabin, she finds herself able to take comfort with Jason, and work towards a better 
future in a relationship that was born of good conversation. Perhaps, like Pip, when 
Franzen is free of the forms of authority he formerly depended on, he will be able to 
do the same.
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Dave Eggers: Platforms and Privacy 
Totally Wired 
In 1993, the editorial staff of Wired magazine moved out of their offices in San 
Francisco and into a larger space two floors up in the same building. Their old floor 
was quickly filled by the landlord, a consultant who had helped to launch the monthly 
publication about technology, culture, and politics. Among the replacement tenants 
were the editors of a new magazine, Might, whose number included the twenty-three-
year-old Dave Eggers. In his memoir A Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius 
(2000), Eggers recalls the mixture of contempt and awe he and his friends felt for the 
“young creative elite of San Francisco” who worked for the “countless start-up 
software companies, Web developers, [and] Internet providers” nearby.1 While 
proximity alone was enough to make Eggers “kind of even believe” the widespread 
internet boosterism of the area, he also knew that this kind of thinking was resulting in 
a lot of people “doing dumb, doomed things.”2 And even if there was “no prestige like 
the prestige in working for Wired,” Might’s brand of detached irony meant that the 
staff could not “let on that we’re part of this scene, or any scene.”3 The public face of 
the editors, based on the “ridiculing [of] other magazines, especially Wired upstairs,” 
obscured the effective private seduction by which cyberutopianism was winding its 
way into the hearts of even the most resistant.4 
This reluctant acquiescence was due less to any engagement with emergent 
technologies themselves than to the culture surrounding their creation – we can see in 
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Eggers’s parodic detailing of the lives of Silicon Valley workers (the “sophisticated 
and gorgeous youth […] each day lathered in sun and possibility”5) a reflection of the 
claim that an editorial for the UK edition of Wired made in 1996, that “Technology = 
Culture” and “Culture = Technology.”6 Before such bold claims became mainstream, 
however, while Eggers was downstairs writing parodies, Wired were asking the kind 
of questions that would very much come to interest the author twenty years later – 
including, in one article by Steven Levy, the question of “whether privacy will exist in 
the 21st century.”7 This concern lies at the heart of Eggers’s 2013 novel The Circle, 
which is set in a near future San Francisco where the titular technology company has 
monopolised the social internet. The legacy of Eggers’s early exploration of Silicon 
Valley in A Heartbreaking Work is identifiable in The Circle, which argues that 
privacy, power, and the public sphere are all being refigured by the culture surrounding 
technology as much as by technology itself. 
For Eggers, the institutional seat of this cultural shift is Silicon Valley. As Zara 
Dinnen points out, The Circle is chiefly concerned with “the becoming historical event 
of Silicon Valley,” the early history of which depended on the “two-pronged 
instantiation of sanctioned knowledge and counterculture experimentation in the San 
Francisco Bay area.”8 The importance of “slacker-turned-cyber manifestos expounded 
by magazines such as Wired” to this story should not be underplayed – in the early 
1990s these magazines produced “a peculiarly localized ethos of the potential future 
of digital technologies that underwrites many of our contemporary encounters with 
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that technology.”9 As A Heartbreaking Work shows, Eggers was particularly tuned in 
to this localized ethos. Indeed, when The Circle was released, the author was keen to 
play down the existence of any “real-life corollaries” for the titular company whilst 
simultaneously affirming his credentials for writing the novel in terms of proximity 
(“I’ve been living in the Bay Area for most of the last twenty years, so I’ve been very 
close to it all for a long time”).10 This position mirrors the one that Eggers describes 
in his memoir: “We begin to perfect a balance between being close to where things are 
happening, knowing the people involved and their patterns, while keeping our 
distance, an outsider’s mentality, even among other outsiders.”11 
The ethos that Eggers was tuned into, however, was not just localized but 
specialized – the distance he maintains is specifically that of a journalistic detachment. 
Detectable amidst the complex of reasons for Might’s disparaging stance towards 
Wired is a position on the role of magazine journalism in the era of the commercial 
internet’s nascence. With a tongue-in-cheek tone aware of his youthful over-optimism, 
Eggers describes his attempts to create “the very first meaningful magazine in the 
history of civilization,” as compared with the “computer rags” running out of the same 
building. For Might, the aim is to take a “mute mass of human potential and […] mold 
it into a political force” – “advertising [and] distribution” are just “flotsam.”12 In this 
section of A Heartbreaking Work, Eggers’s anxieties about journalism are mostly 
absorbed into the book’s broader concerns with irony and sincerity, but he also berates 
similar ideas to those that Franzen does in Purity – the boosterism, sycophancy, and 
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commercialism of the so-called computer rags. This perspective stays with Eggers all 
the way through to the publication of The Circle. But whereas in Purity Franzen looks 
to convince readers that “the best stories come when you’re out in the field,” and that 
“it takes a journalist to collate and condense and contextualize” the information that 
leakers inundate the internet with, Eggers dramatizes a world where this is no longer 
considered true.13 The threat to journalism in The Circle is not state surveillance (as 
Levy’s Wired article had suggested in 1993), nor increasingly lax standards of 
journalism (as Franzen fears), but the logic of Silicon Valley itself.  
In a 2017 report for The Tow Center for Digital Journalism, Emily Bell and 
Taylor Owen claimed that “the influence of social media platforms and technology 
companies is having a greater effect on American journalism than even the shift from 
print to digital.”14 Although The Circle does not focus its attentions on journalism for 
long, one scene imagines the possible extent of this effect. One of the Circle’s products 
is an openly accessible network of cameras around the world called SeeChange, which 
users can access livestreams from at any time. When the novel’s protagonist Mae 
Holland takes a tour of the Circle’s “newsroom,” she notes that the company’s “news 
gatherers” (no longer ‘journalists’) 
were able to do most of their reporting via SeeChange. There were now over a 
hundred million cameras functional and accessible around the world, making 
in-person reporting unnecessarily expensive and dangerous, to say nothing of 
the carbon expenditures.15 
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The seemingly virtuous reasons given for this sea change in reporting practices, 
however, are cast in a sceptical light by the preceding passage, when Mae first enters 
the newsroom: 
[It was] modelled on old-time newspaper offices, with a hundred low cubicles, 
news tickers and clocks everywhere, each desk with a retro analog telephone, 
a row of white buttons below the numbers, blinking arrhythmically. There were 
old printers, fax machines, telex devices, letterpresses. The décor, of course, 
was for show. All the retro machines were nonfunctional.16 
Although appearing to acknowledge the long history of journalistic practices, the 
Circle’s model only comprises now-obsolete technology. The machines no longer 
function not just because they have been replaced by more efficient ones, however: the 
style-over-substance newsroom also points to a time when journalism has been 
disconnected from its historical values. Eggers’s novel suggests that the acquisitive 
logic of Silicon Valley must lead to such an end. For him, Bell and Owen’s findings 
would surely not state the case urgently enough – it is not just that “publishing is no 
longer the core activity of certain journalism organizations,” and that technology 
companies have “forced news organizations to rethink their processes and 
structures.”17 Rather, the future might be one in which journalism as an entire industry 
is absorbed by Silicon Valley. If it is in the nature of these companies to be 
expansionary, Eggers asks, what is at stake?  
The Circle attempts to answer this question, as Eggers examines the ideological 
reach of corporate power and what this means for privacy, work, democracy, and the 
public sphere. He draws attention to key practices and qualities of Silicon Valley 
companies, and highlights the corporate obsession with data collection as a potential 
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threat to democracy through its revision of the public sphere’s relation to privacy. Just 
as Franzen responds to a crisis of the authority of individual voices in the public sphere 
by modelling a form of literary publicness that centres on trusted author figures, 
Eggers’s literary publicness sets great stall by the idea of authorship – The Circle 
demonstrates how Eggers’s form of literary publicness rests on making political 
critiques through literary forms and styles in a performance of authorial expertise. 
Furthermore, a number of his other books focus on telling the stories of real people he 
has met, a move which suggests Eggers’s alignment with Franzen’s belief in the 
filtering function of the author.18 But Eggers is also more interested than Franzen in 
the contexts in which authors work, both societally and institutionally, and his literary 
publicness incorporates this interest. Indeed, he has extended his belief in the 
importance of authorship well beyond published writers, particularly in his work as an 
activist and advocate for the literacy charity 826 National.19 The charity comprises a 
network of different ‘chapters’ across America that work within communities to 
provide writing classes for students aged six to eighteen – as their website glosses it, 
“while each 826 community is unique, our common practices and vision unify us.”20 
In The Circle, however, Eggers highlights the difficulty of championing these ideas 
when corporations have co-opted the ideals of community and communication to self-
interested ends.21 Caroline Hamilton has suggested that it is “through books [that 
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Eggers] affirms the power within the individual and the community” – if this remains 
the case in The Circle, it is because Eggers is able to frame literature as a potential 
curative to the internet’s effects on one arena where individuals and communities 
overlap: the public sphere.22 
Silicon Values 
The Circle draws attention to what Eggers sees as the insidious operations of 
Silicon Valley companies by thematising platform capitalism – a business model 
focussed on providing software and hardware to connect users rather than just trying 
to sell directly to them, typified by corporate entities such as Google, Apple, and 
Facebook. Nick Srnicek points out that critical reflection about these platforms has 
mostly “focused on them as political and cultural actors,” neglecting the fact that “they 
are first and foremost economic actors […] operating within a capitalist economy.”23 
Yet Eggers does not overlook this aspect; he highlights how the company’s drive for 
profit inflects every encounter Circle users engage in.24 As a Circle user, Mae 
consistently demonstrates a mode of interaction with others that legitimates and 
supports what one character calls the Circle’s “ruthless capitalistic ambition.”25 In one 
scene, Mae posts pictures of her ex-boyfriend Mercer’s artwork on various design 
appreciation pages, thinking that “if he wasn’t smart enough to get business for 
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himself, she would be happy to do it for him.”26 She ignores his protests, instead 
focussing on raising his “ranking” on one particular site, searching for feedback that 
would make his “resistance […] fall away.”27 Mae is the ideal Circle user, as Mercer’s 
complaints attest: “every time I see or hear from you, it’s through this filter. You send 
me links, you quote someone talking about me [… and] it becomes like we’re never 
alone.”28 In this instance, Mae has become what Kylie Jarrret describes as “the 
endlessly phatic subject who continues to express his or herself through, and because 
of, these mediating platforms.”29  
Even these parts of the novel concerning what appear to be cultural interactions 
can be convincingly understood in economic terms. As Jarrett notes, “user activity […] 
adds value” to platform companies, be that through “the tangible production of content 
[… or] the traces of user activity […] sold to advertisers.”30 Writing about Facebook, 
Jarrett outlines how, “in the context of commercial websites, such data exchanges can 
be seen as a form of exploitation, as they are unpaid contributions to the content of the 
site and the economic surplus generated by the company.”31 Through projects such as 
Retail Raw (which calculates “the total gross purchase price of […] products” Circle 
users recommend to each other), PastPerfect (a family history project using “billions” 
of photos and videos provided by “the digital community”), and LuvLuv (a dating site 
that gathers information about people from their social media profiles32), the Circle 
can be seen to represent the apotheosis of “a capitalism that has an enhanced capacity 
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to extract value directly from our sociality.”33 No wonder, then, that when Mae first 
visits the Circle’s campus, and finds that the paths cutting through it are made up of 
“tiles with imploring messages of inspiration,” one commands her to “Find 
Community.”34 Time and again, Mae is reminded of the importance of community to 
the Circle’s endeavours – in a briefing, her supervisor places emphasis on “the 
fostering of community”; she is encouraged to visit a coworker’s page and write 
something on the wall” as an “act of community”; another of the company’s slogans is 
“Community First.”35 In all these cases, however, what it seems that communities are 
important to is merely the tautological advancement of the company’s culture of 
community. For Mae’s boss, the reason that “communication should never be in 
doubt” is simply because “it’s what we do here” – he never offers any elucidation as 
to why this is a preferable state of affairs, instead simply echoing the steadfast belief 
in connection that is often provided by technology companies as their raison d'être.36 
Yet the Circle’s economic ambitions are once again key here: connection and 
community bolster the company’s endeavours because, as Srnicek reminds us, “one of 
the key features of platforms is their reliance on (and ability to generate) network 
effects.”37 This means that “the more users are using a platform,” and the stronger their 
community becomes, “the more valuable that platform becomes for everyone” – 
including the platform themselves.38  
Yet it is not only Circle users’ absorption of its culture that Eggers concerns 
himself with. He recognises that the increasingly pervasive culture of Silicon Valley 
is a “culture of work, of workaholism,” as Castells puts it, and so extends his 
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exploration to how the Circle’s labour practices also perpetuate their cultural values.39 
One particular scene points to the facets of work that most interest Eggers. After a 
heated argument with Mercer at her parent’s house one night, Mae drives past a kayak 
rental business that she frequently uses, and which she has been chastised by her Circle 
colleagues for not sharing information about online. Upon finding that the business 
has closed for the evening, Mae borrows an unattended kayak and sets out across the 
water to an island on the bay. Over the next few pages, Eggers highlights the 
uncertainty and ephemerality of Mae’s situation: a seal appears and she “wondered, 
briefly, if the seal would follow her […] but the next time she turned around, the animal 
was gone”; “the distances” between landmarks are “impossible to tell”; she becomes 
“aware of the millions of permutations possible around her, and take[s] comfort in 
knowing she would not, and really could not, know much at all.”40 All this stands 
firmly in opposition to the Circle’s ethos that “ALL THAT HAPPENS MUST BE 
KNOWN.”41 It is also important to note that, before Mae borrows the kayak, she 
compares Mercer (a “man, fast approaching thirty, making antler chandeliers”) to 
herself (“who worked at the Circle!”).42 Mae’s defining feature in her own mind has 
become her work, and it is this context that must be kept in the reader’s mind when 
Mae indulges in her leisure activity, which has been framed in opposition to the 
ideology of the Circle. In doing so, Eggers’ sly reveal at the end of this section, that 
the owner of the kayak business is called “Ms. Lefebvre,” becomes a telling one.43 
Evgeny Morozov has claimed that The Circle’s depiction of “unceasing and 
utterly trivial updates delivered to [users] on a rapidly proliferating number of screens” 
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is a portrayal of “mediated boredom,” one which echoes philosopher and sociologist 
Henri Lefebvre’s description of a similar “modern condition in a splendid essay from 
the early nineteen-sixties.”44 Eggers may well “sit firmly in Lefebvre’s camp,” but if 
he is directing his readers towards Henri Lefebvre’s work with the inclusion of Ms. 
Lefebvre in Mae’s leisure activity, another aspect of the philosopher’s writing appears 
to be more relevant.45 In his Critique of Everyday Life Vol. 1, Lefebvre suggests that 
“leisure […] cannot be separated from work,” given that “we work to earn our leisure, 
and leisure only has one meaning: to get away from work.”46 It is surely this idea that 
is most apposite here: the dialectic of work and leisure, at “the same time united and 
contradictory.”47 Yet Lefebvre’s remarks stand somewhat in contrast to the situation 
in The Circle. For employees of the Circle, work does not earn leisure. Rather, leisure 
is work. Circle employees’ social media use is aggregated into a Participation Rank 
and considered to be “integral to participation” in the culture of the company, but so 
too is attendance at social events.48 When she fails to attend a brunch organised by a 
colleague, Mae is reprimanded for “causing worry and emotional distress […] not to 
mention threatening the delicate ecology” of the workplace; when she attends an event 
that night on the campus, she ensures that her supervisors know she is there, and is 
“happy they’d seen her, had registered her attendance” by the time she leaves.49  
Furthermore, Mae’s work is also framed as leisure – most of her labour 
comprises social interactions that mirror Circle employees’ mandatory leisure 
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activities. In her initial role in ‘Customer Experience’, Mae interacts with Circle users 
to answer their queries. In a briefing for the role, Mae is told that she “should always 
be sure to inject humanity into the process,” 50 and her job includes producing what 
Jarret calls the “troika of affective immaterial products within contemporary capital,” 
as she communicates with customers to give them knowledge about the Circle in a way 
that produces a social relationship.51 As the novel progresses, and as Mae’s visibility 
increases, these social relations become more intense, producing very strong affective 
responses in customers, as when one woman claims that Mae knows her “pretty well 
by now” simply after Mae signs a petition and briefly browses her online profile.52 The 
importance of such interactions is amongst the “core beliefs [of] the company”, and 
the “fostering of community” is considered “just as important as the work” the Circle 
does.53 This is surely because a lot of the work done in ‘Customer Experience’ is 
precisely to create the same sense of community that keeps users coming back to Circle 
products. 
Another of Lefebvre’s claims, that “leisure and work and ‘private life’ make 
up a dialectical system,”54 is brought to mind at the end of The Circle, in Ty’s warning 
to Mae that the company’s ideology means that “public-private leads to private-
private.”55 Readers might infer that this is the trajectory of all such dialectics under the 
Circle’s dispensation: online-offline becomes online-online, work-leisure becomes 
work-work (even as Circle employees convince themselves that it is leisure-leisure). 
When one of Mae’s supervisors calls her into his office to talk about her role in the 
company, he once again parrots the company’s obsession with community: “We see 
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the workplace as a community, and every person who works here is part of that 
community. And to make it all work it requires a certain level of participation.”56 The 
double meaning of this last line, with its implication that the Circle wants to make 
everything into work, is indicative of the attitude to work that The Circle presents. The 
culture of community from which the Circle extracts value and perpetuates its power 
is seen here to extend to any who interact with it, including its employees. The belief 
that leisure cannot be separated from work is truly embodied by the Circle, in a way 
that goes beyond the meaning of the claim for Lefebvre himself. 
The economic endeavours of platforms are clearly an important element of 
their motivations, and Eggers’s interest in the labour of Circle users and employees 
situates these endeavours as central to his exploration of technology companies’ 
dominance. Indeed, The Circle’s effective demonstration of how social connection is 
co-opted by platforms for profit is a key part of Eggers’s contribution to debates about 
the internet’s effects on society. Yet focussing solely on the Circle’s drive for profit 
would do little to distinguish platforms from any other kind of corporation. To properly 
understand Eggers’s engagement with platforms, and how it relates to the public 
sphere, it is important to examine how he situates the Circle’s accumulation of 
economic power within the frames of culture and politics. Eggers makes it clear that 
the Circle should be taken as a company comprising all three strands of Silicon 
Valley’s rise (the political, cultural, and economic) through the company’s founders, 
the ‘Three Wise Men.’ If Manuel Castells believes that “the Internet entrepreneur is a 
two-headed creature,” combining tech-savvy creators and venture capitalists, then 
Eggers thinks it is more Cerberean.57 The Circle’s “world-striding CEO” Tom Stenton 
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is a “self-described Capitalist Prime” who undeniably fuels the company’s rise, but he 
does not do this alone.58 The other two founders, Ty Gospodinov and Eamon Bailey, 
are equally important to the Circle’s dominance – the former is the epitome of a tech-
wunderkind cliché, brilliantly innovative and often self-effacing, who later becomes 
the novel’s voice of political uncertainty; the latter is an out-and-out performer who 
embodies the culture of the Circle with boundless optimism, “a first-term Teddy 
Roosevelt, accessible and genuine and loud.”59  
Morozov has berated his “occasional fellow travelers who write literary essays 
or works of fiction attacking Silicon Valley,” such as “Jonathan Franzen, Dave Eggers, 
[and] Zadie Smith,” because their “attacks mostly focus on the values and beliefs of 
the companies’ founders.”60 For Morozov, this attention misses the point – it betrays 
a naïve assumption that “tech entrepreneurs could simply be talked out of the 
disruption that they are wreaking on the world.”61 More than this, it reaffirms a tired 
liberal humanist belief in the transformative powers of literature: “if Mark Zuckerberg 
would just miraculously choose a tome by Isaiah Berlin or Karl Kraus for his ongoing 
reading marathon, everything could still go back to normal.”62 Eggers does arguably 
betray such a belief, but if he wants to persuade anyone of anything it’s simply his 
readers, tech entrepreneurs or not. And if Eggers focusses on the potentially curative 
elements of culture, he does not do so out of naiveite. Rather, he does so precisely 
because he recognises that Silicon Valley has cemented its economic and political 
power through the inculcation of its own culture into the lives of its users. In The 
Circle, Eggers enters debates about how the internet is changing contemporary life, 
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arguing that when it comes to understanding the effects of platforms on broader 
society, we cannot separate the political, cultural, and economic issues at play – and 
nowhere is this clearer than in his novel’s treatment of the public sphere. 
Democracy 2.0 
In one scene in The Circle, Eamon Bailey introduces a new initiative at a public 
meeting by declaring his belief that “it’s the natural state of information to be free.”63 
Bailey’s sentiment casts corporations as liberators of information, defenders of natural 
rights acting purely in the interests of its users, but the statement also harks once again 
to the economic revisions being wrought by platform capitalism. The idea itself is not 
exclusive to the internet age – as Cory Doctorow points out in his appositely titled 
Information Doesn’t Want to Be Free (published by Eggers’s own McSweeney’s 
Books), the founder of the Whole Earth Catalog Stewart Brand famously drew 
attention to the economic double bind information exists in as early as 1984: “On the 
one hand,” Brand claimed, “information wants to be expensive, because it’s so 
valuable. […] On the other hand, information wants to be free, because the cost of 
getting it out is getting lower and lower all the time.”64 The nuance of Brand’s idea has 
all but disappeared in Bailey’s version – information is no longer caught between two 
competing impulses, but instead has a natural state which it must be returned to. This 
evolution echoes Doctorow’s claim that the idea of free information “has gone from a 
useful way of provoking discussion about the philosophy of the information society to 
a trite slogan that obscures more than it illuminates.”65 In the Circle’s case, Bailey’s 
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slogan obscures the company’s primary ambition: Eggers knows that behind public 
paeans to information there often lies a private pining for saleable data. 
As Srnicek points out, “data is the basic resource that drives these firms,” who 
cash in as they “develop ways to siphon off and aggregate this information.”66  
Importantly, this “drive towards more and more data has a nefarious consequence: 
impingement on privacy becomes a necessary feature of platform capitalism.”67 In The 
Circle, this fact is where the cultural and economic strategies of platforms meet. The 
way that the Circle is said to have “crushed all meaningful opposition […] started with 
the commerce sites,” because these platforms began to require use of the Circle’s 
“TruYou” feature, an account tied to a user’s real identity.68 From here, “the actual 
buying habits of actual people were now eminently mappable and measurable, and the 
marketing to those actual people could be done with surgical precision” (a situation 
not too far from the present reality of many Facebook users).69 The way that Circle 
users consume information is apparently changed by TruYou – “the messages [they 
received] were more focused and accurate and, most of the time, even welcome” – and 
this newfound convenience placates users, at least enough for them not to mind that 
their information is being used to more successfully achieve the same ends as the 
previously “buckshot marketing that guessed, at best, within a mile of their desires.”70  
Silicon Valley’s inculcation of its culture of efficiency, novelty, and 
community into users means that they willingly provide their data for what is seen as 
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a beneficial economic payoff – impingement on privacy is perceived as a necessary 
feature, but not a nefarious one. The Circle’s analysis of platforms sharpens here, as 
Eggers suggests that when economic and cultural shifts occur, political changes will 
likely follow. The Circle’s culture of data extraction, born of a willing surrender of 
privacy, denigrates the public sphere by making everything public – by erasing the line 
between public and private that Habermas argues was so central to the bourgeois 
public sphere’s emergence. Eggers nods to the importance of the idea of the public 
throughout his engagement with platform capitalism: Bailey, the most vocal proponent 
of the Circle’s cultural values, is described as the “public face of the company”; when 
one Circle employee lectures Mae about the importance of community, she informs 
her that “community and communication come from the same root word, communis, 
Latin for common, public, shared by all or many.”71 But Eggers’s contribution to 
debates about the public sphere in the internet age is particularly prominent in his 
invention of one specific Circle product.  
Demoxie is an interface through which Circle users can vote on everything 
from “a local ordinance” to a referendum on “a new tax.”72 Even before its release, 
Mae suggests that Demoxie could allow the Circle to integrate government services 
such as voting and tax payment into their system, saving the country “hundreds of 
billions” of dollars – the company’s CEO even begins to wonder whether their system 
might be able to “eliminate much of Washington” altogether.73 For Carl Boggs, this 
was precisely the effect of increased corporate power in America across the twentieth 
century – “corporate colonization” undermined political discourse and governmental 
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efficacy, not least through “extensive lobbies and influence over legislative activity.”74 
Writing in 2000, Boggs argued that whatever “utopian hopes and dreams” the digital 
revolution offered for the public sphere had been dashed by its development into “yet 
another extension of the corporate multimedia complex.”75 Indeed, a number of Silicon 
Valley staples openly admit that this is their ultimate aim: for contemporary figures 
like Peter Thiel, co-founder of PayPal and an early investor in Facebook, “monopoly 
businesses like Google, Facebook, and Amazon serve as a welcome replacement for 
government.”76 Thiel has written about how large, dominant corporations avoid being 
“audited, scrutinized, and attacked,” suggesting that they “tend to do whatever they 
can to conceal their monopoly, usually by exaggerating the power of their 
(nonexistent) competition.”77 In The Circle, however, the titular corporation aren’t 
lying about their dominance – their explicit (and publicly broadcast) ambition is to 
“require every voting-age citizen to have a Circle account.”78 Rather, they are lying 
about their aims – they don’t want to “eliminate lobbyists” and “polls,” just other 
companies’ lobbyists, and polls that they do not administrate.79 Just as Bailey earlier 
cast the Circle as a liberator of information with no mention of the company’s use of 
data, Tom Stenton here frames them as liberators of American citizens without 
disclosing his private interests. The company’s decisive ambition, to perhaps “even 
eliminate congress,”80 is an all-too-recognisable version of “Thiel’s […] anti-
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democratic fantasy, where tech businesses set policy priorities rather than elected 
officials.”81 
The corporate takeover of democracy dramatized in The Circle is further 
demonstrated by the way Demoxie is run – it is, essentially, an app for data-gathering 
that is indistinguishable from the CircleSurveys that characters complete to register 
their consumer preferences elsewhere in the novel.82 But even when Demoxie is used 
to engage with political issues, claims that the Circle “might really perfect democracy” 
through direct and mandatory engagement with voters fail to see what is missing: the 
democratic public sphere’s dialogic element.83 At one point, while taking part in a test 
of Demoxie, Circle employees are told to imagine that they “had the direct and 
immediate ability to influence U.S. foreign policy,” before voting on whether or not to 
launch a drone strike “in a lightly populated area of rural Pakistan” with the aim of 
killing a known terrorist, “considering the likelihood of moderate collateral damage.”84 
For Mae, “the power felt real” when answering, but even for a question as politically 
charged (and potentially violent) as this one, she appears to have no chance to debate 
or discuss the decision with anyone other than herself.85 Mae is said to be “weighing 
the pros and cons,” but the short deliberation readers are given access to is one-sided, 
given that it goes on in her own head.86  
Eggers here traces a direct line from Mae’s inculcation with the Circle’s ideas 
and ideals to the monologic public sphere fostered by Demoxie. Because privacy is 
inextricably bound up with the notion of the public, when our relationship to the former 
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is changed, our relationship to the latter must be too. As Peter Boxall puts it, Eggers’s 
novel demonstrates how “the experience of hyperconnectivity that comes with the 
emergence of the internet leads to the loss of any kind of privacy, any sense that we 
can withdraw from the public sphere, into some inner space of contemplation or 
thought.”87 For even Mae’s apparent withdrawal inwards during her engagement with 
Demoxie cannot be thought of as the kind of contemplation that the liberal democratic 
public sphere requires. As Habermas argues in Between Facts and Norms, it is “an 
authoritarian, distorted public sphere that […] merely provides a forum for plebiscitary 
legitimation”; this in contrast to a liberal public sphere which, Habermas claims, both 
“prevents the accumulation of indoctrinated masses that are seduced by popular 
leaders,” and “pulls together the scattered critical potentials of a public,” allowing 
“subinstitutional political movements” to thrive (in theory).88 If Franzen feared 
technocracy’s totalitarian streak, then, we can see how Eggers is keen to establish the 
Circle’s corporatocracy as equally authoritarian. The questions asked via Demoxie – 
about cafeteria options and musicians as well as interventionist foreign policy – all 
point to a redefinition of the liberal democratic public sphere where, as Jeffrey Severs 
puts it, “applied to technological formations, liberal now essentially refers not to 
citizens’ rights but to the freedom they grant corporate systems to instrumentalize their 
tastes and habits.”89  
Eggers’ novel here presents a view of the public sphere in the internet age 
shared by a number of political theorists, echoing in particular Jodi Dean’s claim that 
many of the “norms articulated together by the notion of the public”, such as 
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“inclusivity, equality, transparency, and rationality,” have effectively “been co-opted 
by a communicative capitalism that has turned them into their opposite.”90 As Dean 
summarises it, “regulatory interventions are invoked and pursued so as […] to make 
appear a public sphere what is clearly the material basis of the global economy.”91 It 
is the Circle’s corporate identity, then, as much as the technologies it produces, which 
brings into focus the novel’s view of the public sphere in the internet age. It is not so 
much that technology itself precludes the development of an effective public sphere – 
indeed, as Dean suggests, “computer-mediated interactions seem to materialize 
aspirations long associated with the public sphere.” 92 Rather, Demoxie’s choice-based 
public sphere presents an example of the social internet’s intractably corporate 
character. In the Circle’s illiberal vision of democracy, the logic of the market has won 
out through its imbrication of culture, politics, and economics. Eggers’s novel 
represents his contribution to debates about the internet’s effects on the public sphere; 
his central argument is that changing attitudes to privacy are influencing public life. 
Elsewhere in the novel, Eggers brings this argument into alignment with his model of 
reparative literary publicness, by referencing another novelist who shares his interest 
in political critique. 
Can We Speak Privately? 
In his 1945 essay “Politics and the English Language,” George Orwell claimed 
that “when the general atmosphere is bad, language must suffer.”93 In The Circle, 
language is always suffering in the rarefied air of the company’s campus. At a product 
launch early in the novel, Bailey outlines the Circle’s insistence “that all that happens 
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should be known,” but when his “words dropped onto the screen” behind him, the 
sentence reads “ALL THAT HAPPENS MUST BE KNOWN.”94 The change of modal 
verb from “should” to “must,” and of the sentence’s formatting from lowercase to 
capitalised, imply that this technology saps nuance from language. When language is 
mediated through the Circle’s technologies at other moments during the novel too, it 
is rendered as either tautological nonsense (“The past is past, and Annie is Annie”), or 
as nothing more than a string of consumer preferences (“Yes, yes, no, Cancun, deep-
sea diving, upscale resort, breakaway weekend”).95 At another point in The Circle, 
Eggers not only echoes an Orwellian sentiment, but mirrors an Orwellian text. During 
one key scene, Mae announces that, “in the interest of sharing all she saw and could 
offer the world,” she will be “going transparent immediately.”96 This entails 
livestreaming video and audio online for nearly all her waking hours, sharing her every 
experience with any Circle user who wishes to watch. Introducing the announcement, 
Mae and Bailey outline three “revelations” that have inspired her to do this: 
SECRETS ARE LIES 
SHARING IS CARING 
PRIVACY IS THEFT97 
These three slogans comprise a clear allusion to The Circle’s central antecedent 
influence, Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949), and the equivalent “three slogans of 
the Party”: 
WAR IS PEACE 
FREEDOM IS SLAVERY 
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IGNORANCE IS STRENGTH98 
The formatting of the slogans in The Circle, laid out as a separate, centrally-aligned, 
capitalised paragraph, clearly emulates Orwell’s text, but despite the allusion, the 
sentiments expressed here differ notably. In The Circle, knowledge is the ultimate 
goal, and withholding it is to be seen as a crime; in Nineteen Eighty-Four, to not know 
is the aim, an idea reflected in the destabilising false equivalencies of the first two 
statements. If Eggers evokes Orwell as a useful guide for engaging with ideas of 
political, economic, and cultural power, he does not simply reproduce the conditions 
of Nineteen Eighty-Four’s Oceania. Yet this is precisely the point – Eggers invites 
readers to directly compare the two institutions of the Circle and the Party to suggest 
that the former’s brand of cyberutopianism is closer to the censorial and dictatorial 
tone of Ingsoc than it appears on the surface. In Orwell’s novel, Boxall argues, 
the emergence of global superpowers in the wake of the Second World War, 
combined with the development of information technology that allows for the 
manipulation of recorded reality, has produced in the novel a situation in which 
the past has become infinitely malleable.99 
In Eggers’s novel, the emergence of corporate superpowers, combined with (and 
resulting from) the development of information technology, has produced a situation 
in which the past has become infinitely storable and profitable. The Circle cannily 
monetises the archives of rival social media companies, and attempts to crowdsource 
a complete register of every user’s family history, “to fill in your memory and the 
historical record.”100 The past is inescapable for the novel’s characters, as when Mae 
is told that a video of her that has been filmed without permission cannot be deleted 
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because “the deleting of any information [is] like killing babies.”101 All the Circle’s 
data, one employee tells Mae proudly, will “be here next year and next century.”102  
The inverse of the Party’s practices nevertheless serves a similar purpose to 
Orwell’s novel. In Nineteen Eighty-Four, the past is inaccessible so as to completely 
deny the reality of the Party’s actions; in The Circle, the past is consistently invoked 
to the same end, to hide the Circle’s interest in accumulating power. Dinnen points out 
that “everything about the [Circle’s] campus – from the garden to the naming of each 
area after a historical era, to the user you are becoming – is designed to make all that 
is new appear not new, appear familiar.”103 This comforting obfuscation, she argues, 
creates “subjects defined by their exposure to, rather than comprehension of, 
novelty.”104 In Dinnen’s view, this situation robs subjects of their agency, and she cites 
Christine T. Wolf to argue that denying the opportunity for comprehension impedes 
the formation of discursive publics.105 This reading can illuminate Eggers’s allusions 
to Orwell too, as this obstruction of public discourse is arguably also the end Orwell 
portrays. Boxall suggests that Orwell sees the historical relativism of a number of 
twentieth-century thinkers as a “compliant preparation for the manipulation of history 
by tyrannical superpowers – and for the production of an entirely fungible public 
sphere, endlessly adaptable to the demands of the global market place.”106 In other 
words, whether arrived at through the violent tyranny of the Party, or the willing 
purchases of Circle users, when institutions are allowed to govern our sense of history, 
those institutions often proceed to govern the public sphere as well, dictating the forms 
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of discourse, and indeed the very form of the public or publics, that are permitted 
within it. Like Orwell, Eggers depicts a public sphere devoid of dissent – those scenes 
in The Circle when characters discuss the company negatively happen in private (such 
as Mae’s arguments at home with her ex-boyfriend Mercer, or when Ty disrupts her 
live-stream to talk with her unobserved). Eggers identifies the Circle’s malign 
elimination of privacy and concealment of its objectives as the cause of this situation, 
but his contribution does not end here. He responds to the problematic public sphere 
he portrays by modelling his own form of literary publicness, which, I will argue, 
involves employing a particularly literary strategy (here, free indirect discourse) to 
reveal these conditions of contemporary life to the reader.  
Whereas in Nineteen Eighty-Four, Winston’s position in the Ministry of Truth 
stands in juxtaposition to his desire to rebel against the Party, Eggers places Mae 
within the confines of the Circle to foreground an environment that makes her 
particularly susceptible to its ideology, surrounded as she is by its followers. The 
Circle performs Mae’s experience of acquiescence in its free indirect style, through 
which the narrative voice often asserts opinions, justifications, or thought processes of 
Mae’s. Margaret Atwood points out that this style “demands that the reader think [the 
Circle’s] positions through in the same way that the characters must.”107 Galow also 
outlines how this intellectual challenge is a key feature of the style,” which is 
“designed to help the reader understand, and not merely experience, the protagonists’ 
gradual conversion to the supposedly utopian ideology that governs the progress of 
one major technology company.”108 The Circle asks its readers to deeply engage with 
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Mae’s perspective, and in this way, despite lacking any depictions of direct attempts 
at resistance on Mae’s part similar to Winston’s, Eggers’s attitude still echoes Orwell’s 
towards his reader. If, as Raymond Williams suggests, “it is central to Orwell's 
arguments that what is being described, in its main tendencies, is not only a universal 
danger but a universal process,” Eggers mirrors this interest in his demonstration of 
the process by which people might capitulate to the Circle’s governing logic.109 
Yet the effectiveness of Eggers’s strategy has a potential downside – as Dinnen 
points out, it is a somewhat limiting approach, as “Eggers’s narrative can only rarely 
disclose its fear of a company that preaches absolute transparency and an end to 
privacy because Mae is silent witness to the logic of software ideology.”110 She goes 
on, however, to suggest that this is precisely Eggers’s intention, and that “we can read 
in this novel something of a contemporary culture of computation – even if what we 
read is the project of effacement.”111 Indeed, rather than thinking of Eggers’s approach 
as limiting the disclosure of his fears about Silicon Valley’s ideology of intrusion, we 
can understand the novel’s narrative voice as a constant disclosure of such anxiety. In 
the novel’s final paragraph, Mae thinks how “exasperating” it is to not know “what 
was going on in [her friend Annie’s] head,” calling it “an affront, a deprivation, to 
herself and to the world.”112 The extent to which Mae has absorbed the Circle’s ideals 
here is clearly disquieting, and the novel’s final two sentences promise a bleak future 
of mind-reading beyond the final page: “Why shouldn’t they know? The world 
deserved nothing less and would not wait.”113 By this point, Mae has completely 
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immersed herself in the ideology of the Circle, and she eagerly awaits “completion.”114 
If readers take on the intellectual challenge of trying to understand Mae’s conversion, 
however, they might be tempted to complete the circle of the novel itself, and return 
to its opening line. To do so, in fact, would be to experience and understand what 
completion of the Circle would be like within the world of the novel, with the first 
sentence (“My God, Mae thought”) providing a direct glimpse into Mae’s mind, as the 
rest of the novel also does.115  
The particular dynamics of free indirect discourse, however, are still more 
intricately linked with the novel’s arguments about privacy. Indeed, it would be wrong 
to claim that Eggers looks only to make an argument for privacy through his use of 
narrative voice. Instead, he reveals its relationship with publicness, and in doing so 
situates literature as a site for revealing this relationship in nuanced ways. In one of 
The Circle’s final scenes, Ty makes a plea to Mae, asserting that the “barrier between 
public and private must remain unbreachable.”116 This is a more complex position than 
it initially appears to be. Throughout his appeal, Ty presents what Helen Nissenbaum 
has called a “normative conception of privacy,” one which “incorporates a 
presumption that privacy is something worthwhile, valuable, and deserving of 
protection.”117 In other words, Ty’s argument, mainly comprising unanswered 
rhetorical questions, follows the form of the unsubstantiated beliefs in connection and 
knowledge espoused by the Circle. More than this, however, Ty’s claim is essentially 
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for a “private/public dichotomy,” which may itself only play into the Circle’s hands.118 
As Nissenbaum notes,  
dichotomy theories are spared having to explain why video surveillance of 
public spaces or trawling public records for purposes of aggregation is 
problematic because, according to them, they are not in the private sphere and 
therefore are not a privacy problem. […] A stark way of expressing this 
alignment is that the private warrants privacy protection while the public does 
not; in the public ‘anything goes.’119 
The problem for Ty’s argument here is that this dichotomy “neglects a range 
of situations,” many of which are fostered by “technology-based systems and 
practices.”120 The limitations of the private/public dichotomy “have come to light as 
digital information technologies radically alter the terms under which others […] have 
access to us and to information about us in what are traditionally understood as private 
and public domains.”121 Social network sites in particular “seem to defy obvious 
categorization as either public or private,” and Ty’s suggestion that there be an 
unbreachable barrier seems to miss the point: “in this case, we may at least conclude 
that whatever expectations of privacy are in play, they do not appear reducible to 
whether a network, or a space in a network, is deemed public or private.”122 Rather, as 
Eggers suggests in his depiction of Demoxie, privacy must be understood as more 
complexly bound up with ideas of publicness, as a shifting concept that varies with 
context. For Eggers, free indirect discourse provides an ideal way to reveal these 
complexities. The style’s “effect of greater interiority,” Michael McKeon reminds us, 
“is achieved by the oscillation or differential between the perspectives of narrator and 
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character, by the process of moving back and forth between ‘outside’ and ‘inside,’” 
from the public to the private.123 Furthermore, by “simultaneously ‘concealing’ and 
‘revealing’ itself, free indirect discourse encapsulates in miniature the dialectical 
impulse of the novel’s ideological function” – in particular, it “provides the 
grammatical basis for the dialectical construction of the public over against the 
private.”124 Rather than simply providing an argument for privacy, or an indictment of 
technology companies’ intrusive practices, Eggers employs the novel form to 
reconsider the dynamics of the issue, using style to reify the interconnected nature of 
the public and the private in the internet age.  
Even as Ty tries to mitigate his part in the Circle’s damaging actions by making 
an argument for a public/private dichotomy, he cannot extricate himself from the 
company’s way of thinking. Bearing this in mind, Eggers’s revealing of the contingent 
conditions of the public and the private can be read as an opposition to Ty’s situation 
– literature, Eggers’s novel suggests, can provide a way of speaking publicly that 
remains uninflected by corporate ideology (or, at the very least, that can perform or 
reveal the existence of that inflection). In an interview given at the time of The Circle’s 
publication, Eggers acknowledged the particularly literary quality of his engagement 
with the internet’s effects on society, claiming that “we’re already engaged in a 
constant and meaningful examination of how the available technology is affecting us, 
but maybe fiction can shine a different kind of light on it.”125 The free indirect 
discourse through which the novel traces Mae’s capitulation to the Circle provides this 
different kind of light – Ann Banfield has outlined how it is an “exclusively literary 
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style.”126 Eggers’s use of this style is the most obvious manifestation of his model of 
literary publicness, which rests on the ability of an author to engage in debates through 
the particular affordances of literary forms. Yet even if literature can provide a way of 
speaking publicly that remains uninflected by corporate ideology, Eggers does not 
simply accept this as inevitable. In The Circle, Eggers portrays the inculcation of 
institutional values into the Circle’s users and employees. In this way, his perspective 
is similar to Franzen’s – both identify problematic issues for the public sphere that 
arise at an institutional level. For Franzen, the solution is a return to a model of expert 
authorship founded on the abilities of individuals to contribute to the public sphere, a 
solution which is threatened by the ways in which those contributions tend to be 
considered through a personal lens. Yet for Eggers, this form of consideration is key – 
he knows that he cannot forgo institutions entirely, so looks instead to build and 
associate himself with alternative institutions which can underwrite the authority of 
the arguments he makes as an author in the public sphere. Just as Eggers’s interest in 
and proximity to Silicon Valley pre-dates The Circle, his career was bound up with 
corporations, institutions, and the internet long before he wrote the novel. Examining 
these contexts, and how his work is considered in the public sphere, will help clarify 
the form of literary publicness that Eggers models in response to the internet’s apparent 
denigration of public discourse.  
One Wise Man 
 Five years after The Circle’s publication, Eggers helped to mark the seventieth 
anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by contributing an essay to 
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a series that reimagined the Declaration for our contemporary moment. The 
participating authors chose to address those rights they felt were most important to 
protect in 2018, and Eggers’s essay addressed a topic that readers of The Circle will 
be familiar with: “the right to a life offline.”127 In one of the novel’s final scenes, Ty 
implores Mae to publicly announce “a list of assertions” that he has written on a piece 
of paper “under the headline ‘The Rights of Humans in the Digital Age,’” including 
calls for “the right to anonymity” and an end to “the ceaseless pursuit of data.”128 If 
Eggers aligns himself with Ty’s opinions through his essay on human rights in the 
internet age, however, this is not the only overlap between the two. Ty’s concerns are 
broadly applicable to debates about the internet, but are also tinged with the founder’s 
personal desires to disappear from public view and build a life outside of the Circle. 
At the bottom of his written declaration is “one line, written in red ink: ‘We must all 
have the right to disappear.’”129 Ty’s red line is, however, impossible for him to 
achieve. As noted at the beginning of the novel, “his fingerprints […] were on every 
major Circle innovation.”130 Ty cannot disappear from the code he wrote, Eggers 
suggests – he and his work are etched into every part of the company. As I will show, 
Eggers mirrors Ty’s situation here, but instead of lamenting this, the author in fact 
draws attention to the institutional contexts of his own creative work.  
Eggers’s early career took a similar turn to Ty’s, as both looked to move 
beyond the institutions that fuelled their initial success. Eggers’s first book was met 
with huge media fanfare and, Keith Gessen notes, “from the first, much of [his] fate as 
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a popular icon was beyond his control.”131 As Caroline Hamilton has explained, this 
experience had a distinct effect on Eggers, whose “vocal frustration with corporate 
publishing, and […] ambivalence regarding the media,” led to his decision to release 
his second book, You Shall Know Our Velocity (2002), through “his own newly created 
McSweeney’s Books.”132 Beyond the commercial and critical success of his writing, 
Eggers has built a literary career on a number of endeavours in the publishing industry 
and charitable sector: 
 Keeping in mind the modest ambition of McSweeney’s Quarterly Concern with 
its 1,500 copies distributed by hand, it is remarkable to consider Eggers’s 
publishing success and his business’s growth: three magazines (McSweeney’s, 
the monthly review The Believer and the DVD magazine of short films, 
Wholpin), three book imprints and countless charitable enterprises devoted to 
literacy projects.133 
Anthony Hutchison has usefully referred to McSweeney’s as an “institutionalizing of 
Eggers’ own early style,” highlighting the links between the author and his work 
beyond writing, and how this can inflect readings of his work in the public sphere.134  
 Yet this inflection cuts both ways – as well as reading McSweeney’s as an 
institutionalized expression of Eggers’s own literary style, his work has in turn been 
read as reflecting those values and ambitions of contemporary literary production that 
publishing houses attend to in their business. Just after the publication of A 
Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius, for example, a seventeen-year-old student 
called Gary Baum set up a “controversial literary website” devoted to “trac[ing] the 
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rise of the unstoppable Eggers.”135 The website combined “an undisguised affection 
for Eggers […] with an unrelenting and often highly critical scrutiny of his every 
move”:  Baum’s first post on the website “amounted to a damaging exposé [… of] all 
the connections Eggers had at his disposal.”136 Keith Gessen suggests that Baum’s 
blog “is both a literary document and a sign of the times,” a hit-and-miss representation 
of a contemporary literary network.137 Baum’s blog also serves as an interesting 
example of how the internet can come to partially blur the lines of cultural authority: 
several writers, including Zadie Smith, were sufficiently “annoyed with Gary’s antics” 
to contact him and tell him so.138 Despite his acknowledgement that much of the media 
fanfare surrounding his first book was “out of [Eggers’s] control,” Gessen concludes 
his article by calling Eggers a “marketing genius,” suggesting that he is a “New York 
media insider” who has managed to “get away […] with pretending otherwise” by 
employing the persona of an outsider.139 Hamilton has also suggested that the success 
of Eggers’s career with McSweeney’s is not simply down to “his control of the means 
of production, but his management of the production of his persona and his ability to 
put this into the service of his business.”140  
 The links between Eggers’s business and creative work are interesting to note 
alongside Michael Szalay’s examination of the anxiety expressed by several of Eggers’ 
contemporaries about the corporate contexts of the production and dissemination of 
their writing. Szalay notes how, in Freedom (2010), Jonathan Franzen inquires “into 
the terms and conditions of [his] own entrance into a middle-class mainstream.”141 By 
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contrast, Szalay claims, Dana Spiotta’s Stone Arabia (2011) proposes “that novelists 
have more affinities with the working class than they do with the middle,” and asks 
questions of an author’s artistic integrity within a corporate system: if a writer’s 
“insides are branded, has she become, in effect, the kind of person that corporations 
are understood to be?”142 In light of the critique of corporate ideology that The Circle 
presents, one might be tempted to conclude that Eggers shares these anxieties. Indeed, 
Hutchison has suggested that the critique of corporate ideology and globalization in 
the internet age present in Eggers’s A Hologram for the King (2012) continues beyond 
the text itself, with Eggers extending the novel’s thematic “commitments to the realm 
of material production,” by having it printed and bound by “an employee-owned 
printing and bookbinding firm based in Clayton, Michigan.”143 
 Yet to conclude that Eggers’ work unequivocally represents an anxious 
questioning of corporate contexts would be false. Indeed, Ralph Clare has argued, 
contra Hutchison, that in A Hologram for the King, protagonist Alan Clay’s “final 
decision to create something lasting is figured as a rebirth of the salesman, global 
capitalist style, and is thus a curious and sincere reaffirmation of globalization.”144 
Further to this, outside of his texts Eggers does not adopt an entirely anti-corporate or 
anti-internet stance: the 826 National chapter 826 Valencia has an ongoing partnership 
with Google, and McSweeney’s has previously used the website Kickstarter to 
fundraise.145 These decisions suggest that Eggers has a more pragmatic than anxious 
relationship with corporations in the internet age, one that puts up with certain means 
to reach certain ends. Hamilton goes as far as to say that “McSweeney’s Books 
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provides a model for the publishing industry that seizes the advantages of the capitalist 
system and harnesses them to positive political ends.”146 
Zadie Smith, in a commencement speech at The New School in New York, 
seems to agree with this evaluation, citing Eggers as an exemplary figure to the 
graduating class:  
 I look at the fine example of my friend, the writer and activist Dave Eggers, 
and see a man who took his own individual prestige and parlayed it into an 
extraordinary collective action: 826 National, in which many hands work to 
create educational opportunities for disadvantaged kids all over this country.147 
Eggers’ biggest achievement, Smith suggests, is that he has found a way to “make a 
gift” of himself and his success as a writer, and we can think of the way in which 
Eggers uses his cultural authority to help others as linked to his model of literary 
publicness.148 One of 826 National’s stated aims is to promote “writing as a tool for 
young people to […] advocate for themselves and their community.”149 Part of the 
charity’s work, in other words, is to prepare young citizens for interactions in the 
public sphere. 826 National’s identification of writing as the tool with which to prepare 
their students also aligns this aim with Eggers’s modelling of a literary publicness that 
centres on the specific uses of literary writing in public debates. But we must also 
acknowledge that Eggers’s own writing is considered in the public sphere alongside 
the attendant facts of his association with McSweeney’s and 826 National (indeed, his 
author biography at the end of The Circle lists his achievements with both companies 
before information about his literary career). Readers with knowledge of 826 
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National’s ‘mission’ are able to understand The Circle as providing its readers with a 
similar kind of training for the public sphere too, as Eggers’s association with his 
charity’s ambitions underwrites the authority of his model of literary publicness. Lee 
Konstantinou’s reading of A Heartbreaking Work shows that this institutional 
guarantee has in fact informed Eggers’s creative practice since long before The Circle: 
Eggers has asked his readers to believe in him, in the truthfulness of his 
memoir, the sincerity of his various enterprises. This is why Eggers’s 
experiments in self-publication – his institution-building drive – turn out to be 
the primary contents of his memoir […]. As an empirical organization, of 
course, McSweeney’s necessarily transcends the particular personality and life 
story of Eggers […]. Nonetheless, Eggers’s public performances […], his 
publishing enterprises […], and his philanthropic activities […] can be 
profitably understood as extended interlocking paratexts of A Heartbreaking 
Work itself.150 
By the time of The Circle’s publication, Eggers’s institutional affiliations had become 
interlocking paratexts of all his creative work, and he uses this to his advantage to 
underwrite his model of literary publicness.  
The Circle, or, rather, those technology companies that the Circle represents, 
have co-opted an idea that Eggers has always expressed faith in: the idea that everyone 
has a story to tell. Taken as a trite truism this might not mean much, but Eggers intends 
it in part as a corrective to the way that the internet encourages constant contact instead 
of considered connection. As he puts it simply in one recent interview, “social media 
separates and isolates us”; his response, the interviewer suggests, “is to focus on 
personal stories”: “‘On this block,’ [Eggers] says, ‘I could introduce you to nine people 
whose stories would make interesting books … If you’re listening, the stories are 
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never-ending.’”151 Eggers’s literary publicness is founded on this idea of universally 
enfranchised authorship, but is not tied to the criterion of expertise like Franzen’s is. 
Rather, Eggers recognises that the ways in which stories are told often depends upon 
the institutional contexts in which authors find themselves, and he directs readers to 
recognise how their own values are affected by the institutions they are part of. 
Eggers’s literary ideals (including the use of form and style to reveal conditions of 
contemporary life) must be underwritten by ideal institutions – institutions which have 
developed pragmatic attitudes to compromise in their attempts to improve political, 
cultural, and economic conditions, and look to reclaim concepts that have been co-
opted by platform capitalism.152 Attempting to realise such a mode of being in public 
might, Eggers implies, restore some of the balance that is lost in online life. 
The Circle, in conjunction with the facts of Eggers’s career, suggest that since 
the internet age is increasingly characterised by malevolent institutions seeking to co-
opt social connection for profit, we must align ourselves with better institutions to 
ensure the effectiveness of the public sphere. Yet once again, a parallel with The Circle 
arises here – by inviting readers into what Konstantinou calls “McSweeney’s magic 
circle of (small-batch, sincere) production, (non-profit) circulation, (nonsnarky) 
criticism, and (postironic) reception,” Eggers to some extent replicates the 
expansionary cult of community he pillories in The Circle.153 Indeed, Eggers’s 
pragmatic relationship with the corporate in his philanthropic work represents 
something of a double bind for him. In another article, Konstantinou examines Lewis 
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Hyde’s The Gift (a book which “addresses itself to the problem of whether it is possible 
to freely give gifts under unrestrained capitalism”) in the context of Hyde’s own grant-
awarding foundation, before turning his attention to McSweeney’s.154 Focussing on 
McSweeney’s Kickstarter campaign, Konstantinou claims that “such gift-funded – and 
gift-giving – organizations invoke a fascinating hybrid discourse” by offering 
alternatives to mainstream, market-driven commerce, whilst simultaneously invoking 
“the language of venture capital.”155 This is no condemnation of the campaign’s aims, 
and the “success of such worthy projects is reason for celebration,” but Konstantinou 
points out that the form of such a campaign could be said to “institutionalize all of the 
well-documented problems of the neoliberal nonprofit sphere, which […] privatizes 
support for the arts.”156 Konstantinou’s essay reflects a potential problem for Eggers: 
attempts to construct alternatives to a system can nevertheless themselves be co-opted 
by that system. Adam Kelly has written about how many of David Foster Wallace's 
“generation of writers […] have absorbed the depictions of institutional interpellation 
in the postmodern fiction of authors like Don DeLillo and Thomas Pynchon,” but that 
“the result of this inheritance is that for twenty-first-century writers, interpellation is 
now acknowledged as a given.”157 For writers like Eggers, “speaking or writing in the 
contemporary moment involves expressing forces beyond one's own authentic 
interiority; subjectivity is not only a cause but also an effect, whether of technology, 
culture, neurochemistry, or language.”158 
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By tracing Mae’s acquiescence to the Circle’s ideology, Eggers’ novel implies 
that Mae’s subjectivity is as much a construct of the Circle as it is her own. As such, 
The Circle portrays a world in which “it is impossible to isolate ourselves […] outside 
the instrumentality of capital and the mass media,” as Michael Hardt and Antonio 
Negri have claimed is the case of our own time.159 Yet unlike Franzen, whose 
resignation to this point in Purity functions to absolve himself of agency, Eggers takes 
this as his work’s starting point, apparently accepting Hardt and Negri’s further claim 
that if “there is going to be any ethical redemption it will have to be constructed inside 
the system.”160 Indeed, we can see something of Eggers present inside the system of 
The Circle. The contexts of his work with McSweeney’s and 826 National, however, 
surely mean that it is no longer with Ty that the author is most appositely aligned. Nor 
is it, as Severs suggests, Mercer who “signifies Eggers the small publisher, obsessing 
over a low-profit venture in beautiful artifacts.”161 Rather, I believe that the Three Wise 
Men more accurately represent the trinity of traits inherent to Eggers’s mode of 
authorship in the internet age. The context of his career surely invites such a reading: 
he is equal parts driven businessman (with his numerous McSweeney’s ventures), 
interminable optimist (with his charity work and founding of The Believer), and critical 
creator (as evidenced by the critiques presented in The Circle). Even if he has the right 
to disappear, Eggers can’t quite manage to do so.
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Zadie Smith: Depiction and Difference 
Comment Threads 
If the quasi-religious following of the Circle represents an extreme imagining of the 
reception of social media, the rapidity of the corporation’s rise to prominence is a 
wholly plausible detail of Dave Eggers’s speculative novel. When Mae starts her job 
with the company, it is “less than six years old, [but] its name and logo […] were 
already among the best-known in the world.”1 Facebook experienced a similarly 
dramatic expansion in its first decade, with just one million users in 2004 becoming 
over a billion by 2013.2 Alongside the rapid growth and subsequent market dominance 
of specific internet companies (one study estimates that, in 2013, websites and services 
owned by Google alone accounted for twenty-five percent of North American 
consumer internet traffic3), the more general forms of content popularised online 
proliferated with extraordinary speed: in 1999, there were only twenty-three blogs on 
the internet; over the next ten years, 126 million blogs were created.4 Statistics like 
these point to an important element of the story of the internet’s rise – the fact that, as 
Jacob Weisberg notes, “our transformation into device people has happened with 
unprecedented suddenness.”5  
For Zadie Smith, this suddenness has had an inordinate impact on how we 
understand the internet’s role in our daily lives. In an interview given in 2010, the 
author pointed out that “any other revolution that took place with so many people in 
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so little time would have a philosophy, a period of thought, a period of discussion, an 
argument, but the internet revolution has happened [too quickly for that].”6 But 
whereas in The Circle Eggers casts corporate actors as primarily to blame for this 
paucity of reflection, Smith would have internet users also carefully consider their own 
roles in the internet revolution, and acknowledge that “most of us have just fallen into 
it without serious consideration.”7 In other words, Smith believes that the internet, 
despite its ubiquity, has evaded adequate consideration within the public sphere, and 
that this should be remedied lest the technology’s more creeping and insidious effects 
go unnoticed for too long. Across Smith’s work, she returns to one particular effect of 
the internet’s development that can help to explain her concern further – if the internet 
has not been considered adequately within the public sphere, this might be because the 
technology has itself adversely affected the public sphere.  
Smith’s most well-known exploration of this argument comes in her 2010 
essay “Generation Why?,” which focusses her digital scepticism on Facebook, and 
stages a debate that scholars of the public sphere have been having for some time, 
asking to what extent social media actualises long-held aspirations for a web-based 
public sphere. In her essay, Smith identifies Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg as a 
particular brand of cyberutopian par excellence, one whose obsession with 
‘connection’ (“he uses the word ‘connect’ as believers use the word ‘Jesus,’ as if it 
were sacred in and of itself”) establishes him as a champion of an online public sphere.8 
Yet even if Facebook’s spread has undoubtedly enhanced quantity of participation in 
an online public sphere, Smith is concerned about its effects on the quality of discourse 
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therein. For Zuckerberg, Smith claims, this concern is beside the point: “Connection 
is the goal. The quality of that connection, the quality of the information that passes 
through it, the quality of the relationship that connection permits – none of this is 
important.”9 Platforms like Facebook may look like discursive spaces, even 
Habermasian ones – “a uniform environment in which it genuinely doesn’t matter who 
you are, as long as you make ‘choices’” – but on such platforms these choices always 
mean, “finally, purchases.”10 Debate in Facebook’s public sphere is something which 
is to be chiefly expressed through the market, whatever Zuckerberg’s protestations. 
We might glean from this element of Smith’s critique in “Generation Why?” that she 
can easily be aligned with Eggers, as both authors condemn the fungible public sphere 
fostered by social media platforms in pursuit of profit. But one of Smith’s own 
comments about her essay can help nuance our understanding of her contributions to 
debates about the public sphere in the internet age, and introduce the argumentative 
threads that run through the rest of her work.  
Discussing the publication of “Generation Why?” during an interview, Smith 
outlines her interest in how social media platforms discourage discourse by robbing 
users of their ability to be “relational rather than performative,” and fostering “an idea 
of being human which is one way,” neglecting the fact that “real life is relational.”11 
Here Smith usefully explicates her contribution: the forms of communication 
encouraged by platforms are partly to blame for a decline in discourse, but the real 
danger of platforms lies in how they might rewrite users’ ideas of what it is to be 
human. Performativity’s association with the internet, and relationality’s with “real 
life,” in fact informs Smith’s perspective on the public sphere in the internet age 
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throughout her work. Such a dichotomy is characteristic of Smith’s writing – as she 
has noted herself, one of the recurrent “deep structures” of her work is that she is 
“always thinking about opposites.”12 Her interventions into debates about the internet’s 
effects on public discourse are no exception: they are structured around a series of 
oppositions between the performative and the relational, the digital and the literary, 
and information and experience. I do not use Smith’s explications of her own work 
here simply to bow to authorial interpretation – rather, I do so because they represent 
a key part of her model of literary publicness. Indeed, whereas Eggers was reticent to 
make many public comments about The Circle upon its release, and whereas Franzen’s 
glosses of his fiction can be misleading, Smith is a frequent and intelligent reader of 
her own work. Smith’s consideration (and reconsideration) of her ideas in public 
contexts represents one way in which she models her literary publicness, which rests 
on a further opposition, between writing and reading. Smith’s form of literary 
publicness promotes parity between the processes of writing and reading, and the ways 
in which she discusses her own work (in essays or interviews) are key to understanding 
how she models certain ways of thinking critically. But the balance Smith strikes 
between writing and reading is by no means reflected in the other oppositions that 
structure her thinking about the internet, in which one side tends to be promoted over 
the other. 
Smith’s contributions to debates about the public sphere in the internet age 
often stem from one key question: if we cannot be relational online, how are we to 
deliberate there? In NW (2012), for example, when the protagonists Leah and Natalie 
message each other online, their conversation is tellingly structured:  
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cant believe you getting hitched 
whats happening to 
me too 
universe? 
we iz old 
we’re not fucking old 
at least u achieving something. I’m just slowly dying 
this my 2nd year as pupil. May be pupil for rest of 
dying of boredom 
life13 
The fractured nature of the characters’ dialogue here points to a potential problem for 
fostering fruitful debate through online forms. Smith’s portrayal represents several 
features of online discussion that Lincoln Dahlberg has suggested trouble the 
development of reflexivity (a vital process for the development of a rational-critical 
public sphere), wherein participants do not just broadcast their opinions, but critically 
examine their own “cultural values, assumptions, and interests, as well as the larger 
social context.”14 In Smith’s terms, a public sphere devoid of reflexivity is not 
relational, but performative. Dahlberg has analysed the key traits of computer-
mediated communication which can be seen as “retarding the operation of reflexivity,” 
highlighting “bite-sized postings […], the non-linear structure of conversations, and 
the rapidity of the exchanges” as potentially problematic, all of which Smith 
foregrounds in her portrayal.15  
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In Swing Time (2016) too, Smith gestures towards online forums’ frequent 
divergences from rational-critical relationality in favour of performativity. One 
character, Tracey, often posts messages in the kind of online chat rooms that had once 
been a source of hope for those tracking the emergence of a digital public sphere, but 
her tendency to “abus[e] anyone who did not agree with her arguments” can be read 
as an indictment of the state of online debate.16 Indeed, the description of Tracey’s 
chat room as “a bizarre world, filled only with the echoing voices of people who had 
apparently already agreed with each other,” posits online discussion as devoid of 
deliberation.17 Yet, once again, Smith is reluctant to absolve internet users of agency 
by directing her critique solely at the affordances of online methods of communication. 
The “dozens and dozens” of emails, “abusive even in their subject heading,” that 
Tracey sends to the unnamed narrator’s mother are framed as the discursive failure of 
a user, rather than the technology itself, by an earlier passage in the novel, when the 
narrator describes the entrance of digital communication into her life: “together we 
entered this new space that now opened up between people, a connection with no 
precise beginning or end, that was always potentially open.”18 Smith suggests here that 
it is in fact possible to be relational online, but we must combine the right forms of 
communication with the right attitudes to achieve this goal. If real life is relational, as 
she has suggested, the solution might appear to lie in recreating the conditions of that 
real life in our online encounters. Yet Smith’s optimism fades at this point in her 
argument, as she suggests that the opposite situation is increasingly occurring – the 
performativity of online life is replacing relationality even in the offline world. 
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In one of her most recent short stories, “Now More Than Ever” (2018), Smith 
draws attention to how the influence of the internet manifests in life offline. In 
particular, she highlights how digital technology’s ability to capture information, and 
as such our ability to access information about the past at any time, has paradoxically 
produced a cultural logic devoid of historical understanding. The narrator of the story 
describes her friend, Scout, as an “involved and active” internet user who “is on all 
platforms, and rarely becomes aware of anything much later than, say, the three-
hundredth person.”19 The narrator is less savvy (“the earliest I’ve ever been aware of 
anything was that time I was the ten-million-two-hundred-and-sixth person to see that 
thing”), but is given up-to-date news by Scout.20 The story’s thematic focus is on one 
such piece of news: “Now, according to Scout, the news was (is?) that the past is now 
also the present.”21 Rather than referring to the ways in which history has informed or 
led to present circumstances, or to how technology might give us access to information 
about the past, Scout means to highlight the importance of the personal trait of 
“consistency”: 
You’ve got to reach far, far back, she explained, into the past […], and you’ve 
got to make sure that when you reach back thusly you still understand 
everything back there in the exact manner in which you understand things 
presently. For if it should turn out that you don’t – that is, if, after some digging, 
someone finds evidence that present-you is fatally out of step with past-you – 
well, then, you’ll simply have to find some way to remake the connection, and 
you’ve got to make it seamless.22 
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The idea of uncompromised consistency offends a right that Smith has evoked across 
her career, not least in her own reconsideration of ideas: the right to change one’s mind. 
Smith’s story casts the notion of pure consistency between one’s public life and one’s 
inner life across time in an absurd light by having Scout explain it through the medium 
of a puppet show – it is in this way rendered a childish and unrealistic prospect. But 
just as important as the logic of Scout’s claim itself is the fact that Scout has been 
aligned so strongly with a digital dispensation. The public sphere that Scout promotes 
has entirely foregone the relational in favour of the performative – the character’s 
thinking represents that of the online milieu, applied to offline encounters without 
consideration or justification.  
Smith explores the irrationality of such application further by mapping the 
online world onto a ‘real life’ site. The narrator describes a “new routine” that has 
taken hold in her apartment building: “We stand at our windows, all of us, from the 
second floor to the seventeenth, and hold aloft large signs with black arrows on them. 
The arrows point to other apartments.”23 Smith pillories the call-out culture endemic 
to social media here, as she imagines its manifestation in the offline world. In this way, 
Smith’s story echoes another sentiment from “Generation Why?,” where she suggests 
that “world makers, social network makers, ask one question first: How can I do it? 
[…] The other question, the ethical question, [comes] later: Why?” “Now More Than 
Ever” depicts a world Smith foresaw in her earlier essay, where societies “race ahead 
with technology and hope the ideas will look after themselves” – in her story, 
technological ability precedes and ultimately shapes morality.24 This points to an 
important reason that Smith has her story narrated by a philosophy professor – Smith 
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believes that the existence of the internet is directly relevant to some of that discipline’s 
historically core questions. In another story, “The Lazy River” (2017), the again 
unnamed narrator poses two of these questions: “What is the solution to life? How can 
it be lived ‘well’?”25 The following paragraphs describe two young women who 
relentlessly photograph themselves for social media, hiding anything unsightly in their 
surroundings to present a palatable image. Yet Smith’s narrator is not critical of their 
actions. She suggests that “it is easy to say they make being young look like hard 
work,” but also asks, “wasn’t it always hard work, even if the medium of its difficulty 
was different? They are making a project of their lives, a measurable project that can 
be liked or commented upon. What are we doing?”26 If we leave companies such as 
Facebook to provide answers to questions about how to live ‘well,’ Smith suggests, 
we might eventually lose the power to complain about their solutions as they become 
more and more entrenched. 
In her work, Smith challenges the internet’s model of a ‘good life,’ not simply 
by pointing to the technology’s failures to follow through on its potential for 
encouraging quality connections between people, but by contrasting these failures with 
visions of literature’s own communicative capacities. As I have shown, one of Smith’s 
key complaints is that the communal arena of the internet is not amenable to proper 
debate, as it replaces the public-minded ideal of relationality with that of 
performativity. The threads that run through her exploration of the topic of the internet 
– the actions of technology companies and users; the discursive forms, logics, and 
practices that proliferate online – all represent committed interrogations of the actors 
within, and the norms and ideals of, the public sphere in the internet age. Smith clearly 
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has lots to say about the topic, and her contributions to the public sphere on the issue 
are important. But what makes her work most apposite here is another thread that runs 
through it, namely the idea that art and the aesthetic realm might somehow stand in 
opposition to the internet’s denigrating effects, and subtend a more effective public 
sphere. To properly understand Smith’s literary model of the public sphere, we must 
first understand the ways in which she creates a more general tension between the 
values associated with the digital and the literary in her early fiction. Her model of 
literary publicness emerges from and builds on this tension, and lays the groundwork 
for a more thorough interrogation of representation and the public sphere that Smith 
comes to later in her career. 
Reduction Costs 
Smith’s first sustained reference to the internet is found in her second novel, 
The Autograph Man (2002), when she uses the technology as a detail of her protagonist 
Alex-Li’s everyday life to comic effect: 
One day he will take advantage of this incredible resource. He will find out 
about ancient Babylonia and gain a working knowledge of Estonian. He will 
learn how to make a bomb. One day. For now, he means to head straight for 
his corner of the world, an imaginary auction room […] And he will in no way 
be tempted by that friendly, clumsy woman, falling in and out of her bikini, 
beckoning to him from the corner of the screen… Look, five minutes only.27 
Alex-Li knows that the internet could give him access to a world of knowledge (both 
useful and dangerous), but he defers this kind of engagement to an uncertain future. 
When Alex-Li watches the pornographic pop-up, Smith includes a knowing reference 
that highlights a key tenet of her engagement with the internet as a topic: “Wallala 
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leialala, cried the woman.”28 This cry is a quotation from Wagner’s Götterdämmerung, 
by way of the third section of T. S. Eliot’s The Waste Land. By incorporating this 
reference, Smith gestures to the network of literary influence and allusion that much 
of the rest of The Autograph Man is interested in exploring. Literature has a memory, 
she seems to suggest; in contrast, when Alex-Li closes his web browser, “it was gone, 
as if it had never been.”29 In this brief scene, Smith subtly creates one level of tension 
between the values associated with the digital and the literary, aligning the former with 
individual satisfaction and the present moment, and the latter with connection and 
history.  
Smith builds on this alignment in her following novel, On Beauty (2005), a 
contemporary re-telling of E. M. Forster’s Howard’s End (1910). Instead of beginning 
with “Helen’s letters to her sister,”30 Smith brings Forster forward into the twenty-first 
century, and opens her novel with “Jerome’s e-mails to his father.”31 On Beauty’s 
reference evokes both the overlaps and differences between communicative forms, and 
points to the restive nature of communications technologies. In a slightly later allusion 
to Forster’s novel, Smith capitalises on the fact of these overlaps and differences to 
once again create a tension between the values associated with the digital and the 
literary. Towards the end of the novel’s first chapter, On Beauty’s Howard Belsey 
makes the same mistake as Mrs. Munt does in Howard’s End, travelling to advise his 
son against a marriage that has already been called off. The fact that this happens 
despite the technological advances that could have forewarned him shows a reluctance 
to embrace the increasing ubiquity of digital devices not just on the character’s part 
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but on Smith’s too – a feature endemic to what Toby Litt has called the “pseudo-
contemporary novel.”32 For Litt, this type of novel, “in which characters are, for some 
reason […] technologically cut off,” is a way for novelists to “avoid the truly 
contemporary (which is hyperconnectivity).”33 On Beauty’s transposition of Forster’s 
plot, however, does not signify a lack of engagement with the contemporary world. 
Rather, it can be read as another reminder of the novel form’s retention of a useful 
sense of history, and an active opposition to technology’s obstinate inexorability, as 
Smith excuses her plotting through her own character’s technophobia (there is “no way 
to contact him. Howard […] had never owned a cellphone”).34 Smith knows that her 
world is no longer that of Forster’s fiction – computers and mobile phones do appear 
later in On Beauty, assimilated into the everyday without much apparent consideration 
(from characters and author alike) – but she nonetheless refuses to allow the 
affordances of technology to structure her characters’ encounters with that world and 
compromise her homage. 
Smith’s early fiction thus considers how the internet and literature interact and 
inflect each other, and associates each with different values and ideals. 
Characteristically, Smith expands upon these ideas in an essay, and lays the 
groundwork for a reconsideration of the tension she has established. In “Generation 
Why?,” Smith unpacks the broader ramifications of allowing digital technology to 
prefigure representation: 
When a human being becomes a set of data on a website like Facebook, he or 
she is reduced. Everything shrinks. Individual character. Friendships. 
Language. Sensibility. […] Software may reduce humans, but there are 
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degrees. Fiction reduces humans, too, but bad fiction does it more than good 
fiction, and we have the option to read good fiction.35 
Smith here identifies reduction as an inevitability, a fundamental problem of any kind 
of representation. Yet if her conclusion is clear enough (good fiction does a better job 
of representing human beings than social media platforms like Facebook do), a 
question hangs over it: what constitutes the better reduction of good fiction? One 
answer to this question may lie in how Smith characterises Facebook’s worse 
reduction, which she suggests happens “when a human being becomes a set of data.” 
If the internet can be thought of as trying to reduce humans to a saleable dataset of the 
kind that Facebook produces, perhaps literature can be thought of as trying to reduce 
them to another kind of information – Smith’s next novel NW will suggest that this is 
information related to experience.  
The tension between the digital and the literary established in Smith’s earlier 
fiction is rephrased in NW as a specific question about how different forms aim to 
depict human lives – a question which Smith also brings into dialogue with her 
thoughts on the public sphere in the internet age. In NW, Smith makes clear her 
anxieties about representation. Early in the novel, one character, Leah, ruminates on 
narrative’s relation to reduction after a charged encounter with a neighbour: “But 
already the grandeur of experience threatens to flatten into the conventional, into 
anecdote […] Nothing survives its telling.”36 An echo of Smith’s argument in 
“Generation Why?” can be identified here: Facebook takes representation’s inherent 
threat to flatten experience into anecdote and makes it a certainty, denying any real 
chance to portray individuality, difference, or ‘unsanctioned’ forms of community. In 
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other words, its form is too rigid.  The novel, however, is a broad church: as Smith 
points out in an essay on George Eliot, “what is not universal or timeless […] is form. 
Forms, styles, structures – whatever word you prefer – should change like skirt 
lengths.”37 What, then, does NW’s form tell us about Smith’s priorities for 
representation? The novel’s shifting perspectives, multiple voices, and fluid structures 
might seem to represent a fractured and uncertain world. But as Joanna Biggs points 
out, “the prose shards of NW manage to tell us something about the way we tidy our 
lives into stories” – and, I would suggest, by attending to the internet’s capacities for 
representation while doing so, the novel compares the kinds of stories that different 
technologies allow us to tell.38 
David James identifies the “note of artistic resignation or concession” in Leah’s 
suggestion that nothing survives its telling, but insists that it does not mean that “Smith 
has given up on what the novel as a form can capture and convey with its powers of 
‘telling.’”39 NW’s interest in ways of ‘telling’ is evidenced by its formal diversity, but 
the novel’s second section is particularly apposite here in how it connects this concern 
with Smith’s broader interest in the public sphere. The section follows one character, 
Felix, during the last twenty-four hours of his life. Smith has admitted in various 
interviews that the section is based on Gustave Flaubert’s novella A Simple Heart 
(1877), but Flaubert’s influence on Smith is one less of story than of ambition. “I 
wanted to see if I could make somebody,” she claims, “and then, I guess, kill them, 
and have you care about it. It’s quite a difficult thing to do – it’s not a real person, it’s 
just thirty pages. You really have to put some work in to make anybody feel that 
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someone’s been lost.”40 This explicit ambition to create and portray a full and 
convincing life informs Smith’s model for the ‘better reduction’ of good fiction. In 
Felix’s case, it stands in opposition not just to the internet, but to another potentially 
inadequate form of reduction in the public sphere, the newspaper report.  
Smith claims that at the time of writing NW, it “was like a stabbing epidemic 
seemed to be going on in London,” and this shaped how and why she decided to write 
Felix as she did: 
It’s really easy for people to dismiss a young black man dying in the street – 
[…] it’s just going to be a little paragraph in the Evening Standard: ‘Black 
youth stabbed on…’ And that’s your son, that’s your brother, that’s your uncle. 
[…] He had a life, he had a history, and now he’s gone in five minutes, for 
nothing.41 
For Smith, the novel is a space in which to insist upon the importance and reality of 
these lives and histories of others. This is an ethical stance as much as an aesthetic one; 
more precisely, it codes “aesthetic choices” as “ethical ones.”42 Indeed, Smith’s 
representation of Felix can be seen to manifest a particular link between aesthetics and 
ethics that she has identified elsewhere in her work. In the novel’s final section, after 
Leah has found out about Felix’s death, she considers the contingency of her more 
privileged circumstances: “I just don’t understand why I have this life […] You, me, 
all of us. Why that girl and not us. Why that poor bastard on Albert Road. It doesn’t 
make sense to me.”43 In her essay “Man versus Corpse,” Smith takes Leah’s 
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incomprehension and applies a similar question to “the unequal distribution of 
corpses” in the world.44 She expresses understanding but dismay at the “conceptual 
gap between the local and the distant corpse [that] is almost as large as the one that 
exists between the living and the dead,” and at first uses this to outline “a persistent 
problem for artists: How can I insist upon the reality of death, for others, and for 
myself?”45 She goes on to ask whether “the premature corpsification of others [would] 
concern us more if we were mindful of what it is to be a living human”; importantly, 
for her this is “the point where aesthetics sidles up to politics.”46 Smith’s argument 
places exposure to a multiplicity of stories at its heart, while suggesting that the 
internet lets us down in this regard (or, rather, our use of it does): “it’s claimed that 
Americans viewed twelve times as many Web pages about Miley Cyrus as about the 
gas attack in Syria.”47 The ambitions that Smith lays out in “Man vs Corpse” are clearly 
already present in NW. The depiction of Felix’s lived experience functions as Smith’s 
attempt to make readers mindful of what it is to be a living human, with the direct hope 
that they will care more about the “premature corpsification” of young black men that 
they might otherwise only read about in short newspaper notices.  
Reading Smith’s essays can elucidate her aim to make readers believe in Felix, 
“and then feel sad that he was gone,” in another way, too.48 In “Man vs. Corpse,” Smith 
ruminates on the mourning process, and how “insist[ing] upon the reality of a once-
living person” ensures that they are “never reduced to matter alone”; in “Generation 
Why?,” she wonders whether the online world instead insists upon an equivalent 
unreality.49 She outlines how she has “noticed – and been ashamed of noticing – that 
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when a teenager is murdered, at least in Britain, her Facebook wall will often fill with 
messages that seem to not quite comprehend the gravity of what has occurred.”50 Smith 
goes on to consider whether the undeveloped tone of the messages is down to “poor 
education,” but admits to having “a darker, more frightening thought. Do they 
genuinely believe, because the girl’s wall is still up, that she is still, in some sense, 
alive? What’s the difference, after all, if all your contact was virtual?”51 The 
supposedly communicative interactions of online life are framed here as no better than 
the newspaper articles that populate the public sphere and reduce the lives of young 
men like Felix to facts about their deaths. The relationality of real life is absent from 
these interactions, but Smith looks to counter this in NW. She does this not only by 
depicting Felix’s relation to other characters in a full and convincing way, however, 
but also by highlighting how literature might better depict how readers relate to the 
world around them.  
All Modern Cons 
As I have suggested, in NW Smith uses the novel form to draw attention to the 
question of how different technologies aim to represent (and, consequently, reduce) a 
life. Smith poses a dichotomy in answer to this question: representations of lived 
experience are contrasted with rigidly categorised, instrumental information; the 
former the substance of literature, the latter the mainstay of the internet. Chapters nine 
and ten of NW’s first section provide the most overt examples of this dichotomy, as 
Smith directly contrasts the internet and literature’s abilities to represent characters’ 
experiences of London. Chapter nine consists of a list of “suggested routes” and 
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directions to take Leah “From A to B,” laid out as one would be given them by an 
online routefinder such as Google Maps: 
A5        47 mins 
2.4 miles 
A5 and Salusbury Rd      50 mins 
2.5 miles 
A404/Harrow Rd      58 mins 
2.8 miles.52 
At the bottom of the route plan, readers are told that they “may find that construction 
projects, traffic, weather, or other events may cause conditions to differ from the map 
results.”53 This is a reminder of the breach between representation and the physical 
world that gestures towards what chapter ten immediately goes on to demonstrate 
further – literature is characteristically more interested in portraying experience than 
stripping events down to efficient information, and, by extension, does a better job of 
representing a human life. Chapter ten, introduced as “From A to B redux”, outlines 
the experience of Leah’s journey by emphasising sensory details, from the olfactory 
(“sweet stink of the hookah, couscous, kebab, exhaust fumes”) to the auditory (“I give 
you good price, good price […] Boomboxes just because […] Birdsong!”). Stories 
emerge from the smallest details of what Leah sees (“Lone Italian, loafers, lost, looking 
for Mayfair”), and she is connected to memory by visual experience (“Here is the 
school where they stabbed the headmaster”). She is surrounded by examples of 
London’s rich and varied cultural past in the buildings she passes (“Tudor, Modernist, 
post-war, pre-war, stone pineapples, stone lions, stone eagles”), and this emphasises 
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the pluralistic make-up of contemporary London too (“Polish paper, Turkish paper, 
Arabic, Irish, French, Russian, Spanish, News of the World”).54 
 These two sections may seem to propose an unfair comparison – a novel is not, 
after all, the same thing as a map, nor would we expect (or desire) a routefinder to 
include irrelevant information about affects in its results. Yet Smith’s comparison aims 
to draw attention to the broader ramifications of privileging a data-driven and digital 
way of telling over a literary one. The acknowledgements in Smith’s Swing Time can 
be helpful in clarifying this, as they contain “a note on geography: North London, in 
these pages, is a state of mind. Some streets may not appear as they do in Google 
Maps.”55 Given that all of Smith’s novels are set, at least in part, in North London, this 
note could be taken as a retrospective comment on geography applicable to each of her 
books, and the reference to Google Maps is telling of a particular notion. Smith does 
not concede that that the streets in Swing Time may not appear as they do in the world, 
as for her their experiential texture in the novel provides a less reductive representation 
than the more utilitarian mode of information privileged online. 
The divide between online information and depictions of human experience in 
NW does not only manifest in relation to the city. One of Smith’s most enduring themes 
is time (“the idea of what does it really feel to be in time, to exist in it,” as she puts it 
in one interview), and NW represents the first major effort in Smith’s fiction to contend 
with how digital technologies change how we experience it.56 When Leah wants to use 
the computer she shares with her husband, he shouts back “five minutes!” – the fact 
that “he says it irritably whether thirty have gone by or a hundred or two hundred” 
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gestures towards the inexorability of digital culture, how it is always extending itself, 
headlong into the future.57 When NW’s internet users are not demanding five more 
minutes, they are expecting something to be done in less time than it currently takes, 
wanting the future to appear quicker (“though incredibly fast, her phone was still too 
slow”).58 Smith mostly foregrounds the links between time and technology, however, 
in how she writes about memory.  
In one scene, whilst on the Underground, Natalie believes that she has 
misremembered a quotation from an interview, and decides that “once she got within 
network she would check the year and whether or not that was the correct wording.”59 
She immediately doubts this impulse, however, conceding that “perhaps the way she 
had remembered it was the thing that was important” – in other words, that her 
experience of remembering was more important than the information being 
remembered.60 Smith endorses this attitude further when she directly follows Natalie’s 
revelation by describing two processes that privilege visceral experience over 
information-gathering. Readers are told that “in her tube seat, Natalie Blake moved 
her pelvis very subtly back and forth,” a clear allusion to Natalie’s discovery as a 
teenager that “a vaginal orgasm can be provoked by […] simply moving one’s pelvis 
forward and backwards in a small motion while thinking about something 
interesting.”61 The “interesting” thing that Natalie is thinking about in her tube seat is 
a branch of an apple tree, “heavy with blossom,” that she had broken off and taken 
with her on her way to the tube station, having been “surprised by [its] beauty.”62 
“Beauty,” readers are told, “created a special awareness” in Natalie, which causes her 
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to consider “the difference between a moment and an instant.”63 The next numbered 
section of the chapter consists of a quotation from Søren Kierkegaard’s Philosophical 
Fragments, a description of the “peculiar character” of a moment, which “is decisive, 
and filled with the eternal.”64 Given that Natalie’s memory of this description is 
triggered by her recognition of the blossom’s beauty, we can identify that aesthetic 
experience as a decisive and eternal moment for her. The heading of this section, by 
contrast, is a web address for a google search that would ‘instantly’ help her find “the 
philosophical significance of the distinction” she hopes to make.65 One implication 
here is that the instantaneous nature of online life is devoid of that which makes a 
moment special. Moreover, by highlighting Natalie’s experiences of memory, desire, 
and beauty in such close proximity to each other, Smith seems to seek to elicit from 
her readers a ‘special awareness’ of how experience is represented by different forms. 
By contrasting the literary and the digital, Smith portrays the novel as more 
temperamentally, formally, and historically suited to documenting and enquiring into 
experience than online media is. Indeed, we can identify this attention to experience 
as a particularly literary way of telling, and connect this back to Smith’s vision of 
literary publicness, by situating her work in relation to Virginia Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway 
(1925). 
Drawing on the modernist impulse to conduct narrative “through the moment-
by-moment experience – sensory, visceral, and mental – of the main character or 
characters,” Leah’s traversal of the city in NW echoes what Robert Alter calls “the 
experiential realism of the novel as a searching response to the felt new reality of the 
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European city.”66 The sensorial description of Leah’s walk is immediately reminiscent 
of Clarissa Dalloway’s perambulatory pondering at the beginning of Woolf’s novel:  
In people’s eyes, in the swing, tramp, and trudge; in the bellow and the uproar; 
the carriages, motor cars, omnibuses, vans, sandwich men shuffling and 
swinging; brass bands; barrel organs; in the triumph and the jingle and the 
strange high singing of some aeroplane overhead was what she loved; life; 
London; this moment of June.67 
For Alberto Fernández Carbajal, Natalie and Nathan’s walk across London later in the 
novel also recalls Woolf’s novel, and operates as a “simultaneous reflection and 
refraction of Clarissa Dalloway.”68 Whereas Clarissa’s “epiphany about the self in the 
city comes to fruition in […] a place that best mirrors her own socioeconomic 
background,” Natalie’s ambivalent relationship with class troubles such a realisation.69 
Rather, her conversation with Nathan, which focusses on “his impression that she has 
risen far above him socially and that she no longer understands his plight,”70 is 
mirrored in the ever-changing city that the two characters traverse: “the world of 
council flats lay far behind them, at the bottom of the hill. Victorian houses began to 
appear, only a few at first, then multiplying.”71  
As Alter notes, this kind of “fragmentation […] is an essential element in the 
experience of the modern metropolis.”72 In Mrs Dalloway, Woolf attempts to “imagine 
a kind of unity in the heterogeneity or at least a sort of unity imposed by the perceiving 
consciousness that enables it to exult in the heterogeneity instead of being disoriented 
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by it.”73 Smith imagines a similar unity at the end of Leah’s walk in NW’s first section. 
Further to noticing the categories that separate people, by experiencing the physical 
world in its rich detail Leah can identify connections between certain pockets of the 
diverse population of this area: “Everybody loves fags […] Everybody believes in 
destiny […] Everybody loves fried chicken […] Everybody loves sandals […] 
Everybody loves the Grand National.”74 That each of these declarations is followed by 
a repetition of the word “Everybody” is significant, highlighting as it does the idea of 
a group, the communal, and the possibility of community. Indeed, Nick Hubble glosses 
Wendy Knepper’s reading of NW to suggest that such interpersonal connections, 
whether characters are conscious of them or not, structure the novel, revealing a 
“hidden set of networks and connections that extend beyond the city’s surface 
appearance to an otherwise submerged intersubjective London.”75 
Mrs Dalloway’s influence on Smith’s depiction of urban experience is made 
clear in how she structures NW around a network of diverse yet overlapping 
experiences of London, but taken alongside NW’s references to Flaubert, the novel’s 
engagement with Woolf can be read as part of a more general engagement on Smith’s 
part with the legacies of modernism. Whereas Franzen and Eggers look to foreground 
antecedent authors and novels to provide ready-made ways of understanding the 
contemporary public sphere’s problems, Smith looks to build on the insights of the 
past in a critical act of reconsideration. As David James and Urmila Seshagiri have 
argued, NW is one of a number of contemporary novels that could be said to “reassess 
and remobilize narratives of modernism,” in this case by employing “an aesthetics of 
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discontinuity, nonlinearity, interiority, and chronological play”; in particular, a “self-
reflexive perspectivism” pervades the novel.76 If, as James and Seshagiri suggest, NW 
joins a slate of recent fiction which “incorporates and adapts, reactivates and 
complicates the aesthetic prerogatives of an earlier cultural moment,” then it is in 
Smith’s engagement with perspectivism that this most interestingly occurs – not least 
because it extends beyond this one novel to her work more generally.77 As alluded to, 
Smith’s perspectivism is self-reflexive – in her 2007 essay “Fail Better,” she draws 
attention to the contingent perspective from which she writes, outlining how “writers 
know that between the platonic ideal of the novel and the actual novel there is always 
the pesky self.”78 In the essay, Smith challenges T.S. Eliot’s insistence that “the 
progress of an artist is a continual self-sacrifice, a continual extinction of 
personality.”79 For Smith, this is an untenable description of writing, which in her view 
is always to some extent inflected by the personality responsible for producing it. 
Smith’s perspectivist approach extends not only to writing, however, but to 
reading, and in such a way that it cannot be simply aligned with the modernist 
perspectivism of her evoked forebears. Summarising the eighteenth-century debates 
between ‘ancients’ and ‘moderns’ that characterised the nascent stages of aesthetic 
modernism, Art Berman points out that, “for the modernist, the event called art,” as 
experienced by readers or spectators, “is always fundamentally a personal event 
occurring in an individual mind, whereas for the classicist it is equally or more a 
communal or societal event.”80 The way that Smith’s work “incorporates and adapts, 
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reactivates and complicates” the modernist version of perspectivism is through her 
attempts to reconcile these two ways of conceiving of our encounters with art.81 For 
her, the public sphere is the critical concept that can help most in this endeavour.  
In the foreword to her second essay collection, Feel Free, Smith suggests that 
essays about one person’s affective experience have, by their very nature, not 
a leg to stand on. All they have is their freedom. And the reader is likewise 
unusually free, because I have absolutely nothing over her, no authority. She 
can reject my feelings at every point, she can say: ‘No, I have never felt that’ 
or ‘Dear Lord, the thought never crossed my mind!’82 
The imperative title of Smith’s collection is revealed here as a directive for both herself 
and her readers, a description of the free interpretation enacted at both ends of her 
creative process. For Smith, it is of the utmost importance that we recognise “that 
reading involves all the same liberties and exigencies as writing” – we can in fact 
understand this balance as the basis of her model of literary publicness.83 Her 2017 
essay “Getting In and Out,” provides an apposite statement of this model. Writing in 
opposition to a public call to have a painting in the Whitney Biennial destroyed, Smith 
suggests that  
art is a traffic in symbols and images, it has never been politically or 
historically neutral […]. Each individual example has to be thought through, 
and we have every right to include such considerations in our evaluations of 
art […]. The solution remains as it has always been. Get out (of the gallery) or 
deeper in (to the argument). Write a screed against it. Critique the hell out of 
it. Tear it to shreds in your review or paint another painting in response.84 
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Smith asserts her faith in the power of the public sphere in relation to art here, and in 
doing so combines her insistence upon individual perspective with a recognition of the 
importance of collaborative debate. Indeed, Smith presents the affordance to readers 
or spectators of the same rights as artists as the very thing which underwrites any 
important issue’s consideration in a piece of art. Her literary publicness rests on a 
guaranteed parity between the processes of reading and writing, and she models this 
literary publicness by herself reading and rewriting modernist ideas of perspectivism. 
This is by no means the end of Smith’s consideration, however – in her following 
novel, Swing Time, she revisits the notion of perspectivism, and more concretely 
connects it with her thinking about the public sphere. 
Constructionist Sites 
In “Generation Why?,” Smith imagines the possibly forthcoming effects of a 
change that Facebook introduced to their service in 2010, which allowed users to 
connect their accounts to other websites:  
In this new, open Internet, we will take our real identities with us as we travel 
through the Internet. This concept seems to have some immediate Stoical 
advantages: no more faceless bile, no more inflammatory trolling: if your name 
and social network track you around the virtual world beyond Facebook, you’ll 
have to restrain yourself and so will everyone else.85 
Although prescient in other ways, this part of Smith’s essay has not aged well – her 
hopeful perspective seems naïve now, with anonymity, trolling, and tracking all 
coexisting in the continuingly fractious online world. In Swing Time, however, Smith 
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reconsiders the salience of our online identities from a different viewpoint, one that is 
informed by the perspectivism of her previous novel. Swing Time complicates the idea 
of online anonymity by suggesting that Tracey is detectable online, even when 
operating under a pseudonym, by the very nature of the information that she divulges 
or the stories she tells. Tracey “wasn’t hard to find” in the comments sections of news 
websites, as 
she always went at it full tilt, every time, no compromise, aggressive, full of 
conspiracy. She had many aliases. Some were quite subtle: tiny references to 
moments from our shared history, songs we’d liked, toys we’d had, or numeral 
re-combinations of the year we first met or our dates of birth. I noticed she 
liked to use the words ‘sordid’ and ‘shameful’, and the phrase ‘Where were 
their mothers?’ Whenever I saw that line, or a variation upon it, I knew it was 
her.86 
Just as the online world bleeds into the offline one in Smith’s recent stories, this 
passage points to how the facts of a person’s offline existence are not entirely mutable 
when mediated. As well as contemporary questions about how technology changes 
public discourse, this means that we should of course still be asking more traditional 
questions about the public sphere when considering its online manifestations. And as 
Dahlberg suggests, we should dismiss the utopian idea “that social hierarchies and 
power relations are levelled out by the ‘blindness’ of cyberspace to bodily identity” – 
rather, “identity becomes just as salient online as offline [… and] leads to the 
reassertion of authority and subsequently power differentials online.”87 By gesturing 
to these power differentials that reassert themselves online in Swing Time, Smith asks 
a foundational question: what does difference mean for the public sphere?  
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From a Habermasian perspective, difference is irrelevant to the public sphere 
– it is something to be bracketed during discussion, and moved away from in the search 
for consensus. Yet Smith has no such interest in bracketing difference. As she put it in 
a recent interview,  
it’s correct to say that people’s experiences absolutely matter and that they are 
completely various. […] Our experiences are entirely different, and that is a 
revelation more important than [the idea] that we are all the same on the inside. 
[…] That’s not true at all. In a million ways we’re all incredibly different on 
the inside.88 
Smith recognises that this difference extends further than just what opinions people 
hold – it might also have an impact on how those opinions are expressed. In order to 
formulate a vision of the public sphere that makes room for difference, Smith considers 
two key questions: firstly, what forms of contribution should be allowed in the public 
sphere, and secondly, who should be able to contribute to debates about particular 
issues. In both cases, Smith looks to literature for a model of success. 
Late in Swing Time, the novel’s unnamed narrator describes the entrance of 
digital communication into her life: “the first email I received came from my mother. 
She sent it from a computer lab in the basement of University College London, where 
she had just taken part in a public debate, and I received it on a computer in my own 
college library.”89 The internet is foregrounded here as a tool for communication, 
access to which is linked to educational institutions. Furthermore, by mentioning a 
public debate, Smith draws attention to different discursive spaces, and puts readers in 
mind of how the online world might redraw the boundaries of public and private. By 
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highlighting these details, Smith gestures to how education inflects communication 
and debate throughout the rest of the novel. The divergent educations and experiences 
of Swing Time’s narrator and Tracey are central to the novel, in which Smith is keen 
to foreground (as she did in NW) how “class […] shapes your reality,” and how 
education is a primary site of this difference.90 Implicit within the divergent lives of 
Tracey and Swing Time’s narrator is the recognition that rational-critical conceptions 
of the public sphere can privilege certain kinds of education. “The issue here is not the 
inability of some groups to provide rational arguments for their beliefs,” as Ferree et 
al. clarify, “but that narrative and other preferred modes may be unfairly devalued.”91 
In Swing Time, Smith creates a narrator who refuses to assent to a gold standard of 
participation in public life, and who appears sympathetic to a constructionist approach 
to interaction in the public sphere, one which evinces “a strong norm of popular 
inclusion, which in turn serves the goals of empowerment of the marginalized and 
recognition of differences.”92  
It is this recognition of differences that Smith emphasises the need for – a part 
of her contribution to debates which in fact dovetails with how her work is considered 
in the public sphere. Popular accounts of Smith’s literary success are often taken as 
“proof, among all society’s sadness and badness, that education works,” as one of her 
interviewers has suggested.93 Smith is usually quick to point out, however, that this 
depends on “if it can be accessed” – as she sees it, “plenty of people from my school 
could have got to Cambridge, it’s just that they didn’t know it existed.”94 That said, 
                                                          
90 Smith, “Guardian Books Podcast.” 
91 Myra Marx Ferree, William A. Gamson, Jürgen Gerhards and Dieter Rucht. “Four Models of the 
Public Sphere in Modern Democracies,” Theory and Society 31, no. 3 (2002): 311. 
92 Ibid, 315. 
93 Kirsty Young, “Desert Island Discs,” BBC Radio 4, radio broadcast, September 22, 2013, 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b03bg4v7. 
94 Zadie Smith, “Lunch with the FT: Novelist Zadie Smith,” interview by Jan Dalley, Financial Times, 
November 11, 2016, https://www.ft.com/.  
155 
 
Smith’s fiction has increasingly thematised what she acknowledges as the problematic 
assumption at the heart of the idea of social mobility: “there’s something slightly 
obscene about the idea of ‘You!,’ like it’s a talent show […] You alone will be picked 
out of your class and shown as an example, like a kind of performing monkey – ‘look 
what can happen!’”95 In an interview for The Penguin Podcast, Smith talks about the 
“deal offered to kids” of her generation who did well in their exams and dedicated 
themselves to learning about British culture, with the attendant promise that they could 
“go all the way.”96 Such an idea, Smith claims, while not false, comes with caveats, 
questions at the forefront of her mind while she was writing Swing Time: “What do 
you have to do to yourself in order to meet those requirements? What do you have to 
ignore? What do you have to pretend isn’t in you? And who do you have to leave 
behind?” 97 
Attendant to Smith’s insistence on recognising difference is an attempt to find 
a way for citizens to participate in public life without having to leave behind any part 
of themselves. Smith does this primarily by foregrounding a constructionist 
perspective in the later, more fractious interactions between Tracey and Swing Time’s 
narrator. Constructionists “do not devalue deliberation and formal argument in 
discourse,”98 and as such Tracey’s anger and abusive tones are, quite rightly, not taken 
lightly by Swing Time’s narrator – she is “stunned by the rage.”99 Importantly, 
however, this anger does not supersede the rest of Tracey’s story, which comprises “a 
surreal mix of personal vendetta, painful memory, astute political protest and a local 
resident’s complaints,” and understandably employs an affective register to outline a 
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“catalogue of pain: child-support woes, rent arrears, skirmishes with social 
workers.”100 For Smith, like most constructionists, narrative “reveals experiences 
based on social locations that cannot be shared fully by those who are differently 
situated.”101 Indeed, when the narrator goes to confront Tracey about her abusive 
emails and online posts, she cannot ignore their shared personal history and divergent 
present circumstances, and finds herself unable to disagree with Tracey’s claim that 
“there can’t be no understanding between you and me any more! You’re part of a 
different system now.”102  
But Smith herself seems unable to fully accept Tracey’s pronouncement about 
an inevitable lack of understanding, and explores the idea that the existence of 
‘different systems’ means that the public sphere must make room for different systems 
of expression. To be truly accepting of difference, the public sphere needs to 
incorporate norms and ideals that go beyond the narrow constraints of a Habermasian 
model.  The central means of expression in the constructionist view, as mentioned 
above, is narrative. One of the most interesting manifestations of this idea in Smith’s 
work is her interest in conspiracy theories. At one point, while Swing Time’s narrator 
is living in The Gambia to oversee the development of a school that her popstar boss, 
Aimee, is trying to set up, she meets “a lively young woman called Esther,” who is 
amazed that Aimee “knows Jay-Z, she knows Rihanna and Beyoncé.”103 When the 
narrator confirms that Aimee also “knows Michael Jackson,” Esther asks: “Do you 
think she is Illuminati, too? Or she just is acquaintances with Illuminati?”104 When 
challenged on the veracity of claims she has read online about the Illuminati, Esther 
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declares that “here for us it is real, because there is a lot of power there for sure.”105 
Smith points to the value of translating such perspectives when she links Esther’s 
conspiracy theory with others in the novel. Tracey looks to the internet to find “truth,” 
posting in a chat room “under the alias Truthteller_Legon,” first about grand 
conspiracies that Smith models on David Icke’s ‘reptoid hypothesis,’ and later about 
“a secret eighteenth-century Bavarian sect […] at work in the world today.”106 
Interestingly, however, the novel’s narrator suggests that Tracey’s perspectives should 
not be immediately discounted. Indeed,  
if you could put aside their insane first premise, [Tracey’s posts were] striking 
in their detail and perverse erudition, linking many diverse historical periods 
and political ideas and facts […] which, even in its comic wrongness, required 
a certain depth of study and persistent attention.107 
The narrator is able to “read between the lines” to find the valid message at the heart 
of this ridiculous story – one that also applies to how she explicates Esther’s belief in 
the existence of the Illuminati: “Wasn’t it all a way of explaining power, in the end? 
The power that certainly exists in the world? Which few hold and most never get near? 
A power my old friend must have felt, at that point in her life, she utterly lacked?”108 
Even though conspiracy theories are not accounts of personal experience in the way 
that constructionist theories might expect contributions to the public sphere to be, the 
fact that Smith frames these stories as valid attempts to articulate structural political 
problems, and that she suggests reading as the process in which this validity can be 
unpacked, proposes narrative as a central tenet of Smith’s model of literary publicness. 
Indeed, it is important that Smith has her narrator unpack these perspectives – if Smith 
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suggests that the public sphere might benefit from being more literary in character, this 
is not just because she believes that any narrative should be taken as a permissible and 
helpful contribution. Rather, she expects all actors within the public sphere to think of 
themselves as simultaneously writers and readers, and to bring a critical mind to their 
encounters with other perspectives. As Burbules and Rice importantly point out, this 
kind of approach “does not require embracing the other standpoint or letting it 
supersede our own, but it does stress the value of incorporating that perspective into a 
more complex and multifaceted framework of understanding.”109 Smith’s model of 
literary publicness attempts to build such a multifaceted framework, and guarantee that 
all perspectives are fairly considered regardless of how unconventional their forms 
appear. 
In one interview, Smith links her perspectivist approach with ideas about 
argumentation, claiming that 
we’re living in an age where people feel that pathos is all you need when you 
make an argument – as in, ‘I feel it, and so it is true.’ However, an argument is 
not just emotion. You can feel something with incredible strength, but that’s 
not enough. It’s not true just because I feel it to be true. That world is chaos in 
my opinion.110 
In the face of this chaos, Smith looks back to her own education for an alternative: “I 
was educated in things like Aristotle’s idea of rhetoric […]. When you make an 
argument, you make it through Ethos, Pathos and Logos — Ethos appeals to ethics, 
Pathos appeals to emotion and Logos appeals to logic.”111 The fact that Smith 
summarises Aristotelian ethos here as an ethical appeal, rather than as “a person’s or 
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community’s character or characterizing spirit, tone, or attitude” as Liesbeth Korthals 
Altes summarises it, shores up the links that I have already shown Smith makes 
between a writer’s aesthetic contributions and their ethical positions.112 Her comment 
also suggests a more accurate way of describing the vision of the public sphere that 
emerges in Swing Time: an Aristotelian constructionism, a form of public discourse 
that makes room for narrative, ethical and emotional appeals, but also maintains the 
logical elements of a rational-critical public sphere. As Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos 
has claimed, “Aristotle’s fusion of reason, emotion, and performance also provides us 
with a unique alternative to both agonistic and rational/deliberative conceptions of the 
public sphere”; we can identify this alternative in the forms of the public sphere that 
Smith portrays.113  
If Smith believes that her perspectivism is a curative for contemporary modes 
of argumentation, it is worth stressing that this is because, for her, literature’s value to 
the public sphere lies as much in how it constitutes a model for interactions as in the 
contributions it can make to debates. Indeed, she admits that she is “less interested in 
convincing people of an argument than in modelling a style of thinking.”114 Her model 
of literary publicness is founded on the notion of parity between the processes of 
writing and reading, but to achieve this equality both writer and reader must recognise 
their own perspectives as contingent. For Smith, this recognition of difference can 
embed relationality into the public sphere: the “extension away from yourself, into 
other people, is maybe what fiction could model as a kind of citizenship behaviour,” 
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in an attempt to build a “coalition across difference.”115 Finding the most inclusive 
way to approach different elements of identity in the public sphere is key to building 
this coalition – the overall aim, for Smith, is “to create a citizen […] who thinks as a 
writer does about identity.”116 Yet for all that Smith’s contributions look to model a 
specific way of thinking about identity, her work is not always considered in the public 
sphere in this way. Rather, as I will now show, a reductive focus on the facts of Smith’s 
individual identity can serve to obscure some of the nuances of her form of literary 
publicness. 
Writers’ Rights 
In Swing Time, when the narrator describes going online after missing one of 
Aimee’s gigs, readers are put in mind once more of how different forms represent 
experience: 
Search Aimee, search venue, search Brooklyn dance troupe, image search, AP 
wire search, blog search. At first simply out of a sense of guilt, but soon enough 
with the realization that I could reconstruct – 140 characters at a time, image 
by image, blog post by blog post – the experience of having been there, until, 
by one a.m., nobody could have been there more than me.117 
This scene, more than it initially appears, reaffirms NW’s position on information and 
experience. As Mark McGurl points out in an article on fiction and Amazon.com, “to 
speak of, say, ‘fiction in the age of the Internet,’ however illuminating the discussion, 
would risk missing the extent to which literary experience remains even now 
unassimilated to the phenomenology of web browsing, from which it is quite 
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distinct.”118 For Smith, this is precisely the point – just as she encourages readers to be 
mindful of different ways of representing experience, here she foregrounds the 
phenomenological differences between experiences of those representations. Despite 
the narrator’s claim that “nobody could have been there more than me,” the fact 
remains that she has been sitting in bed “aimless[ly] surfing” the internet for hours.119 
The narrator’s online experience is extended when she begins to observe “the 
debates as they form and coalesce” as to whether the costumes Aimee and her dancers 
were wearing (they were “dressed up to resemble Asante nobles”), and the dances they 
performed, could be considered examples of cultural appropriation.120 When the 
narrator challenges Aimee on this, Aimee responds by claiming that “the aim of art is 
love,” a belief Smith uses to explain her own approach to alterity in her fiction:121 
Aimee, the pop star, says something that I don’t disagree with, which is that art 
involves an act of love, and of imitation. I would maybe use the word 
“voyeurism”. I think of myself explicitly as a voyeur, somebody who wants to 
be inside other people’s lives. To write On Beauty, I wanted to know: what’s 
it like to be a middle-aged, white male academic? Or in The Autograph Man, 
what’s it like to be a young, Chinese-Jewish guy who collects autographs? […] 
The identity facts of your life are so profoundly contingent – where your 
parents happened to be on the day you were born – that I can only take identity 
seriously as an act of commitment and love. 122 
Even though Aimee’s performance itself could be considered culturally and politically 
problematic, the fact that Smith aligns herself with her character’s aim is telling. Time 
and again, Smith claims the right to a creative freedom to write about whatever, or 
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whoever, she wants to – as long as it is done respectfully, she sees no problem with 
the process. Indeed, despite her belief that writing is always an expression of an 
author’s personality or perspective, Smith also suggests that aesthetic freedom to some 
extent means refusing the limits that being a self places on one’s imagination. As she 
puts it in one interview, “if I had to rely on my experience, as it is at the moment […] 
if I had to believe that this was the only scope of my existence, the only thing available 
to me as subject or as idea, I think I would go mad.”123 
Smith’s approach, of course, isn’t without its detractors – and, 
characteristically, Smith herself is one of them. In “Getting In and Out,” her 
contribution to the debate about white artist Dana Schutz’s painting of Emmett Till, 
Open Casket, Smith points out that when artworks like Schutz’s are “facilely 
celebrated as proof of the autonomy of art,” this is “more often than not hoary old 
white privilege dressed up as aesthetic theory.”124 Furthermore, it is important not to 
conceive of this freedom to write about, or from the perspective of, other identities as 
a refusal or denial of any part of one’s own identity – again, that way lies a false 
neutrality: the insidious idea, as she puts it in one interview, “that blackness, or any 
other kind of identity apart from white identity […] is a narrowing of vision.”125 In the 
same interview, when asked about the impulse to restrict the treatment of certain 
subjects to those with direct experience of them, however, Smith’s ambivalence is 
clear: “I don’t think it’s the worst crime […] but I don’t think it’s ideal.”126 Smith’s 
ambivalence about what she calls “an artist’s right to a particular subject” actually 
structures “Getting In and Out,” manifesting in the fact that much of the essay’s 
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treatment of the issue comprises questions rather than positions.127 Her questions are 
mainly phrased as responses to a letter sent to the curators of the Whitney Biennial by 
artist Hannah Black, who called for the destruction of Schutz’s painting. Smith 
focusses in particular on one part of the letter, Black’s argument that “the subject 
matter is not Schutz’s; white free speech and white creative freedom have been 
founded on the constraint of others, and are not natural rights.”128 In the interview I 
cited earlier, Smith suggests that thinking of the issue of an artist’s right to a particular 
subject in terms of individual rights misses the point: “the question of duties is more 
important than the question of individual rights because individual rights echo a kind 
of capitalist dogma […]: What’s accrued to me? What can I get? What am I owed? 
That, I find, is a depressing political place.”129 Rather, if Smith wants all subjects to 
be available to all minds, it is because there exist “collective duties” in need of renewal, 
and “structural inequalities” that require collective attention.130 An etic perspective 
(that from outside a particular social group) should never override an emic one (from 
within that group) outright, but Smith believes that the former should not be dismissed 
out of hand, either – rather, “each individual example has to be thought through.”131 
Smith hopes that her own work will be given this opportunity too. Indeed, her 
changing style itself reflects a process of thinking through the various aesthetic and 
ethical ramifications of writing in particular ways. Throughout Smith’s career, her 
work has been consistently considered in the public sphere through a particular lens, 
as critics have debated her use of voice. Upon White Teeth’s publication, James Wood 
criticised Smith’s dominant authorial presence, claiming that she “not only speaks over 
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her character, she reduces him, obliterates him.”132 But Dorothy J. Hale believes that, 
in On Beauty, Smith’s authorial intrusions work to overturn “both modernist pieties 
about the value of authorial impersonality and postmodernist pieties about the 
impersonal sources of all subjective agency.”133 In NW, David James argues, the 
authorial voice becomes more ambivalent, so much so that he is tempted to ask 
whether readers are “witnessing a new kind of ethical maneuver, one that […] 
highlights how the deliberate quelling of authorial evaluation might itself be ethically 
motivated.”134 Smith’s novella The Embassy of Cambodia’s (2013) first-person plural 
voice gestures towards how “the political narrative of collective action is something 
we experience in first-person plural” but Kaya Genç proposes that, by revealing the 
narrator to in fact be just one character “speaking on behalf of her community,” Smith 
also asks the implicit question of whether a writer has “the right to do such a thing.”135 
For Smith herself, no stranger to considering her own work in the public sphere, Swing 
Time’s narrator represents an “open ‘I’,” a figure who can “exist in relation to other 
people,” but still presents an uncertainty about what her own character might “consist 
of.”136 
Throughout the evolution of Smith’s style, we see her grappling with various 
issues of representation and voice, but all of them identify the defining feature of 
Smith’s identity in her fiction as, unsurprisingly, her identity as a writer and reader. 
References to literature abound in her novels, as well as references to her own work: 
                                                          
132 James Wood, “Human, All Too Inhuman,” New Republic, July 24, 2000, 
https://newrepublic.com/article/61361/human-inhuman.  
133 Dorothy J. Hale, “On Beauty as Beautiful?: The Problem of Novelistic Aesthetics by Way of Zadie 
Smith,” Contemporary Literature 53, no. 4 (2012): 820. 
134 James, “Wounded Realism,” 210. 
135 Kaya Genç, “The Embassy of Gossip: Zadie Smith’s First-Person Plural,” Los Angeles Review of 
Books, March 1, 2014, https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/embassy-gossip-zadie-smiths-first-person-
plural/.  
136 Smith, “The Penguin Podcast.” 
165 
 
her cameo as “a feckless novelist on a visiting fellowship” in On Beauty137; in NW, 
Natalie’s mother’s mention of White Teeth’s “Mrs. Iqbal”138; and Swing Time’s 
reference to “a buck-toothed girl called Irie,” also from Smith’s first novel.139 This 
identity, however, is firmly grounded in her fictional worlds and the question of how 
best to represent them, and Smith seems loath to let her extraliterary persona inflect 
her writing too much. This concern animates Smith’s anxiety about the effects of the 
internet on writers. If, early in her career, Smith complained that English literary 
culture was “driven by the celebrity mania that this whole country is sunk in,”140 then 
the rapid rise of the internet has only made things more performative: 
I think the main effect [the internet] has had on writers […] is it depresses the 
hell out of you because the first thing people do, obviously, is Google 
themselves. Everybody does it. And if you’re a writer like me, who is very 
attracted to negative opinions of yourself – it was taking up my day, you 
know?141 
For Swing Time’s narrator, the internet offers an abundance of “meanings and subtexts 
[…] the insults and the jokes, the gossip and the rumour, the memes […] and all the 
many varieties of critique given free rein”; what this ephemeral, “mighty act of 
collation” is missing, of course, is any act of commitment and love.142 To be relational 
instead of performative, to attempt the act of love Smith strives for in representation, 
involves, she seems to claim, to some extent forgoing the rigid identity that fame has 
thrust upon her. Since the beginning of her career, Smith has spoken about her 
discomfort with being “expected to be more than a novelist – a spokesperson for race, 
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youth, women”: “I was expected to be some expert on multicultural affairs, as if 
multiculturalism is a genre of fiction or something, whereas it's just a fact of life – like 
there are people of different races on the planet.”143 The point for Smith is not to elide 
any issues related to race, age, gender, or class – rather, her fiction allows her to 
explore these ideas in ways that don’t centre solely on her individual identity as a 
celebrity figure, or force her to be a spokesperson for any one group, and instead allow 
for a multiplicity of responses. 
We can in fact return to Facebook for a neat example of Smith’s place within 
the public sphere. Smith’s American publisher, Penguin Press, runs a Facebook page 
on the author’s behalf, dedicated to marketing her work. One post on the individualised 
page advertises her second essay collection, Feel Free, with a quotation from Smith’s 
essay “The I Who Is Not Me”: “For me fiction is a way of asking: what if things were 
other than they are? And a central component of that is to ask: what if I was different 
than I am? I have always found the practice of writing fiction far more an escape from 
self than an exploration of it.”144 To the left of the quotation is a picture of the book’s 
cover, emblazoned with her name; on the right, Facebook’s commenting interface, a 
picture of Smith, and a reminder that the new collection is forthcoming. This image 
sums up how Smith’s writing is often caught between the concerns of the market and 
the perceptions of the public, and serves as a prompt for us to pay more attention to 
where the ideas that she explores sit in this relationship. Her writing situates her as 
central to contemporary fiction’s exploration of the public sphere, and instantiates a 
model of literary publicness where authority emerges not from the author figure, nor 
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from their connections to esteemed institutions, but from the exchange of ideas 
between writers and readers. The result of this work, Smith hopes, is that we will all 
feel free to change our minds whenever we need to.
168 
 
David Foster Wallace: Reading and Refusal 
Prescience or Precedents? 
Upon first inspection, it seems that the internet has far more to say about David Foster 
Wallace than the author ever had to say about the internet. If this appears obvious (of 
course ‘the internet’ has more to say, comprising the contributions of its billions of users 
as opposed to those of one writer), it is still worth reflecting on the abundance of articles 
and blogs published online wondering what Wallace’s ‘take’ on the technology would be 
if he were still writing.1 As the author’s biographer D. T. Max highlights, “people 
frequently ask what David Foster Wallace would have made of the Web,” a “weird 
question” given the fact that Wallace, who died in 2008, “actually lived well into the 
Internet era.”2 Max goes on to offer a possible explanation for the question’s continued 
prevalence: “When he wrote about how the media permeates all of our actions and 
thoughts he was referring to television.”3 Yet this recurrent focus on television, others 
argue, can also be read as part of a broader attention to the intersections of technology 
and entertainment, and we can infer from Wallace’s work many interesting insights about 
the internet age. Indeed, in his introduction to Infinite Jest’s (1996) twentieth anniversary 
edition, Tom Bissell goes as far as to suggest that, “as a novel about an ‘entertainment’ 
weaponized to enslave and destroy all who look upon it, Infinite Jest is the first great 
internet novel,” mainly due to Wallace’s almost “Delphic” foresight in his depictions of 
video binging and mediatised communication.4  
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Bissell’s suggestion here is redolent of a broader trend in popular Wallace 
criticism, namely the frequent attribution of an impressive prescience to Infinite Jest (an 
indicative sample of headlines would include “Our Lives on the Internet as Prophesied 
by David Foster Wallace,” and “The 5 Impressive Ways David Foster Wallace's Infinite 
Jest Predicted the Future”).5 This perspective, however, can often feel rather forced. After 
all, how similar to contemporary smartphones can the novel’s ‘teleputers’ really be said 
to be? And how much of Netflix and Google can actually be seen in the fictional 
entertainment company InterLace TelEntertainment?6 This focus on prescience results 
from a lack of attention to Wallace’s writing – it examines contemporary events and 
looks for similarities within his work, rather than interrogating how and why Wallace’s 
vision converges with and diverges from both the 1990s America in which he was 
writing, and our own present reality. As a result, the relationship between Wallace’s work 
and the internet remains relatively untheorized.7 Even some of the comments that he did 
directly make about the technology are confused by context, such as those in an 
unpublished story (described again, this time by Max, as “prescient”), or an unverified 
interview conducted in a chat room.8  
One remark of Wallace’s can point us in a more useful direction, however, and 
help to unpack the relevance of the internet to his later work in particular. In a 1996 
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interview, Wallace offered some thoughts on the nascent technology of the commercial 
internet: 
This idea that the Internet’s gonna become incredibly democratic? I mean, if 
you’ve spent any time on the Web, you know that it’s not gonna be, because that’s 
completely overwhelming. There are four trillion bits coming at you, 99 percent 
of them are shit, and it’s too much work to do triage to decide.9 
Wallace here makes two key points about the internet: first, he suggests that its 
democratic potential is wildly overstated, and second, he highlights how its scale poses 
important questions about the value of information, and attendant processes of 
discernment. His comment is less prescient than it is descriptive, and if it scans as 
prophetic this may simply be because the internet has developed along consistently 
expansionary lines since the mid-1990s. What is most important to note about Wallace’s 
insight, however, is the fact that he links these two ideas, establishing a connection 
between the questions of how technology might support or impede democratic ideals, 
and how information circulates in complex societies. These questions, which sit at the 
core of many debates about the contemporary public sphere, return as central themes in 
Wallace’s final novel, The Pale King (2011).10  
Whereas in his interview Wallace suggests that triaging information is too much 
work, The Pale King concerns itself with people for whom it is their work. The novel 
follows a number of employees of the Internal Revenue Service in the 1980s, many of 
whom work with abstract information every day, and for whom “the point of a procedure 
is to process and reduce the information in your file to just the information that has 
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value.”11 These characters are employed during a tempestuous period for the IRS, when 
the very principles of the organisation are in flux, prey to the reconfiguration of American 
economic policy under Ronald Reagan. The novel’s concern is not with the impossibility 
of discernment in online life specifically, then; rather, deciding what information is 
valuable is characterised as a more general difficulty facing American democracy. But 
even if The Pale King is a historical rather than a prophetic novel, this does not mean that 
Wallace has nothing to say about the internet age. In The Pale King, the author tells a 
story about the relationship between digital technology and neoliberalism, exploring how 
the norms and ideals of the public sphere are refigured by this relationship.  
As with the other authors I address in this thesis, Wallace looks to literature to 
provide a recuperative model for a public sphere undergoing a contemporary structural 
transformation. But unlike Franzen, Smith, and Eggers, he does not engage with one 
antecedent author or movement to inform his model. Wallace identifies the inability of 
citizens to decide what information is valuable as a problem particular to the public 
sphere in the internet age, due both to the internet’s oversaturation with information, and 
neoliberalism’s outsourcing of valuation to market forces. Because of this, he focusses 
his attention on the process of reading, modelling a form of literary publicness centred 
on it. The Pale King highlights the role of contingent perspectives in individual reading, 
but in order to avoid perpetuating a neoliberal valorisation of individualism, Wallace also 
stresses the importance of recognising our intersubjective condition as citizens. In an era 
when that intersubjectivity is being devalued and denigrated by neoliberal priorities and 
politics, Wallace suggests, a renewed vision of the public sphere might have to abandon 
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its aims for consensus-building, and instead work towards instantiating dialogue as an 
end in itself. 
Wallace’s interest in neoliberalism is evident throughout The Pale King. In §19 
of the novel, for example, several IRS employees engage in a debate about contemporary 
politics while stuck in an elevator. Their discussion takes in a wide range of issues, 
including civics, taxes, the American Revolution, individual responsibility, 
consumerism, and the upcoming 1980 presidential election (which Ronald Reagan would 
win in a landslide). Adam Kelly has highlighted how in this scene, “in keeping with 
swathes of emerging scholarship on the era of ‘neoliberal’ capitalism, Wallace places the 
key transitional moment to contemporary American society in and around 1980.”12 Many 
of the elevator discussion’s themes also play out elsewhere in the novel in the ongoing 
debate over the Spackman Initiative, a restructuring process which, “distilled to its 
essence,” concerns the question of “whether and to what extent the IRS should be 
operated like a for-profit business.”13 Although fictional, the Initiative is grounded in 
historical shifts associated with Reagan’s economic policies – it functions as Wallace’s 
dramatization of the integration of a neoliberal rationality into liberal democratic 
institutions. Wendy Brown has summarised this rationality as one which “disseminates 
the model of the market to all domains and activities – even where money is not an issue 
– and configures human beings exhaustively as market actors, always, only, and 
everywhere as homo oeconomicus.”14 This latter term, Brown notes, has a long and 
complex history, but its referent emerges in the contemporary era as a triumphant figure, 
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one that is “normative in every sphere.”15 A number of Wallace scholars have attended 
to the author’s interest in this characteristic of contemporary life, and have read his work 
as both critical of, and as prey to, neoliberal norms and values.16 But two facets of 
Wallace’s focus here remain relatively unexamined. The first, which I will deal with in 
this section, is how Wallace’s attention to neoliberalism addresses (and attempts to resist) 
the ideology’s effects on the public sphere; the second concerns how Wallace connects 
neoliberalism with technology in The Pale King. 
The rise of a neoliberal dispensation has had particular impacts on the public 
sphere’s conception and operation. Robert Asen has identified “three significant […] 
challenges” that neoliberalism presents to the public sphere, challenges which in fact 
recur throughout The Pale King as thematic strands.17 The first challenge Asen highlights 
is to traditionally public-minded notions of subjectivity – he cites Hannah Arendt’s work 
on the public sphere to outline how publicity helps to fashion subjects: “individuals do 
not appear as discrete, ready-made actors prior to their interactions with others. Rather, 
interactions constitute the individual.”18 By contrast, “neoliberal models of publics assert 
a view of the subject as an atomistic individual motivated by their own self-interest.”19 
Throughout The Pale King, as he details the effects of neoliberal governance on the IRS, 
Wallace employs a strategy that looks to provide formal resistance to this atomising view. 
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To this end, he includes snippets of stories from the lives of previously unknown or minor 
characters at unexpected moments in the narrative. For example, on the bus to an IRS 
facility, one character’s mind wanders, and as he remembers a high school girlfriend, 
readers are given a brief insight into her life and that of their classmates: 
And without being conscious of any of the connections between the field that now 
passed […] and the girl[, he] was thinking in a misdirected way of Cheryl Ann 
Higgs, now Cheryl Ann Standish and now a data-entry girl at American Twine 
and a divorced mother of two in a double-wide trailer her ex had apparently been 
arrested for trying to burn up […] Danny something, his daddy died not much 
later, but he couldn’t play Legion ball that summer because of it […] and lost his 
scholarship and God knows what-all became of him.20     
Similar interruptions recur sporadically throughout the novel, and function as Wallace’s 
reminders to readers of our intersubjective social condition, in contrast with the 
neoliberal vision of a society comprising atomised individuals. Even inanimate objects 
spark stories of the humans who have used them (“the corrugate trailer where it was said 
the man left his family and returned some time later with a gun and killed them all as 
they watched Dragnet”).21 Wallace concludes another paragraph by pivoting from the 
section’s focus, Leonard Stecyk, to sketch one of his nameless classmate’s experiences 
of the Vietnam War (“he had just stood up and told them to strip ordnance off the dead 
and form a defilade against the opposite side of the creek-bed, and everyone had 
obeyed”).22 Not only do these interruptions provide reminders of characters’ 
intersubjective formations, then – they also allow the narrative to gesture outwards, 
moving from one character’s interiority to another’s, engaging with multiple 
perspectives, as most conceptions of the public sphere would expect participants to do.  
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 Leonard Stecyk is also key to Wallace’s treatment of the second challenge that 
neoliberalism poses the public sphere, namely the wholesale dismissal of public 
concerns. According to Asen, engagement with public life “draws importantly on the 
promise of a public good,” which “refers to a practice of cultivating relationships with 
others that recognizes the mutual standing required to address shared concerns.”23 This 
notion of public good is not tenable in a neoliberal model, as “calls to advance a public 
good cannot produce efficacious action” precisely because “they ask people to make 
decisions outside of their direct experiences.”24 §5 of The Pale King concerns the many 
good deeds of a ten-year-old Leonard Stecyk, whose selfless actions mount throughout 
the chapter in parodic escalation. He volunteers helping younger children cross the road, 
delivers Meals on Wheels at a home for the aged, donates his allowance to UNICEF, and, 
when he breaks his leg, donates his crutches to the paediatrics wing of a local hospital 
“even before the minimum six weeks the doctor sternly prescribed.”25 Yet despite 
Stecyk’s public mindedness, “everyone hates the boy”: parents swerve their cars towards 
him as works on the crosswalk; the charity home’s “administrator lunges to bolt her office 
door” as he approaches; his teacher has a nervous breakdown and threatens to “kill first 
the boy and then herself.”26 In §5 Wallace looks not only to characterise Stecyk, but also 
to describe the world and institutions he exists in, which collectively find his public 
mindedness not only distasteful, but repulsive. Those around him are, knowingly or not, 
expressing a neoliberal model of publicity, which identifies “self-interest as a universal 
human motivation, [… and asserts] a limited view of knowledge as direct experience as 
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the [sole] basis for public engagement.”27 Furthermore, this chapter is set in and around 
1964, suggesting that Wallace recognises how the roots of neoliberal thought were 
already taking hold well before the 1980s. A general suspicion of public mindedness 
existed in America that was ripe for exploitation, he suggests – indeed, it had been 
exploited just two years earlier by Milton Friedman, who claimed in his Capitalism and 
Freedom (1962) that, “to the free man, the country is the collection of individuals who 
compose it, not something over and above them.”28  
This refusal to believe that forces beyond the decisive actions of individuals can 
affect society, highlights the third and final problem that Asen claims neoliberalism poses 
for the public sphere. Much post-Habermasian work on the public sphere has been 
concerned with acknowledging how structural conditions limit the agency of subjects in 
public, be that due to marginalization of certain identities, or untenable norms and 
expectations. By contrast, neoliberal publics discount these structural constraints, and 
focus instead on individuals’ behaviours. Even as The Pale King perpetuates some of the 
more problematic elements of Wallace’s writing regarding race and gender, his interest 
in the links between agency and structures is undeniable.29 Stretches of the novel are 
spent detailing the minutiae of the U.S. tax system, as readers are reminded of their 
existence within systems of governance that they do not have the specialized knowledge 
to fully understand. The bureaucracy that characterises the day-to-day life of IRS 
employees is so all-encompassing, Wallace suggests, that is “a parallel world, both 
connected to and independent of this one, operating under its own physics and 
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imperatives of cause.”30 Wallace wants readers to remember that they are always 
implicated in systems, and that their lives are beholden to the ripple effects of invisible 
structures: “tiny movements” in one part of a system are “transmitted through that system 
to become the gross kinetic charges […] at the periphery.”31 Even if we experience our 
lives as individuals within a system, Wallace would not have his readers believe for a 
second that their agency is limitless. Throughout The Pale King, Wallace highlights how 
a neoliberal dispensation is affecting public life – his contribution to debates about the 
public sphere in the internet age suggests that we should balance our attention to 
technology with an equal focus on the ramifications of neoliberalism. But Wallace also 
believes that the internet has an important part to play in this debate, and his interest in 
digital networks is key to The Pale King’s contribution. Examining the links between 
technology and neoliberalism will help to elucidate the second element of Wallace’s 
attention to the ideology that so far remains unexamined in academic inquiries, namely 
how in The Pale King Wallace associates a transitional moment in socioeconomic 
thinking with an equally important transition in technological development. 
Homo Techonomicus 
At one point in §19, a character outlines his view that “corporate advertisers” 
have turned “buying a certain brand of clothes or pop or car or necktie into a gesture of 
the same level of ideological significance as wearing a beard or protesting the war.”32 
The conversation then turns to a more specific example: 
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‘Just wait sixteen quarters till ’84. Just wait for the tidal wave of ads and PR that 
promote this or that corporate product as the way to escape the gray 1984 
totalitarianisms of the Orwellian present.’ 
‘How does buying one kind of typewriter instead of another help subvert 
government control?’ 
‘It won’t be government in a couple years, don’t you see?’ 
‘There won’t be typewriters, either. Everyone’ll have keyboards cabled into some 
sort of central VAX, and things won’t even have to be on paper anymore.’33 
Kelly’s reading of §19 points out that, “while in Infinite Jest Wallace was concerned to 
ask how technological developments should alter our political commitments, in The Pale 
King it is the rise of the corporation that is front and center, placing historic ideas of 
citizenship under crushing pressure.”34 While this is true, we can see in this extract that 
technology is still importantly bound up with Wallace’s attention to corporations and 
citizenship. As with Dave Eggers, Wallace is concerned about the particular dynamics of 
technology companies’ power – indeed, in §19 we can think of Wallace as historicising 
the story that Eggers tells in The Circle.  
The above-quoted conversation from §19 makes a direct link between technology 
and the other cultural shifts being discussed, and although 7-Up, Virginia Slims, and 
Alka-Seltzer advertisements are mentioned in passing by other characters in this section, 
Wallace’s reference to typewriters makes it clear that he has Apple’s “1984” advert in 
mind here. In the company’s famous TV spot, “a Big Brother figure addresses a room 
full of drab, bald-headed people and praises the futuristic society's achievement of the 
‘Unification of Thoughts,’” before a colourfully dressed woman “runs into the room, 
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chased by policemen, and throws a sledgehammer through the screen.”35 Manuel Castells 
suggests that the iconic advert points to how Silicon Valley’s key innovators “were 
intentionally trying to undo the centralizing technologies of the corporate world,” but that 
this was, importantly, “both out of conviction and as their market niche.”36 By 
referencing the advert through a character’s prediction of it, Wallace slyly sends up the 
idea of prescience, too – the ad’s existence was inevitable, he seems to suggest, just as 
the internet’s problematic relationship with democracy was obvious to him in 1996. But 
Wallace also makes it clear in his reference that his novel should not be taken as entirely 
detached from contemporary concerns. As Tom McCarthy puts it, “by backtracking to 
the ‘Flintstonianly remote’ era of mainframe computers, tape-and-card-based data 
storage and so on, Wallace identifies a watershed moment, a kind of base layer in the 
archaeology of the present.”37  
What Wallace unearths in this archaeology of our current moment is evidence of 
an encounter between technology and neoliberalism. This link is primarily made through 
descriptions of the Spackman Initiative, which is the subject of a deep conflict between 
the “traditional […] officials who saw tax and its administration as an arena of social 
justice and civic virtue” on the one hand, and the “policymakers who prized the market 
model, efficiency, and a maximum return on the investment of the Service’s annual 
budget” on the other.38 Importantly, Wallace draws attention to the fact that this conflict 
“subtend[s the] operational battle over human vs. digital enforcement of the tax code.”39 
Traditional officials favour human examiners, while the new profit-seekers wish to 
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automate certain parts of the examinations process. At one point, Kenneth Hindle 
explicitly links “the advent of automated letter audits” with the IRS’s overhaul via the 
Initiative; another character suggests that Reagan’s policies make “technology and 
efficiency serious objectives.”40 Indeed, the conflict is phrased as one “between 
advocates and opponents of an increasingly automated, computerized tax system.”41 
Wallace links technological advancement with the Initiative to highlight how technology 
can be thought of as underwriting neoliberal governance and policymaking, and vice 
versa. As Castells argues, “without new information technology global capitalism would 
have been a much-limited reality,” and Wallace’s novel is concerned with the idea that 
“informationalism is linked to the expansion and rejuvenation of capitalism.”42  
The opposition that Wallace establishes between technological automation and 
human examining in the Spackman Initiative is important on still another level, as the 
alliance of certain values with humans and others with machines forms part of a 
constellation of similar divisions articulated throughout The Pale King. Once again, 
alongside the author’s contributions to debates about the public sphere in the internet age, 
we find a parallel modelling of an alternate form of publicness which emerges from the 
specific affordances of literary forms; to understand Wallace’s particular literary 
publicness, we must understand how the complex of oppositions that he establishes 
operate. Whereas Zadie Smith opposes technology and literature to explore different 
forms of representation, in The Pale King Wallace contrasts technology with the category 
of the human. Wallace’s interest in the human raises important questions of how we 
should read his oppositional complex – as Kathleen Fitzpatrick has noted, drawing on 
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the work of Donna Haraway, “the blurrier that boundary [between human and machine] 
becomes, the more the privileged category of the human, and the hierarchies that category 
has for centuries been used to support, come under threat.”43 Fitzpatrick convincingly 
questions “the ‘human’ values that these technologies are represented as eroding […] for 
their gendered specificity, and for the hierarchies that they seek to reinstate,” reading 
Wallace’s apparent anxieties of obsolescence in Infinite Jest as a “writerly anxiety about 
exclusion from ‘the culture’ [that] seems to circulate around [his] whiteness and 
maleness.”44 Yet in The Pale King, establishing these opposing categories allows 
Wallace to do a certain kind of work.45 Wallace constructs a complex of oppositions in 
order to interrogate the alignment of forms, values, and ideas: technology and 
neoliberalism lie on one side, while civic virtue and the human lie on the other.  
The Initiative and its attendant computerization have “only one primary, 
overarching goal: results,” and it is this element of neoliberal rationality (its focus on 
efficiency and one acceptable outcome) that most troubles Wallace.46 The Pale King 
demonstrates Wallace’s belief that technology, in tandem with a neoliberal vision of 
selfhood, has the power to insidiously redefine the human in such a way that, as Brown 
summarises, “all dimensions of human life are cast in terms of a market rationality.”47 
Wallace’s notion of the human, on the other hand, is frequently characterised in The Pale 
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King as something defined by its multiplicity and variety. In a section narrated by David 
Wallace (ostensibly the book’s author), one character is quoted as saying: “The tax code, 
once you get to know it, embodies all the essence of [human] life: greed, politics, power, 
goodness, charity.”48 The parentheses around the word ‘human’ indicate that it is David 
Wallace’s insertion, and we can thus infer that he wishes to characterise the human as a 
multivalent category. “As all mature people know,” he declares in another section, “it’s 
possible for very different kinds of motives and emotions to coexist in the human soul”; 
later he suggests that, “as every American knows, it is totally possible for contempt and 
anxiety to coexist in the human heart.”49  
As these examples show, the category of the human is also strongly linked with 
affect throughout The Pale King. This comprises another node of opposition in Wallace’s 
complex – as McCarthy points out, “machines will never feel, […] nor do they allow for 
human agency and its offshoots (free will, ethics, compassion, love) to unfold and 
blossom in their arid data fields.”50 For Wallace, technology takes us away from this full 
range of affective possibilities – the internet serves to help us “distract ourselves from 
feeling […] directly or with our full attention.”51 As one character says towards the end 
of the novel, to “think in terms of data” is to have “none of the feeling attached to it.”52 
For Wallace, then, the lines are clearly drawn: the human is multiple and affective, the 
technological (in part because of its links to neoliberal ends) is unilateral and unfeeling. 
Wallace articulates these oppositions both to establish links between technology and 
neoliberalism, and to set up his own work as modelling an alternate form of publicness. 
Wallace’s oppositions create a shorthand for his literary publicness – he wants his writing 
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to resist neoliberalism’s denigration of the public sphere, so must align literature with the 
other side of his oppositional complex (that is, with the human, the multiple, and the 
civically minded). He does this both through the resistant strategies that I earlier 
highlighted and, as I will now show, by foregrounding the activity of reading. 
Re: Reading 
The Pale King takes place in a world saturated with information, and the novel 
follows suit formally. Streams of data interrupt the narrative: §11 comprises a list of 
forty-two “syndromes/symptoms associated with Examinations postings in excess of 36 
months,” while §34 outlines the sixteen parts of the United States’ alternative minimum 
tax formula for corporations.53 §38 consists of a recounting of problems with the IRS’s 
“integrated data system,” complete with separately formatted words to indicate computer 
commands (“a BLOCK and RESET sub-subroutine”), while the lyrically written account 
of Toni Ware’s childhood is interjected by a list of her address, height, weight, and 
“Mother’s Stated Occupations, 1966-1972 (from IRS Form 669-D […]).”54 Implicit 
within these interruptions is the question of whether, and why, the information provided 
is valuable or not. Wallace draws out this question more directly when he writes about 
Claude Sylvanshine, an IRS employee who is described as a “fact psychic,” a person who 
experiences “sudden flashes of insight or awareness” into mundane, niche, and 
unverifiable information, such as “how many people faced south-east to witness Guy 
Fawkes’s hanging in 1606,” or “the number of frames in Breathless.”55 The information 
that Sylvanshine receives is less important to note than his experience of receiving it, 
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however, as this experience clarifies the way that Wallace’s other informational 
interruptions function for readers of The Pale King.  
Through Sylvanshine, Wallace dramatizes the experience of online informational 
triage that he first described in his 1996 interview, the “completely overwhelming” 
feeling of “four trillion bits coming at you.”56 Sylvanshine is forced to confront life in 
terms of data – he is given no other option. For him, the pieces of information “come out 
of nowhere, are inconvenient and discomfiting like all psychic irruptions.”57 He has no 
use for anything he intuits – “perhaps one in every four thousand such facts is relevant 
or helpful”; others, like “the number of blades of grass in the front lawn of one mailman’s 
home,” simply “intrude, crash, rattle around.”58 “Random Fact Intuition” afflicts 
Sylvanshine so much not just because of its relentlessness, then, but because he is unsure 
of what any of the information relates to, and how he should relate to it.59 Wallace’s 
interrupting data streams function in similar ways, and draw attention to questions he 
thematises elsewhere in the novel. In §24, Wallace again uses blades of grass as an 
example to explore these broader questions attending Sylvanshine’s situation: 
There are vastly different kinds of truth, some of which are incompatible with one 
another. Example: A 100 percent accurate, comprehensive list of the exact size 
and shape of every blade of grass in my front lawn is ‘true,’ but it is not a truth 
that anyone will have any interest in. What renders a truth meaningful, 
worthwhile, & c. is its relevance, which in turn requires extraordinary 
discernment and sensitivity to context, questions of value, and overall point – 
otherwise we might as well just be computers downloading raw data to one 
another.60 
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Wallace continues to articulate his opposition between the human and the technological 
here, but whereas Jeffrey Severs suggests that, for Wallace, we are approaching a time 
when “human decision making can no longer disentangle itself from computing’s 
complexity,” this section of the novel also seems to locate the possibility of an alternative 
form of valuing within literature.61 In §24, Wallace introduces another important element 
to his complex of oppositions: “I have no intention of inflicting on you a regurgitation of 
every last sensation and passing thought I happen to recall,” he announces at one point, 
“I am about art here, not simply reproduction.”62 Wallace here aligns art with a kind of 
truth that is not solely mimetic, and suggests that its ability to produce such truths sets it 
apart from the exhaustive data streams of technology.63 The ‘truth’ of Wallace’s 
informational interruptions, then, lies in how they relate to the rest of the novel – and 
their ‘relevance’ is guaranteed by the reader’s very questioning of whether or not the 
information is valuable. 
Having established the dual problems of overwhelming information and a 
culturally prevalent inability to decide what is valuable, Wallace moves to establish 
literature as a potential curative for the public sphere. But precisely because the problems 
he identifies are to do with an abundance of information, he cannot follow the same 
process as Franzen, Eggers, and Smith. In previous chapters, I have outlined how these 
authors address conceptions of authorship, the links between economic and political 
power, and questions of representation in their allusions to specific texts and authors. To 
combat his concerns for the public sphere, however, Wallace must model his literary 
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publicness on a process of interpretation rather than creation: namely, the process of 
reading.  
In one section of the novel, the author-character David Wallace outlines his 
decision to write The Pale King in the way that he did, claiming that it is in fact 
“substantially true and accurate [… and] more like a memoir than any kind of made-up 
story.”64 Stephen J. Burn notes that “amidst the calculated misdirection” of this section’s 
false details about the real Wallace’s life, the “commentary on the author’s past shades 
into a suggestive account of the novel’s literary ancestors.”65 The author recounts how 
his “specific dream” as a young person “was of becoming an immortally great fiction 
writer à la Gaddis or Anderson, Balzac or Perec, & c.”66 Burn convincingly argues that 
this list marks “a richer entry point than it first seems in determining what distinguishes 
Wallace’s generation from the first-generation postmodern novelists who mostly came 
to prominence in the 1960s,” but it is also important to remember that the version of 
Wallace narrating this section is not the ‘real’ one.67 David Hering has suggested, in fact, 
that Wallace conceived of “the ‘author’ of The Pale King” as directly linked to his 
previous journalism, and that the novel is framed as a narrative “‘written’ by Wallace’s 
non-fiction persona, not by the ‘fiction writer.’”68 Understanding Wallace as a character 
within the novel aligns his references to the novelists here with The Pale King’s other 
mentions of books and writers, which are articulated with specific reference to the lives 
of its characters. So, Anderson, Balzac, Perec, and Gaddis are framed as exemplary 
figures of individual genius that the author-character David Wallace aspired to emulate 
as a young adult. Later, Chris Fogle recalls a formative moment when taking drugs and 
                                                          
64 Ibid, 69. 
65 Stephen J. Burn, “Second-Generation Postmoderns,” in The Cambridge History of Postmodern 
Literature, eds. Brian McHale and Len Platt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 450. 
66 Wallace, The Pale King, 75. 
67 Burn, “Second-Generation Postmoderns,” 450. 
68 David Hering, David Foster Wallace: Fiction and Form (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 144. 
187 
 
“pretending to sit here reading Albert Camus’s The Fall for the Literature of Alienation 
midterm.”69 Another key figure, Toni Ware, moves from reading road signs in her 
itinerant youth in order “to know the facts of her own history and present,” to a broader 
selection of fiction and non-fiction: 
The girl read stories about horses, bios, science, psychiatry, and Popular 
Mechanics when obtainable. She read history in a determined way. She read My 
Struggle and could not understand all the fuss. She read Weiss, Steinbeck, Keene, 
Laura Wilder (twice), and Lovecraft. She read halves of many torn and castoff 
things.70  
Franzen, Smith, and Eggers have directly modelled elements of their literary 
publicness on antecedent texts, drawing on a cache of what is, for them, relatively stable 
cultural meaning. In The Pale King, however, through scenes like those quoted above, 
Wallace draws attention to the process of individual reading, and as such the contingency 
of meaning, and the importance of perspective.71 As Michael Warner has noted, “the 
attribution of agency to publics,” which emerges from a Habermasian model of a rational-
critical public sphere, “works in most cases because of the direct transposition from 
private reading acts to the sovereignty of opinion.”72 But even if Wallace’s literary 
publicness sets great stall by the idea that reading is a contingent process, and that readers 
will draw their own conclusions, he does not look to replicate an Enlightenment 
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rationality wherein reading processes move through the discussion of opinions towards 
establishing a single, convincing truth. Rather, he recognises, like Warner, that “the unity 
of the public [… is] ideological,” and rests upon “the stylization of the reading act as 
transparent and replicable.”73 For in The Pale King, reading is never characterised thus: 
even when novels are referenced as shorthand for certain cultural values or ideas, the 
notion of their accuracy or stability as artefacts of signification is undermined. When one 
character mentions the rise of “the corporation and the military-industrial complex” in 
the 1950s, for example, another makes a throwaway comment: “The man in the gray 
flannel.”74 This reference to Sloan Wilson’s The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit (1955) 
however, is not taken up: “What is gray flannel anyway?,” another character asks.75 
Later, an IRS employee mentions Jack Kerouac’s Dharma Bums (1958) in a list of iconic 
cultural works and events that defined the American 1960s, making numerous comments 
about how his interlocutors “won’t get some of it,” as the artefacts’ manifold meanings 
are “impossible to describe” to those who weren’t “alive in the late sixities.”76 The Pale 
King’s characters’ experiences of books always depend upon their previous experiences 
in life, as when Toni Ware is said to have “read a coverless Red Badge and knew by sheer 
feel that its author had never seen war.”77  
This attention to reader response is consistent with Wallace’s past comments 
about reading. As early as his 1993 interview with Larry McCaffery, Wallace aligned his 
view with “Barthian and Derridean post-structuralism,” claiming to feel that “once I’m 
done with the thing, I’m basically dead, and probably the text’s dead; it becomes simply 
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language, and language lives not just in but ‘through’ the reader.”78 This sentiment 
endured throughout Wallace’s career, forming the foundations of his thinking about 
aesthetic value. Severs draws attention to the author’s meditation on literary value in 
“Deciderization 2007 – A Special Report,” suggesting that the essay 
makes vivid Wallace’s commitment to making this search for value a 
performative process for a reader – in fact, one in which differentiating one 
detail’s importance from another’s and being the ‘human doing the valuing’ are, 
in effect, aesthetic value itself.79 
What makes this perspective important in The Pale King is how it operates in relation to 
the previous oppositions that I have outlined. The literary and the human, both defined 
in Wallace’s novel by their affordance of interpretative ability and manifold affective 
possibility, stand in contrast to the supposed individual freedom afforded by a free market 
and digital dispensation. Wallace’s literary publicness centres on reading as a radically 
contingent, democratically vital task, and recasts aesthetic value (that is, the valuation 
enacted by a reader in their very engagement with a text) as a political imperative.  
Indeed, in “Deciderization” (so named as a parody of George W. Bush’s 2006 
claim that he was “the decider” in American politics), Wallace explicitly links the 
question of how to discern aesthetic value to a broader premise about the “emergency” 
facing “America as a polity and culture,” which manifests as a “retreat to narrow 
arrogance, pre-formed positions, rigid filters, [and] the ‘moral clarity’ of the immature.”80 
In his essay, Wallace once again contrasts literature and the internet. He takes care to 
highlight how the shifts in public life that he describes are being exacerbated by a digital 
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dispensation – his contribution attempts to establish links between the overwhelming 
character of modern information, and the technology used to disseminate that 
information. For this reason, Wallace believes that the public sphere requires serious 
remodelling: “Whatever our founders and framers thought of as a literate, informed 
citizenry can no longer exist, at least not without a whole new modern degree of 
subcontracting and dependence packed into what we mean by ‘informed.’”81 For 
Wallace, literature might offer hope by functioning “as a model for what free, informed 
adulthood might look like in the context of Total Noise.”82 
Taking this suggestion seriously can help clarify Wallace’s literary publicness. A 
Habermasian vision of truth depends upon instrumental discourse – for him, as Hirschkop 
puts it, “claiming that something is true is claiming that one could, in an ideal situation, 
persuade others that it is the case through sheer force of argument alone.”83 The 
importance that Wallace places on being properly informed in “Deciderization,” and on 
individual reading in The Pale King suggest, however, that his literary publicness is 
closer to the work of Mikhail Bakhtin. For Bakhtin, truth is “formally unified not by the 
notion of the ‘better argument’ but by virtue of the dialogical action – the taking of 
positions, the making of assertions, agreement and disagreement.”84 Bakhtin’s vision of 
truth rests on the “higher ethico-religious truth […] of our intersubjective condition,” a 
condition which, it could be argued, was the most enduring theme in Wallace’s writing, 
and which I have already shown is a central concern in The Pale King.85 It will be worth 
bearing Bakhtin in mind while attempting to unpack the further treatment of the public 
sphere in The Pale King, as his work plays a central role in understanding Wallace’s 
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perspective – both writers overlap especially in how they highlight the particularity of 
human experiences. By focussing on the contingency of these experiences, Wallace is 
able to insist upon the value of the particular without valorising neoliberal individualism, 
and, as I will now argue, it helps him to articulate his vision of a dialogic, agonistic public 
sphere. 
“This is just my opinion” 
In a 2003 interview with The Believer, Wallace identifies something of a double 
bind for the politically minded author. On the one hand, he suggests, writing that is too 
political becomes “totally ideological and reductive.”86 On the other hand, 
the reason why doing political writing is so hard right now is probably also the 
reason why more young […] fiction writers ought to be doing it. As of 2003, the 
rhetoric of the enterprise is fucked. 95 percent of political commentary, whether 
spoken or written, is now polluted by the very politics it’s supposed to be about 
[…]. Opposing viewpoints are not just incorrect but contemptible, corrupt, evil. 
There’s no more complex, messy, community-wide argument (or ‘dialogue’); 
political discourse is now a formulaic matter of preaching to one’s own choir and 
demonizing the opposition. Everything’s relentlessly black-and-whitened.87 
The particular qualities that Wallace highlights here as absent from a dysfunctional public 
sphere – complexity, messiness, dialogue, nuance, and breaking of formulas – are 
frequently linked to literature in aesthetic theory. Indeed, Amanda Anderson has noted, 
after offering caveats acknowledging “the long and varied history of thinking on the 
aesthetic,” how “the aesthetic, as a governing orientation of the field, involves a broad 
spectrum of values associated with complexity, difficulty, variousness, ambiguity, 
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undecidability, hermeneutic open-endedness and threshold experiences.”88 Wallace’s 
formulation of literary publicness gets its clearest statement in this interview: it is his 
“own belief […] that since fictionists or literary-type writers are supposed to have some 
special interest in empathy, in trying to imagine what it’s like to be the other guy, they 
might have some useful part to play in a political conversation that’s having the problems 
ours is.”89 Having made this argument for literature’s discursively recuperative abilities, 
however, Wallace also immediately problematizes his position: “implicit in this brief, 
shrill answer, though, is obviously the idea that at least some political writing should be 
Platonically disinterested, should rise above the fray, etc.; and in my own present case 
this is impossible (and so I am a hypocrite, an ideological opponent could say).”90 Yet 
by imagining the other perspective, Wallace is also modelling here the behaviour he has 
just endorsed. Hering has outlined how Wallace completed the bulk of the novel’s 
composition in the four years following this interview,91 and Boswell notes that, in the 
interview, Wallace “seems to be speaking very much in the language of” The Pale King.92 
If this is the case, we might be led to wonder what other behaviours, norms, and ideals 
Wallace models in The Pale King. 
The conversation in §19 that I earlier highlighted is key to understanding how 
Wallace models his literary publicness, especially the section’s formal qualities. Kelly 
has traced Wallace’s development as a writer across his novels with specific reference to 
scenes of dialogue. Applying Bakhtin’s conception of monologic and dialogic notions of 
truth, Kelly suggests that Wallace’s fiction increasingly moves towards dialogism, 
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wherein forms of speech “emphasize responsivity and open communication with others 
in the joint pursuit of truth.”93 Wallace’s particular employment of dialogism “rests in 
the anticipatory anxiety his characters feel when addressing others,” so that when the 
process of speech “becomes genuinely dialogic in Bakhtin’s sense – when truth appears 
to be generated ‘between people’ – something important has occurred in Wallace’s 
ethical world: the means have become the ends.”94 If §19 – with its informed, rational, 
and considered arguments – can “be read as Wallace’s depiction of what an informed and 
open conversation about American political and intellectual history might look like,”95 
however, it is not immediately obvious that Wallace’s literary publicness is Bakhtinian 
in character (that is, founded on multiplicity, alterity, affect, and “interhuman […] 
relations that are not simply cognitive or narrowly ‘rational’”).96 Rather, we might 
initially be tempted to take Wallace as aligning with a Habermasian view.  
In §19, DeWitt Glendenning’s reminder that he is “not a political scientist” 
evokes the ideal of popular inclusion, and his suggestion that “the concrete reality of 
[civic decline’s] consequences” are of utmost importance also endorses a Habermasian 
discursive model, focussed as it is on tangible outcomes.97 So too does Nichols’s 
comment that “politics is about consensus.”98 Furthermore, several deferent phrases recur 
throughout the conversation, gesturing towards idealised civil discourse – “that example 
makes it a lot easier to see your point”; “let him finish”; “this is just my opinion.”99 The 
dialogue is unattributed, echoing the Habermasian ideal that it should not matter who is 
delivering an argument, and the conversation avoids the kind of partisan positioning 
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Wallace laments in his essay “Host,” as he “is not particularly interested,” Kelly claims, 
“in dividing the positions of his characters into traditional liberal/conservative or 
left/right binaries.”100 There are other traces of Habermasian dialogue in the novel to 
make this case with, too. One such scene takes place between two examiners, Meredith 
Rand and Shane Drinion. Rand is a “legendarily attractive but not universally popular” 
examiner, while Drinion is described by colleagues as “a total lump in terms of 
personality, possibly the dullest human being currently alive.”101 As Mary K. Holland 
notes, when Rand asks questions, Drinion “responds to her perfectly logically, speaking 
of ‘true answers,’” and engaging in critical reflection about his own positions.102 Could 
we think of Drinion as a Habermasian subject, then? It is not just his habit of critical 
reflection that suggests so. Habermas’s focus on rationality in his theorisation of the 
public sphere has been criticised for not paying due attention to “the embodied 
experiences and activities of actual people in the context of their everyday lives.”103 
Gardiner suggests that “there is a Habermasian subject, but it is a rather insubstantial 
entity, one marked by an interchangeable, ‘minimalist’ body (mainly having to do with 
the human capacity for labour), subtended by a rational mind that engages in purposive 
dialogue and moral reflection.”104 Drinion himself is primarily defined through his 
capacity for labour, as a “very solid […] examiner,” one “several orders of magnitude 
more effective than Rand.”105 Drinion’s definition as a worker is linked directly to his 
ability to pay deep attention to whatever he is doing, a trait that manifests in this scene 
as a literal minimisation of his body – at the start of the section, it is noted that “he’s there 
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but in an unusual way; he becomes part of the table’s environment, like the air or ambient 
light.”106 As the scene progresses, Drinion becomes literally weightless: at first, his 
“bottom is hovering very slightly […] above the seat of his wooden chair”; later, “no part 
of his bottom or back is touching the chair.”107  
Yet Drinion’s presentation as a Habermasian subject is not without an implied 
critique from Wallace, not least because Drinion is linked to technology. When Rand 
recalls a conversation with a health worker, describing them as a “computer [who] can’t 
proceed until you give the properly formatted answer,” she claims that the experience 
was “a little bit like talking to” Drinion.108 This comparison aligns Drinion, and the 
Habermasian rationality which he represents, with the negative side of Wallace’s 
oppositional complex. Indeed, upon further inspection, we can identify one simple reason 
that Wallace cannot endorse the mode of discussion that Drinion represents – his 
conversation with Rand entails no actual communication. As Holland notes, 
the asexuality that allows Drinion to pay concerted, unself-conscious attention to 
[the intimidatingly attractive Rand] amounts to total disaffection rather than any 
kind of care. […] The result is that he is never in conversation, merely processing 
information according to his own interests [… and] his utter self-containment 
short-circuits the communication cycle it seemingly enabled.109 
Drinion’s disaffection can be taken as a critique of a Habermasian model, in which, 
Stanley Aronowitz claims, “the public sphere is always a restricted space,” dependent 
upon “the separation of knowedge from interest, manifested in the ability of the intellect 
to transcend the materiality of the body, including emotion.”110 Throughout the rest of 
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The Pale King, as I have shown, Wallace actively asserts that “all cultural formation is 
embodied and interested,” with the attendant hope that such recognition means that 
“antidemocratic exclusions” along these lines cannot continue.111 If Drinion’s and Rand’s 
conversation cannot evince the dialogic qualities of §19, then, this is partly because 
where Drinion is an affectless drone in dialogue, the interlocutors of the elevator scene 
are resolutely not. Revisiting the elevator conversation with these affective qualities in 
mind, then, will reveal Wallace’s literary publicness as far less Habermasian than it is 
Bakhtinain – that is to say, as interested in dialogue as an end in itself, rather than as 
instrumental means.  
The dialogue of §19 is at times heated, as one would perhaps expect from a 
political topic, and at several points during the discussion, a character referred to as ‘X’ 
interjects with fair questions and commentary only to be (comically) threatened by one 
of his interlocutors: “If you don’t shut up I’m going to put you up on the roof of the 
elevator and you can stay there”; “I’ll throw you off this elevator, X, I swear to God I 
will”; “let me throw him off, Mr. G., I’m pleading with you.”112 These comments draw 
attention to the personal relationships between these characters, and their affective 
reactions to the rational points raised in conversation – as does the meandering nature of 
the topic. By the dialogue’s conclusion, its instigator, DeWitt Glendenning, notes that 
“we’re now very very very far afield from what I started out trying to describe as my 
thinking about taxpayers’ relation to the government,” this being in part due to 
Glendenning’s attempt to strengthen his argument with an appeal to the personal (which 
itself stems from his own emotional reaction to the debate): 
“I’m regretting this conversation more and more. It – you like movies?” 
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“You bet.” 
“Are you kidding?” 
“Nothing like cozying up on a rainy evening with a Betamax and a good film.”113 
More than any of this, however, it is Nichols’s contribution that persuades me of 
the importance of affect to Wallace’s view of the public sphere. Nichols suggests that the 
story of “civic decline” in America “goes beyond politics, civics,” and is “almost more a 
matter of metaphysics,” or perhaps “existential.”114 He ruminates on “the individual US 
citizen’s deep fear [… of] our smallness, our insignificance and mortality,” imagining 
both a future where he will not be remembered, and a past whose inhabitants he knows 
nothing about.115 He links the avoidance of this fear that “we’re all less than a million 
breaths away from an oblivion more total than we can even bring ourselves to even try 
to imagine” with the “manic US obsession with production,” and suggests that a person’s 
“terror of not really ever even existing makes them that much more susceptible to the 
ontological siren song of the corporate buy-to-stand-out-and-so-exist gestalt.”116 By 
placing Nichols’s rumination on the vulnerability and irrationality of human affect within 
this particular dialogue, and by having him be carried away on a personalised tangent 
(“not only will I have passed away but it will be like I was never here, and people in 2104 
or whatever will no more think of Stuart A. Nichols Jr”) Wallace considers how such 
affects play out in public discourse.117 
This is not simply humanistic pondering on Wallace’s part – “hundreds of 
empirical studies have provided support for the theory by confirming something called 
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the mortality salience hypothesis,” which shows that fear of death “can amplify 
nationalism and intensify bias against other groups.”118 Clearly there is a danger to 
ignoring the effects of affect in political life. As Chantal Mouffe has outlined, in an 
argument that runs in parallel with much of the elevator dialogue’s, “by privileging 
rationality, both the deliberative and the aggregative perspectives [on the public sphere] 
leave aside a central element which is the crucial role played by passions and affects in 
securing allegiance to democratic values.”119 For Mouffe, a functioning democracy 
requires “providing channels through which collective passions will be given ways to 
express themselves.”120 Her model of public discourse, which she names ‘agonistic 
pluralism,’ involves identifying those with whom we debate as ‘adversaries’ rather than 
as ‘enemies’ – that is, as legitimate opponents in a public sphere underwritten by the 
shared ethico-political principles of liberty and equality. Mouffe concludes her vision by 
gesturing to the future: “By warning us against the illusion that a fully achieved 
democracy could ever be instantiated, [‘agonistic pluralism’] forces us to keep the 
democratic contestation alive.”121 In her monograph on the author, Clare Hayes-Brady 
argues that “the persistent structural and stylistic resistance to closure that marks 
Wallace’s work” in fact stems from “a dogged and sometimes uneasy pluralism,” one 
which “emerges as a fundamentally political invocation of free will.”122 She suggests that 
an Aristotelian notion of perfectibility runs through all his work, a concept which 
conversely “precludes the achievement of perfection, focusing instead on constant 
improvement.”123 In Hayes-Brady’s reading, 
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Wallace’s Perfectionist resistance to ending, and the concomitant commitment to 
process are a fundamentally political series of actions, seeking to draw readers 
out of the search for finality, and toward a comfort with ambiguity that would 
allow for simultaneous conservative and liberal politics.124 
This recurrent element of Wallace’s work highlights his alignment with Mouffe’s vision 
of agonistic pluralism, and points us to the ideal outcome of his form of literary 
publicness – which is to say, Wallace hopes for no final outcome at all, but rather an 
ongoing debate along agonistic, pluralistic lines. 
 Wallace’s literary publicness presents as a patchwork of ideas that reflect his 
consistent interest in the validity of multiple perspectives. His writing’s resistance to 
finality echoes Mouffe’s call for an endlessly renewing democratic project, aligning his 
literary publicness with agonistic ends. And following the Bakhtinian idea that dialogue 
necessarily expresses “a wide range of moral, cognitive, aesthetic and affective qualities, 
designed to provoke active responses and express broader perspectives and world-
views,” Wallace’s literary publicness acknowledges the importance of affect, and the 
contingency of individual identity.125 Wallace situates reading as the central task of his 
literary publicness, in part because, as an activity, it captures this notion of contingent 
response. But he also hopes that focussing on reading will highlight the public sphere’s 
need for shared points of reference in an era when it is overwhelmed by information. As 
Wallace outlines in his essay on conservative talk radio, “Host,” acknowledging the 
contingency of individual views must not simply lead to “a kind of epistemic free-for-all 
in which ‘the truth’ is wholly a matter of perspective and agenda” – while “in some 
respects all this variety is probably good, productive of difference and dialogue and so 
on, […] it can also be confusing for the average citizen,” and instantiate an inert public 
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sphere.126 If “it is increasingly hard to determine which sources to pay attention to and 
how exactly to distinguish real information from spin,” as Wallace claims, then his 
literary publicness might also highlight the need for a new, civically minded literary 
canon – if we are reading the same things, he seems to suggest, then at least we can argue 
about the same things.127 Indeed, this is an apposite idea to bear in mind alongside how 
Wallace’s own work is considered in the public sphere, as the questions of how to read 
Wallace’s writing, and whether it should even be read at all, are increasingly being asked 
in public debates about canonisation and canonicity. 
On Reading DFW 
 Wallace’s orientation towards a Bakhtinian view of the novel as something 
“understood more as a process that never achieves a resolution,” is clearly important to 
understanding the politics of his use of form, but it is also notably literalised in the story 
of The Pale King’s publication.128 Wallace died before the novel was completed, and the 
text was compiled, ordered, and edited by Michael Pietsch. Given Wallace’s view of 
meaningful truth as something dependent on context, we might view the construction of 
The Pale King’s contributions to debates as at least partly a result of Pietsch’s creative 
labour, as well as of Wallace’s. We might think of The Pale King, then, as representing 
a peculiarly dialogic process of composition. But just as in Purity Franzen grappled with 
the knowledge that his model of literary publicness would be threatened by circulation 
within the public sphere, Wallace’s attempt at creating a literary publicness founded on 
dialogism is complicated by how his writing is considered. Indeed, as David Hering 
suggests, Wallace’s attempts at dialogism are arguably most “threatened by [his] 
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increasing fame, and his emergence into the public sphere as a writer with a particular 
and idiosyncratic register.”129 If this was the case while Wallace was alive and writing, 
events since his death have undeniably complicated matters even further. 
The internet’s role in mediating how literature is considered in the public sphere 
in the twenty-first century cannot be overstated, particularly in Wallace’s case. More than 
any of the other authors I have included in this thesis, online forums have structured 
popular conversations about Wallace. As Kelly writes, “Wallace was the first major 
writer to live and die in the internet age […] and his growing reputation gained vital 
cultural traction owing to that brand new medium,” initially via a listserv, and the fan 
website The Howling Fantods.130 This trend only increased after Wallace’s death in 2008. 
After the memorials came the canonisation – as Max noted in response to the release of 
the 2015 Wallace biopic The End of the Tour, “fewer people know DFW as a writer than 
as a public figure, and that figure is a sort of laical saint, a professor of gentle, sustaining 
wisdom to whom we can turn in moments of confusion.”131 This process is encapsulated 
by the response to a video version of Wallace’s Kenyon College commencement speech, 
which he delivered in 2005. The video’s makers edited Wallace’s lengthy speech down 
to five minutes, and compiled a series of filmed scenes of the situations that Wallace 
describes, for which his address acts as the soundtrack. The video gained over 4.2 million 
views in just over a week, and surely perpetuated the sagely image of the posthumous 
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Wallace, one completely abstracted from his writing.132 As Lorentzen has it, Wallace’s 
entry “into the cultural maelstrom […] has flattened him.”133  
Yet Wallace’s reception since this time is perhaps best summed up less by virality 
than by another, more recent, internet phenomenon – the ‘Milkshake Duck.’ This phrase, 
a runner up in Oxford Dictonaries’ words of 2017, refers to “a person or character on 
social media that appears to be endearing at first, but is found to have an unappealing 
back story.”134 A selection of headlines from the past few years, much like those that I 
highlighted at the start of this chapter reporting Wallace’s prescience, tell their own story: 
“Why Literary Chauvinists Love David Foster Wallace,” “Men Recommend David 
Foster Wallace to Me,” and “Enough David Foster Wallace, Already! We Need to Read 
Beyond Our Bubbles.”135 Mark McGurl’s claim that any description of Wallace’s work 
“seems insufficient without some account also of his readership, that social body to which 
his works are directed and in which they seek completion,” is given a new spin by these 
pieces.136 Their authors all address important issues to do with gender, canonicity, and 
cultural capital, but are open to varying degrees to the charge that their criticism is more 
to do with how literature circulates in the public sphere than it is to do with Wallace 
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himself (“this conversation is not about David Foster Wallace at all, of course,” one 
admits).137 
Acknowledging the “litany of seriously inappropriate and dangerous behaviour” 
that Wallace is known to have enacted during his life, Hayes-Brady also asks whether 
“we need to excuse the behavior in order to read the work.”138 Once again, although 
surely not in the way that he intended, reading Wallace becomes an act of valuation: “We 
as scholars of contemporary writing get to decide what we think is important despite and 
because of all its flaws.”139 For my part, I agree that any conversation about Wallace’s 
impact on literary culture must retain a central place for the work itself.140 In fact, in 
Wallace’s case, attention to his writing might even serve to settle some such disputes (or 
at least to nuance them). Tackling the important and increasingly discussed issue of 
gender in his work, for example, Holland demonstrates how, while Wallace’s “insight 
into gender contained its own considerable blindnesses,” it is undeniable that “he 
consistently struggled, in his fiction and nonfiction, to expose beastly assertions of power 
over women, and to avoid solipsistic assertions of authorial power over readers,” while 
simultaneously “exposing the limits – inherent in the roles of self and author – of all past, 
present, and future attempts to do so, including his own.”141 
For Amy Hungerford, however, whose essay “On Not Reading DFW” details her 
decision to refuse to read any of Wallace’s work, arguments like Holland’s miss the 
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broader point to be made about gender and contemporary literary production. For 
Hungerford, the biographical details of Wallace’s often misogynistic behaviour, and the 
criticism about his work that she has read, combine to convince her that she need not 
engage with the author’s oeuvre. Hungerford’s piece is a well-composed defence of her 
decision, but precisely because of her refusal it cannot be taken as an effective critique 
of Wallace’s work. Not that Hungerford intends her piece to be this – rather, it functions 
as a provocative but eloquent elucidation of “a professional decision about resource 
allocation,” and “developments in the cultural conditions under which literature is made 
now.”142 Hungerford has plenty to say about literature’s circulation in particular public 
spheres, particularly the professionalized realm of academic criticism. She poses an 
important question: “Is it ever acceptable, as a professional matter, to refuse the culture’s 
rising call to attend to a literary work?”143 Yet the question seems answerable in the 
affirmative easily enough, especially given, as she later points out, that “as a culture and 
as a profession […] we are daily embracing the decision not to read” any number of 
works.144 
Ironically, of course, Hungerford’s concerns about abundance, refusal, 
overproduction, and uncertainty, “problem[s] for every person on earth who has an 
internet connection,” are the very same problems that Wallace explores in The Pale 
King.145 She points to Wallace’s commencement address as evidence that he understands 
the power of choosing what to think about, but also seems to fault him (or, rather, the 
cultural processes that perpetuate his canonisation) for not appreciating the broader 
forces at work in our decision-making, for not questioning the possibility of such 
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autonomy in the first place. Yet as I have shown in this chapter, The Pale King works to 
nuance such a view, in great depth and with reference to a number of contemporary 
constraints on agency. If Hungerford were to read The Pale King, she might even find 
herself connecting with Wallace’s depictions of reading – her essay likewise reminds us 
that “we do not read alone,” and that, “happily, readers will talk.”146 When we talk about 
our experiences of reading, we might even think of ourselves as participating in exactly 
the kind of recuperative discourse that Wallace’s final novel sought to explore. Whether 
we succeed or not is a matter of perspective. This is just my opinion.
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Conclusion: Modelling Citizens 
In an essay ruminating on the internet’s often contradictory effects on public life 
(“more public shamelessness yet more public shaming; a threat to privacy side by side 
with a growth in anonymous communication”), Benjamin Kunkel acknowledges the 
difficulty of trying to pin down the relationship between the internet and the public 
sphere.1 “The temptation,” he claims, “is to throw up your hands and just say that, 
thanks to the internet, the public sphere contains more of everything: more exposure, 
privacy, publicity, anonymity, truth, lies, opinion, information, pornography, culture, 
advertising – though probably not more art.”2 I am uncertain about the veracity of 
Kunkel’s final claim here, that the internet has not led to an increase in art’s circulation 
in the public sphere (for one thing, it is unclear what qualifies as ‘art’ in this context). 
But in this thesis, I have been less interested in this claim than in its inverse: the idea 
that, thanks to the internet, art contains more of the public sphere. While future 
research may be able to expand the scope of inquiry to include aesthetic forms other 
than novels, and stage a comparison of the public sphere’s treatment in artworks of 
different periods, in this thesis I have been able to show that a range of contemporary 
authors critically engage not only with how their work circulates in the public sphere, 
but also with the concept of the public sphere itself. 
The contemporary novels that I have surveyed can be broadly grouped as 
responses to the internet’s effects on public life, but they identify diverse (sometimes 
even conflicting) pressures on the public sphere, and their suggested solutions vary 
accordingly. A central part of this thesis’s original contribution to literary studies, then, 
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has been its identification of one key locus of the relationship between the internet and 
contemporary fiction. The authors whose work I have addressed find an entry point 
for critical consideration of the internet in the concept of the public sphere – for them, 
it provides a stable node in the technology’s nebulous network of effects on 
contemporary life. By detailing this shared interest, I have demonstrated that there are 
trends in how Anglophone authors write about the internet that extend beyond 
description and analysis of the use of technology itself – these writers are also 
interested in the internet’s complex effects on social structures and modes of political 
engagement. Yet as I have noted, if an interest in the internet’s effects on the public 
sphere unites these authors, their perspectives on those effects are by no means unitary. 
Each chapter of this dissertation has presented a different answer to the same question: 
how might literature help to refigure a public sphere under threat? I have situated these 
responses at different points along a continuum of discursive agency, from a view of 
the public sphere in which writers maintain authoritative sway over publics at one end, 
to a model in which the agency of readers is paramount at the other.  
I have showed how Jonathan Franzen locates the public sphere’s primary 
problem in the transformation of journalism – with fewer and fewer universally trusted 
voices and sources in the public sphere, he suggests, citizens are faced with a crisis of 
authority. His solution is to reaffirm the authority of the author figure, but his appeals 
to his own personal authority falter alongside his simultaneous critique of celebrity 
authorship. For Dave Eggers, the internet’s most significant threat to the public sphere 
lies in how the platforms that internet users most commonly engage with are rewriting 
the norms of public discussion. Because of this, his model of writerly authority rests 
on an author’s association with ethical institutions, which can underwrite their 
interventions in the public sphere. For Zadie Smith, however, focussing on the 
208 
 
authority of writers creates an unhelpful hierarchy, and blaming institutions for 
refiguring the public sphere leaves too much room to dismiss the agency of individuals. 
The public sphere, in Smith’s view, must take seriously the concept of power – her 
response is to reaffirm the importance of discursive parity between writers and readers. 
David Foster Wallace concludes this spectrum of discursive agency. While he 
highlights a similar problem to Franzen, namely the public sphere’s saturation with 
information of questionable reliability and importance, the authors’ solutions sit at 
opposite ends of this continuum – for Wallace, the internet’s abundance of information 
produces a discursive environment in which reading processes must take centre stage.  
By articulating their responses to the contemporary public sphere’s problems 
through literary forms, styles, voices, processes, and ideas, these authors all model 
modes of being in public that emerge from, or are inextricably linked to, literature. I 
have referred to these modes as different forms of literary publicness. Bringing the 
concepts of literature and the public sphere into dialogue is by no means without 
precedent – as I have shown, there is a rich history of criticism detailing the 
relationship between the two categories. But despite this wealth of academic inquiry, 
as I also mentioned in my introduction, the role of literature and culture has remained 
a “lacuna in the theory of the public sphere.”3 By naming and outlining four models of 
literary publicness, I have helped to fill this gap – I have detailed an important role that 
literature plays in the public sphere (namely the modelling of discursive norms, ideals, 
practices, and values), and clarified how novels circulate in the political public sphere 
both as argumentative contributions, and as objects of discursive consideration.  
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In my examination of the strategies that these authors use to model modes of 
literary publicness, I have tried to situate literary form (and readers’ experiences of it) 
as central to our understanding of the public sphere’s relationship with literature, 
following from Rita Felski’s belief that “any ‘textual politics’ worth its weight will 
have to work its way through the particularities of aesthetic experience rather than 
bypassing them.”4 Indeed, the authors that I have addressed all broadcast a similar 
belief, and foreground how the particular formal affordances of literature can help to 
model ideal behaviours for democratic citizens. To identify these behaviours, however 
– be they association with ethical institutions or acceptance of agonistic debate as 
democratically productive – we must read these authors’ texts critically. Indeed, my 
notion of literary publicness relies upon a particular mode of academic engagement 
with texts – the features that I have highlighted emerge from close reading, and the 
reconstruction of rich intellectual, cultural, and sociological contexts. Yet as Felski 
points out, this is not the only way in which we read. In her Uses of Literature, Felski 
calls on scholars to “engage seriously with ordinary motives for reading – such as the 
desire for knowledge or the longing for escape – that are either overlooked or 
undervalued in literary scholarship.”5 Future research might well be able to nuance the 
notion of literary publicness by attending more fully to how “the use of the term 
‘reading’ in literary studies [can] encompass quite disparate activities.”6 Indeed, doing 
so would also help to expand critical theory’s conception of the public sphere itself – 
as Michael Warner has noted, “activities of reading that do not fit the ideology of 
reading as silent, private, replicable decoding – curling up, mumbling, fantasizing, 
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gesticulating, ventriloquizing, writing marginalia, and so on – […] find no counterparts 
in public agency.”7  
What would literary publicness look like if it were to make room for such 
diverse modes of reading? Although it has not been possible to answer this question in 
this thesis, I have been able to introduce the concept of literary publicness and lay the 
groundwork for future interventions of this kind. Indeed, it is my hope that the question 
of literature’s role in the public sphere will be taken up further and more frequently in 
literary studies. If the (admittedly small) public that this thesis addresses have been 
convinced of anything, I hope it is of the importance of the public as a category and 
idea – both to democracy and to literature. A functional public sphere underwrites 
democratic action, and substantive public discourse faces myriad existential threats in 
the internet age. As William Davies notes, “unless […] institutions can rediscover 
aspects of the original liberal impulse” that gave rise to the idea and ideal of the public 
sphere (“to keep different domains of power separate, and put the disinterested pursuit 
of knowledge before the pursuit of profit”) then “no quantity of facts will be sufficient 
to resist” the decline of the public.8 The novels that I have read in this thesis, however, 
do attempt to provide one form of such resistance, recognising their implication in this 
struggle – after all, “one thing that [the] diverse professions and authorities [most 
present in the public sphere] have in common is that they trade primarily in words and 
symbols.”9 If “the infrastructure of fact has been undermined in part by a combination 
of technology and market forces,” then perhaps it is no wonder that fiction writers are 
increasingly looking to the infrastructure of their own forms to provide an alternative.10 
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Further to their modelling of particular modes of literary publicness, these novels ask 
us to be mindful of how our own use of words and symbols will contribute to, or detract 
from, public life. Franzen, Eggers, Smith, and Wallace remind us in their work that we 
cannot avoid the public sphere in the internet age – for readers and writers alike, it is 
a fundamental part of our political lives, and a concept that we should be discussing 
with each other as much as possible.
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